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-V-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
The scenario of development of the four  Central European countries (The Czech and 
Slovak  Republics,  Hungary  and  Poland)  presented in  this  report is  based on  realistic 
assumptions concerning the external and internal conditions for development. It indicates 
the most probable situation of these countries in  the year 2005.  Generally speaking,  it 
is  assumed  that  an  'average  coincidence'  of  all  factors  influencing  socio-economic 
development will  take place. There is  a possibility that certain factors  may occur more 
favourable  than assumed but then probably others may be less favourable. 
Four blocs of problems are examined: economic development, socio-political processes, 
development of science and education and technological advancement, regional differen-
tiation. 
Four Central European countries (called also  the 'Vise  grad Group') occupy an area of 
533,600  sq km and have the population of 64.2  million,  thus being a great population 
and economic potential on the European scale. Until 2005  the number of population will 
grow by 2.3 million, out of which almost 2 million will be located in Poland only. Hungary 
will  lose  population  (decrement  of almost  90  thousand).  The  inhabitants  of Central 
Europe will  become older. In three countries: Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland 
the after-working age group will grow by 8-12% (the slowest growth in Poland, the fastest 
in the Czech Republic) and only in Hungary this age group will  decrease in number by 
over 15%. In Poland and Slovakia the population in the working age will grow by some 
10%, thus creating additional tension to the unbalanced labour market. 
International setting for the Central European countries 
The external factors represent an important constraint for the development of the Cen-
tral European Countries until 2005. The Central European countries - as countries with 
a relatively small economic potential - will have to assume more passive than active role 
in shaping their economic and political relations with the outside world. 
Prolonged  recession  and  increasing  trends  of protection  in  international  trade  might 
make the situation of Central European countries more difficult.  The trade restrictions 
practised by the EU give grounds to suppose that some EU countries are in fact opposed 
to a full  integration of Central and Eastern European countries since they are afraid of 
their competition in the particularly sensitive segments of the market. 
However, the scenario presented herein assumes that Central European countries will 
become members of the Union before the year 2005.  But it should be made clear that 
the fulfilment of this assumption is not only dependent on the Visegrad group. The rela-
tions with the immediate neighbours of the four Central European countries should be 
considered as an important factor of their future development. In general. these relations 
are good, though some tensions might emerge in the future. The stability of political and 
economic situation in  the post-soviet republics,  and in  Russia in  particular, will  be no 
doubt of crucial impoprtance for the Central European countries. 
Mutual relations of the four Central European countries are good, except for some ten-
sion  between  Hungary  and  Slovakia  (due  to  the  dispute  over  ecological  and frontier 
problems). The tightening of mutual cooperation gives each country better chances of its 
integration with the European Union and closer cooperation with NATO. 
-VII-Economic development 
The  economic  scenario was  based  on  a  formalised  model.  The  basic  features  of this 
scenario are presented in the table on the next page. 
The economic scenarios for all Central European countries, are strongly growth-oriented. 
Investment effort and replacement of old and obsolete fixed assets of low technical level 
by  new  equipment are  the basic  assumptions  of the scenarios.  The possibility  of high 
growth rates in the long run without an  appropriate level of investment were rejected. 
A high  efficiency of the investment process seems to be indispensable if the program is 
to be feasible. 
The scenarios assume slower growth of consumption than of the GDP. Fixed capital for-
mation will  note the highest rates of growth.  Public consumption is  assumed to grow in 
a slower pace. 
The Czech Republic will demonstrate the slowest, but the most balanced path of growth. 
The budget deficit will be the lowest there (2.5% of GDP), as well as inflation rate (6.0) 
and the burden of foreign debt. Hungary, and especially Poland, will  demonstrate more 
rapid, but also more unbalanced pattern of growth. 
Economic development, 1992-2005 
Czech  Slovak 
categories  Republic  Hungary  Poland  Republic 
GOP/inhabitant, 2005 
(PPP, USD of 1992)  9463  8809  8510  8505 
2005/1992 GDP rate of growth, 
yearly average  2.5  3.4  4.5  4.1 
2005/1992 personal consumption 
rate of growth, yearly average  2.4  3.0  4.4  3.7 
2005/1992 capital formation rate of 
growth, yearly average  3.2  6.5  8.7  4.0 
share of gross capital formation in 
GDP, 2005  31.7  9.8  32.2  27.6 
net foreign investment as% of gross 
capital formation, 2005  6.4  9.0  9.3  13.3 
share of: 
- manufacturing  25.6  22.5  27.5  24.2 
- agriculture &  forestry  5.4  10.5  18.2  8.0 
- services  62.5  59.0  47.8  59.0 
in  total employment, 2005 
% share of private sector in GDP, 
2005  86.0  - 87.0  80.0 
inflation rate, 2005  6.0  7.5  6.8  8.0 
net foreign debt as: 
-%  ofGDP  6.6  21.1  10.3  16.8 
- % of exports  32.2  57.7  77.0  60.0 
debt service as% of exports, 2005  3.0  5.2  6.9  5.1 
budget deficit as% of GDP, 2005  2.5  3.0  6.0  0.0 
unemployment rate, 2005  5.0  11.7  11.6  8.0 
Fast growth will necessarily lead to structural change, since it will not occur in all sectors 
of the Central European economies at the same pace.  In effect, the sectoral structures 
would resemble in  2005  present economic structure of the western, rural lands of Ger-
- VIII -many.  The primary sectors will  be the greatest losers and the share of agriculture  and 
forestry in the overall employment structure will fall below 5.5% in the Czech Republic, 
though in Poland this sector will  still keep much greater share of the total employment 
(18.4% ).  With  the  exception of Poland  - where  this  share will  be lower by  some  10 
points  - services are likely to accommodate 60% of total employment. 
The overall growth of the working population will  amount to over 2 million  during the 
period 1992-2005,  to reach 26.6 million in 2005.  Unemployment will  still become one of 
the most difficult problems of the three Central European economies and it appears that 
this problem would  not be solved  in  the scenario time-horizon,  even if a high  rate of 
growth is achieved. In Poland alone the number of unemployed will reach 2.4 million and 
the overall unemployment in the four countries will approach 3.5  million. In Poland and 
Hungary the unemployment rate will  exceed  11.5%  and only  in  the Czech  Republic it 
is  likely to remain on a more civilised level of 5%. 
A reduced access to the EU market may cause an important slowdown of the economic 
growth.  Favourable  economic  relations  with  other countries  appear to  be  of crucial 
importance for the assumed path of development. 
Socio-political developments 
Socio-political change is both the outcome of economic development and a condition for 
the  ambitious  growth  strategy.  Social  attitudes  toward  such  milestones  of economic 
reform  like  privatisation,  restructuring,  foreign  capital,  greater  self-responsibility  and 
entrepreneurship,  meritocratic  principles  of  award,  condition  the  acceptance  of  the 
economic strategy.  These attitudes are - to a large extent - also  shaped by the costs 
of economic  transformation,  such  as  unemployment,  polarisation  of incomes,  cuts  in 
social spendings of the state. These costs will be bore unevenly by different socio-profes-
sional  strata  (approximately  half  of  the  population  will  gain  along  with  economic 
changes), which will also lead to accelerated changes in social stratification and structure. 
The  following  table  summarises  the  envisaged  social  structures  in  Central  European 
countries in  2005  (in brackets: change in percentage points in comparison to 1992). 
Socio  .. economic social structures, 2005 
Country  Higher  "White  collar  Entrepreneurs  Blue collar  Farmers  professionals  employees  workers 
Czech Republic  10 ( +2)  32 (-2)  16  ( +8)  37  ( -6)  5 ( -2) 
Hungary  12 ( +4)  34  ( -4)  12  ( + 5)  32  ( -1)  10  ( -4) 
Poland  10 ( +4)  31  ( +4)  9 ( +2)  36  ( -4)  14  ( -6) 
Slovakia  12 ( +4)  32  ( -3)  13  ( +8)  38  ( -8)  5 ( -1) 
The  socio-economic transformation would  have  to  gain  support in  the general public. 
Social attitudes - nowadays predominantly egalitarian and supporting strong influence 
of the state -to such basic processes as privatisation, market economy and social differen-
tiation will  change. It is  envisaged that the majority of inhabitants of the four countries 
will support the general course of reforms and that a shift from the egalitarian-regulatory 
sentiments inherited mainly from the previous socio-political system will  be replaced by 
market-individualistic attitudes. 
The  political  scene  of  the  Visegrad  countries  needs  refurbishing  and  modernisation. 
Some  manifestations of these processes have  already taken place.  It may be envisaged 
that by the year 2005 in all countries few political parties will dominate the political stage, 
thus replacing still  instable political setting. The trade unions will  assume civilized and 
-IX-democratic forms  of social partnership and will  refrain from purely political actions (as 
now happens in Poland). The political elites will become much more professional and the 
'civil  service'  pattern  will  replace  currently  overpoliticised  mechanisms  of  public 
administration. 
In all Central European countries religion and church will be still important, though the 
number  of  people  professing  some  church  and  practicising  will  diminish.  Religion 
tolerance will  dominate.  Public  activity  of the church will  diminish.  Poland will  tradi-
tionally be the country with relatively the strongest role of the Catholic Church in public 
life,  though this  role will  be much smaller than nowadays. 
Along with  the process of European integration the pro-European attitudes in  all four 
countries will markedly grow.  This will be also reflected in their legal systems, which will 
become more adequate to the legal regulations of the European Union. 
Education, science and technology 
Sociological  analysis  proves  that  only  about  half  of central  European  societies  have 
achieved the educational level sufficient for assuming and active role in the transforma-
tion processes.  Rapid development of general education is  therefore one of the condi-
tions  for  success  of economic  reforms.  The process  of long-term  adaptation  of these 
countries to the realities of the European Union will be supported by strong pro-educa-
tional policies which would create 
favourable  conditions for  the full  transformation and rapid development of the system 
of education in these countries. 
This is  especially important in  the situation of dramatic decrease of outlays for science 
and R&D in all four countries brought by  the first stage of transformation, which have 
fallen below any rational level (within the range from 0.6% of GDP in Poland to 2% in 
the Czech Republic, 1992). These shares are to reach 3-4% of GDP in 2005, which would 
enable to restore the scientific potential. 
In the perspective of 2005  the science policy in each of the Central European countries 
will make a strategic choice between organic (i.e. equally supporting al basic disciplines) 
and polarised (selective) approaches. A rational philosophy in Central Europe will  sup-
port the polarised approaches. For example, in Hungary the following  set of disciplines 
is  regarded as  the most promising:  mathematics, physics  (semiconductors, certain areas 
of nuclear physics and cosmology); marketable research in pharmaceuticals, agribusiness 
and medical industry (from molecular biology to biotechnology). This is  a clear example 
of polarised model. 
The  technological  advancement  of the  Central  European  economies  conditions  their 
competitiveness on the world markets. Scientific development of the most promising dis-
ciplines  of science  should in  this way  support the  development of the  most effective, 
export-oriented branches of industry and services. In this light free access to technologies 
is a particularly important issue for the Central European countries. It is a precondition 
of  successful  transformation  and  a  fundamental  element  of a  long-term  economic 
growth. 
In the scenarios is  assumed the lion's share of the modern technological and organisa-
tional know-how will be supplied by imports (mainly from the countries of the European 
-X-Union).  No  results of the domestic R&D important from  the macroeconomic point of 
view may be expected before the year 2000. Problems of an effective use of the available 
labour factor, optimal choice of technology and reduction of unemployment will become 
crucial issues in the social and economic policy. Economic policy inducing a technological 
change  should  take  into  account  contradictory  effects  of  the  choice  of  the  type  of 
technology. 
On the one hand it is  extremely important that the countries follow  the mainstream of 
technological development. Imports of new technologies should allow the inflow of up-to-
date  technological  know-how,  leading  to  an  improvement  of  the  efficiency  of  the 
economy through the increasing productivity of labour and capital. Only under such con-
ditions the competitive position of the Central European countries may  be maintained 
or even improved. 
'Transfer sciences' play an essential role in  providing an interface between the world of 
'pure science'  and industry.  This  interface was  historically a weak link in  the  system of 
science  in  Central  Europe  - and  especially  in  Poland.  The  situation  in  this  field  in 
Bohemia and Hungary is much better at least in some dimensions. The transfer sciences 
will  have  strong priorities for growth in  the Central European countries. 
In  the  conditions  of limited  R&D  potential,  the  Central European countries  have  to 
search for their special market opportunities in only few  industries. The most promising 
chances are open to the highly  specialised products in  short series at high unit prices, 
where the competition of big corporations is not very sensible. This applies to some kinds 
of computer  equipment  of ASIC  type,  the  'semi'  or  'full-custom'  integrated  systems, 
robots for specific branches of industry, specialised chemistry products, mainly electronic 
chemicals.  The  above  products  are  counted  among  those  of the  highest  profitability 
('high value added products'), which would improve the economic structure of the whole 
Central European industry. 
The development of education in  the broad sense (going far beyond the school system 
alone)  is  an  underlying  assumption  for  raising  the  receptivity  of enterprises  to  new 
techniques and, by  the same, for  modernisation of economic and  social life.  Since  the 
technological retardation of Central Europe is the most sensible, in the sphere of techni-
cal  knowledge  and  innovative  attitudes,  development  of universities  - as  educational 
and scientific centres - should be of the highest priority. 
One may expect a radical increase in  the number of university students, to the level of 
some  200  students per 10,000 inhabitants. 
The  organisational  changes  will  allow  the  system  of education  in  Central  Europe  to 
prepare the consecutive  generations to live  and work in  the framework of highly com-
petitive European and global societies. In this effort the self reliance option will be the 
main choice. In this process the multidimensional system of permanent education defined 
as  a pattern of continuous renewal of knowledge  and ability of all  interested members 
of the labour force  and the society at large will grow in importance, at some expense of 
the conventional system of education, starting from  the kindergarten and concluding as 
the university.  In such  a way,  the education system  in  the Central European countries 
will  evolve  towards Western patterns of the education system. 
The regional dimension 
The polarisation effects, so visible  in recent changes of economic and social structures, 
also  manifest  themselves  in  Central European space.  The East-West division  becomes 
more and more visible  on the economic map of Central Europe. 
-XI-All  four  countries  have  their  unquestionable  leaders  of transformation,  which  have 
already  demonstrated  the  highest  potential  for  restructuring  and  great  capability  for 
adaptation to new conditions. The core of Central European transformation: 'the Central 
European boomerang' is  delimited  by  the following  centres:  Gdansk-Poznan-Wroclaw-
Prague-Bmo-BratislavaNienna-Budapest. Two  southern parts of this  'boomerang' have 
real chances to become the truly European centres: the region of Prague and the triangle 
composed of Vienna-Bratislava-Budapest. 
There are  two  major old industrial regions, Postbus : Upper Silesia and L6dz.  Upper 
Silesia will  be the region in sharp recession for the coming years. The scale of restruc-
turing problems of this region far exceeds the potential of the two interested countries: 
Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Central Europe has its very clearly marked periphery. It extends from the north-eastern 
corner of Poland to the south-eastern part of Hungary, with extension westwards to the 
eastern  part of the  Slovak-Hungarian  border.  These  areas  can  not  expect  to  receive 
inducement for transformation and recovery from their neighbours on the other side of 
the border (Lithuania, Byelorussia, Ukraine). 
The  regions which  are the European reservoirs of unspoiled environment (North-East 
Poland and the entire border region of Poland and Slovakia)  do create very promising 
chances for  becoming the basins for  tourist services  and recreation on the continental 
scale.  The shore of the Baltic Sea might also have chances for  attracting tourists. 
* * * 
Research conducted within the project 'East-Central Europe 2000'  seems to have three 
important features.  Firstly, it  dealt with  the strategic choices which face  the four coun-
tries. Secondly, it touched upon all major dimensions: economy, socio-political develop-
ments, education, science and technology - all  supplemented by a regional perspective. 
Finally, it adopted a common, comparative framework. The above three features created 
good  chances for  final  success  of research and made this  project a unique intellectual 
adventure - adventure which could and should have substantial impact on policies for-
mulated in  these countries and also  in  major international organisations. 
-XII-INTRODUCTION 
In order to pass through the process of accelerated and all-embracing change one should 
have  a possibly precise outlook into the future.  This  outlook should also  be flavoured 
with some optimism, since a certain dose of optimism is even necessary for mobilisation 
and courage, so  much needed now in this part of the world under transition. 
Such an outlook is being now provided in the Final Report of the international research 
project 'EASTERN AND  CENTRAL  EUROPE 2000',  financed  by  the  DG XII of the 
Commission of the European Union, managed by  the Institute for Human Sciences in 
Vienna  (IHS)  and  coordinated  by  the  European  Institute  for  Regional  and  Local 
Development of the University of Warsaw  (EUROREG). The project is  a part of the 
wider programme  conducted by  the  IHS,  called  'Transformation  of Higher Education 
Systems in  Central and Eastern Europe'. 
It was originally assumed that the studies would be devoted to the entire European post-
communist bloc. By the decision of the Commission the scope of the project was limited 
to  the  four  Central European countries  - the  so-called  'Visegrad  group':  the  Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The year 2005 was adopted as the time-horizon 
for the prospective outlook into the transformation processes in  these four countries. 
Four multidisciplinary  national  teams  since  mid-1992  have  conducted  comprehensive 
research on the following  topics: 
1.  The  'methodology' of transition. 
2.  The  external conditions and international setting. 
3.  Economic development. 
4.  Socio-political sphere. 
5.  Education,  science and technology. 
6.  The regional and environmental dimension. 
The studies were based on thorough examination of the existing base for transformation 
(a kind of a 'photography' of the starting point of 1989)  and the dynamics of changes 
which occurred during the first three years after the collapse of the communist system 
(using the same metaphor - a short 'film' covering 1989-1992/93). Several assumptions 
were made, and the full membership of the Central European countries in the European 
Union  by  the  year  2005  was  one  of the  most  important  of them.  Moreover,  it  was 
assumed that the global  recession will  be overcome within next few  years and that no 
major conflict will  emerge in the Eastern part of the continent. 
These two premises - identification of the base for transformation and assumptions on 
external conditions for it - have led to formulation of the most probable developments 
in the four countries during the next 10-15 years. 
The programme has been implemented within  18  months  - from  September 1992  to 
January 1994.  In this period of time an international team was composed, management, 
coordination  and  communication  procedures  established,  research  performed  in  four 
countries - as well as few general studies done outside them, two interim reports written 
and discussed during three seminars and this final  report prepared. 
The were no attempts to enforce one theoretical approach and one system of values for 
all  studies undertaken, through some  methodological rigidity  had to be interoduced in 
order to accomplish comparability of date. In this way the coordination was  - perhaps 
- a bit less  efficient, but the programme participants received great freedom  in  their 
research, within the boundaries commonly accepted by the entire team. 
-1-The critical reader of this report will presumably notice all tis shortcomings and deficien-
cies.  However,  its  holistic  and comparative approach should not be disregarded.  More 
synthetic conclusions on these aspects of our work are provided in the final  chapter of 
the report. 
This  report was  'physically'  written  by  the  small  team  indicated  on  its  covering  page. 
However, in fact,  this report should be considered as  a final  result of a collective work, 
as  a top of a big pyramid to which several eminent scholars from all four countries con-
tributed.  Each national  team,  within  common  methodological  framework,  provided  its 
own outlook into the future of its country. The whole work would be also unmanageable 
without the coordination effort of the national coordinators. The Annex provides a full 
register of all papers and background studies prepared. In this place let us only present 
the composition of the coordinating team of the project: 
General Coordination (F4):  Prof.  Grzegorz Gorzelak, EUROREG, Warsaxa. 
Superving Coordination:  Prof. Antoni Kuklinski,  EUROREG, Warszawa. 
National Coordination:  The Czech Republic:  Dr. Michal Illner, Czech Academy of 
Sciences, Prague. 
Hungary:  Prof.  Eva  Ehrlich,  Dr.  Peter Tamasi,  Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, Budapest. 
Poland: Prof. Bohdan Jalowiecki,  EUROREG, Warszwa. 
Slovakia:  Dr. Lubomir Faltan, Slovak Academy of Sciences, 
Bratislava. 
The Annex lists  also  all  tables and figures  presented in  the report. 
-2-Chapter 1. 
INTERNATIONAL  SETTING  OF THE 
CENTRAL EUROPEAN  COUNTRIES 
Four Central European countries (called also  the 'Visegrad Group') occupy an  area of 
533,600 sq km and have the population of 64.2 million, thus being a great population and 
economic potential on the European scale. 
In the  north  they  are  bounded  by  the  Baltic  Sea,  Russia  (Kaliningrad  enclave)  and 
Lithuania.  In the  east their neighbours  are Byelorussia,  Ukraine and Rumania;  in  the 
south  - Croatia, and in the west Austria and Germany. 
1.1.  General  problems 
The external factors represent an important constraint for the development of the Cen-
tral European Countries until 2005. It is  due to several reasons, the trade exchange and 
the inflow of foreign capital being the most important economic ones. The mutual inter-
play of economic and political conditions make the problem of the external factors even 
more complex. Moreover, Poland as a country with a relatively small economic potential 
will have to assume more passive than active role in shaping her economic and political 
relations with the outside world. 
The situation in  the years  1993-1995  will  be determined by  a general situation in  the 
world  economy.  The  recession which  is  experienced  by  the  most  developed  countries 
leads to the increasing trends of protection of their markets in order to maintain employ-
ment threatened in the particular countries and economic blocs (EU, EFTA, NAFTA). 
Despite declarations  supporting 'free trade', the members  of the  European Union,  as 
well as the United States, in a more or less camouflaged manner, are undertaking various 
protectionist  measures.  This  limits  the  possibilities  of the  trade  exchange  of Central 
European countries with  the highly  developed countries. The world  recession is  also  a 
constraint for the level of foreign investment in  Central European countries. 
Since forecasts for the world economy are not too advantageous at present, the situation 
is  not likely to improve in the coming years. 
1.2.  Integration with the European Union 
Despite  numerous  declarations  of support  for  Central  European  countries  in  their 
attempts  at  integration  which  the  European  Union  (EU),  the  hitherto  practice  has 
proved to be different. Especially, the trade restrictions practised by the EU give grounds 
to suppose that some EU countries are in fact  opposed to a full  integration of Central 
and Eastern European countries since  they are afraid  of their competition in  the par-
ticularly  sensitive  segments of the  market:  agricultural  and food  products,  textiles  and 
steel products. Poland's situation is specially disadvantageous because it has the greatest 
export potentialities just in these sectors of production. 
The process of integration of the Central European countries with the European Union 
may  also be subject to constraints stemming from  the slowdown of the integration pro-
cess within the Union itself. The treaty of Maastricht is incomplete and does not envisage 
a  full  integration  as  previously  planned. It also  provides  that there will  be numerous 
exceptions  and  concessions,  in  the  first  place  to  Great Britain  and  Denmark, which, 
however,  may  be extended to  include  all  countries. The common  currency system  has 
collapsed, though perhaps only temporarily. Besides, the forthcoming enlargement of the 
-3-community by admitting new members (Austria, Sweden and Norway) may delay the next 
step towards broader integration. 
However,  the scenario presented herein assumes that Central European countries will 
become members of the Union before the year 2005.  But it should be made clear that 
the fulfilment of this assumption is  not only dependent on the Visegrad group. 
A separate problem is the integration of Central European countries with NATO, which 
aspire to become members of the Atlantic Pact since it is an important guarantee of their 
security. The stance of Western European countries is ambiguous. Before the dissolution 
of the Russian parliament and the overtaking - with the aid of the army - of the entire 
power in this country by Boris Yeltsin, some representatives of NATO member countries 
(especially  Germany)  made  declarations  encouraging  the  admittance  of the  Visegrad 
group to this organisation. After the developments in Moscow in October 1993, the West 
changed its standpoint considerably. Western countries not only ceased to make promis-
ing declarations but - on the contrary - stated clearly that Central European countries 
may not expect to become members of NATO in the foreseeable future. Instead, Central 
European  countries were  offered  bilateral cooperation  agreements  with  NATO.  This 
change of attitude was certainly due to the fact that the West did not want to provoke 
Russia in which military circles are definitely opposed to the enlargement of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. 
1.3.  The neighbours 
Germany. This is  the western neighbour of the Czech Republic and of Poland, which, 
irrespective of the European Union,  has traditionally focused  its  interest on Poland's 
western and northern territories (Gdansk, former East Prussia) as well as on the Czech 
Sudetian  mountains.  The  north-western  territory  of Poland  is  a  direct  hinterland  for 
Berlin, situated 70 km from the state frontier.  Germany's interest is  historical and sym-
bolical,  since  today's  Polish  western  and  northern territories  had formed  part of the 
Prussian State for centuries, and later on of the German Reich. The Sudetian mountains 
were inhabited prior to the Second World War by a sizable German minority, which was 
subsequently displaced from this land. A large number of Germans come from the Polish 
and Czech western territories, and some of them have never renounced them. Without 
overestimating the tendency to revision of frontiers (by peaceful means, of course) it can-
not be excluded that at some time retaliatory moods may appear, which will  influence 
the  policy of the  German government  regardless  of its  goodwill.  This becomes more 
likely in view of the growing nationalism and neo-nazism in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. 
Germany's  interest  in  the Czech  Republic  and Poland is  also  of economic character, 
because Poland,  and especially her western territories are a  direct base of supplies of 
eastern lands of the FRG. After the completion of integration of the former GDR with 
West  German economy,  which  is  likely  to happen in  ten years,  the scale  of German 
investment in  Poland  and  in  the  Czech  Republic will  probably  increase  considerably, 
which may stimulate the economies of these countries. It is not unlikely that the process 
of bringing closer Poland and the Czech Republic to the European Union will be done 
through preliminary integration with the German economy. 
An important aspect of the Polish-German relations is  the so-called 'German minority' 
concentrated in two southern voivodships: Opole and Katowice. Actually, what is at stake 
is not so much the German minority in the strict sense of the word, because the number 
of native Germans in Poland does not exceed several thousand, as  the indigenous pop-
ulation inhabiting this region for centuries. Due to long-lasting and complex social, politi-
cal and economic processes, its national identity is not sure - once it is Polish and some 
other time it is  German. At present, the majority of this ethnic group, no doubt having 
-4-Slav roots, declares itself a German minority, demanding special status, schools with Ger-
man as  a language of instruction, as well as bilingual names of the localities and streets. 
Worthy of mention are  also various conceptions regarding the establishment of 'Great 
Silesia', autonomous in relation to Poland and the Czech Republic and confederated with 
Germany. 
This situation may give rise to a conflict, which may begin at any time and be used both 
by German and Polish nationalists. On the other hand, the presence of this ethnic group 
may be advantageous for the region by channelling German assistance and capital outlays 
in  this area. 
The  Czech  Republic faces  serious  problems with  the  Sudeten Germans who  demand 
restitution  of the  nationalised  property  and  the  possibility  of return  to  their  former 
territories. 
Relationships between Germany and Czech  Republic,  not always  easy in the past, will 
among the most important external factor influencing perspectives of integration of the 
Czech  Republic  into  the  West  European structures.  Implied  is  the  still  not-forgotten 
heritage of World War II. The «German Question» and the World War II repercussion 
still are a tangible issue in the Czech Republic which can be easily misused as political 
ammunition by both the left and the right extremist. 
Austria. It borders directly on Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, but its indirect 
influences also  reach Poland, at least the land of the former Galicia which  - prior to 
the First World  War  - was  part of the monarchy of Austro-Hungarian.  The  role  of 
Austria in Central Europe is  of special character, stemming mainly from the affiliation 
of the present-day Visegrad Group to the Habsburgian monarchy. 
Austrian influences find expression here and there in the present-day myth of being part 
of the so-called 'Mittel  europa', whose significance is  rather historical and psychological 
than factual. 
It is  specially in  Hungary that we  can observe the continuously strong presence of dif-
ferent 'Mitteleuropa' concepts among intellectuals and ideological leaders. The suppor-
ters of different forms of 'Central European' or 'Danube Valley' integration are still very 
visible  in  this country. 
In the real sphere, a close geographical neighbourhood of the three large urban centres, 
i.e.  Budapest,  Vienna  and  Bratislava,  creates  possibilities  of the  emergence  of close 
economic  and  cultural  ties  in  this  triangle.  The  new  geopolitical  situation  in  Central 
Europe creates chances not only for Hungary and Slovakia but also for Austria, whose 
capital  city  - Vienna  - was  deprived  of a  large  hinterland  after  the  fall  of the 
Habsburgian monarchy in 1918. At present, under utterly new circumstances and on new 
principles  there is  a  chance for the rise  of a  new  European development  pole  in the 
«Danube triangle». 
The Baltic countries. The cooperation of the Baltic countries has not taken a concrete 
shape so far,  not to mention the agreements on protection of the Baltic sea and the fish-
ing quotas. The exchange between the Visegrad Group and the Scandinavian countries 
and  Baltic  Republics  is  comparatively low.  Besides,  these countries cannot expect  e.g. 
Swedish investment, even though Sweden has more investment abroad than in its own 
territory. 
The Scandinavian countries, despite their powerful economic potential, have also  been 
experiencing economic difficulties  and  are  not interested in  closer cooperation either 
with  their  nearest  neighbour,  i.e.  Poland,  and  even  less  with  more  distant  Central 
European  countries.  The  Baltic  republics  are  too  weak  to  be  partners  for  Central 
-5-Europe. As regards Poland, its old conflicts with Lithuania may destabilise the situation 
in  the region,  the more so  as  the increasing nationalist tendencies may be observed on 
both sides.  · 
The Czechs may  also be interested in closer Baltic cooperation because Szczecin is  the 
nearest sea port for them. 
Russia. The relations between Central Europe and Russia are encumbered with unequal 
rights under the so-called 'socialist camp', which was shaped after 1945 as a result of the 
Yalta Treaty.  Among specially dramatic moments in  this period were the ruthless sup-
pression  of  the  Hungarian  uprising  of  1956  by  the  red  army,  and  occupation  of 
Czechoslovakia  by  the  Soviet  troops  in  1968.  The  Polish-Russian  relations  are  addi-
tionally affected by  a more distant past. But history is  unlikely to determine the future. 
Despite some reluctance, there is also tradition of economic cooperation and cultural ties 
between Central European countries and Russia. 
Despite a considerable fall of the trade turnover with Russia, it still remains an important 
trade partner for the Visegrad Group, and first and foremost a supplier of such strategic 
raw  materials as  oil and gas.  The collapse of Russian economy, which  is  much deeper 
than  in  Central  European  countries,  caused  a  decrease  of imports  from  the  former 
CMEA countries. The fall  of the empire also led to  declining orders for the weapons, 
which was  exported to the former Soviet Union by Czechoslovakia and Poland in par-
ticular. The absence of the market infrastructure, galloping inflation, as well as  political 
and social destabilisation, are also barriers to business relations with Russia. These may 
certainly be transitional difficulties, but it is  hard to say how long they will last and what 
will be the result.  · 
Various scenarios are possible assuming that the comeback to a doctrinal communism is 
unlikely to happen. 
1.  The scenario of dictatorship based on the army and a  military and industrial com-
plex. It would mean stabilisation of political situation, making a certain order in the 
economy  according  to  the etatist model,  coupled with  a  certain  margin  of private 
initiative,  as well  as  an attempt at restoration of the lost imperial status, first within 
the frontiers  of 1939.  The society will  be mobilised  to back up the achievement of 
these  purposes  by  arousing  the nationalist  atmosphere  of the great power.  On the 
world scale,  this solution will  cause the increase of tension between Russia and the 
United States and Western Europe. 
2.  The  democratic  scenario  based on  the  election  mechanism  coupled  with  a  strong 
semi-authoritarian presidential government (the Yeltsin model). In this scenario there 
will  be a progress in building up the market infrastructure, slow  privatisation of the 
state-owned sector, as well as attempts to establish the mutual relations with countries 
forming part of the 'Commonwealth of Independent Nations'. Democratisation pro-
cess,  especially  the  construction  of  the  market-based  economy  will  be  slow  but 
possibilities  of exports  to  the  Russian  market  will  be  gradually  expanded.  If this 
scenario of a profound restructuring of the Russian society and economy is  realised, 
Russia's interests will focus  on its domestic affairs for several decades to come. 
3.  The scenario of prolonged chaos, under the conditions of ruthless struggle for power 
of the various political forces,  is  most dangerous since it is  not certain who will come 
to  control  the  codes  for  launching  nuclear  weapons.  This  scenario  may  lead  to  a 
progressing economic fall,  as well as social protests and unrest, which will finally cause 
that power will  be taken by  those  political  forces  which  promise  to  restore  order. 
Obviously this leads to realisation of scenario one, but in the worse economic situation 
than  it  is  today.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  new  authorities  by  pursuing 
-6-provocative policy,  may  seek - in the eyes of their society  - spectacular successes 
in the international arena. 
The developments in Moscow in October, 1993, did not make the situation clear and the 
two  first  variants  are  still  feasible,  but the  probability  of· the  'scenario  of chaos'  has 
decreased. The further developments depend on consolidation of quite weak democratic 
forces,  results  of the  elections  and the stance of the  army,  upon whose  approval  the 
possibility of realisation of the democratic scenario depends. The West seems to support 
the success of this variant by lending a univocal support to Yeltsin. Certainly, for Europe 
and for  the World  the democratic scenario  is  the most  advantageous  one,  though the 
probability of its realisation should be estimated with great caution. 
Byelorussia. The political image of Byelorussia has not been shaped well so far. Lack of 
tradition  of its  own  statehood,  close  relations  with  Russia  - not only  economic  and 
military,  but also  cultural  and  psychological  - cause  that  the  country will  be in  the 
foreseeable  future  strongly  dependent  on  Russia  and  it  may  pursue  only  apparently 
sovereign  policy.  Domestic  situation  in  Byelorussia  will  undoubtedly  be  shaped  by 
Russia's situation, and the independence of Byelorussia may only be accomplished in the 
event of realisation of the democratic scenario. 
Polish-Byelorussian relations are quite correct, and the Byelorussian minority in Poland 
and Polish in Byelorussia do not pose any problem. 
Byelorussia  is  a  poor country without  raw  materials,  having  limited  economic  poten-
tialities and it is  not among Poland's major economic partners. 
Ukraine. The situation is different in the case of Ukraine bordering on Poland, Slovakia 
and Hungary.  Ukraine is  almost  as  large  as  all  the Central European countries and it 
continues  to  be  a  'nuclear  power'.  Like  the  Polish-Russian  relations,  the  relations 
between  Poland  and  Ukraine  also  had  negative  patterns  in  the  past.  The  relations 
between  Ukraine  and  Poland,  Slovakia  and  Hungary  are  quite  good,  although  the 
Ukrainian  nationalists  sometimes  raise  claims  to  make  a  correction  of the  frontiers. 
However, they do not seem likely to affect the inter-state relations. 
Ukraine  will  probably  be  less  susceptible  than  Byelorussia  to  Russia's  integration 
measures,  though its  economic dependence on Russian  raw  materials supplies  and on 
this market will not allow Ukraine to carry out entirely sovereign policy.  Like in Russia, 
economic situation in  this country is  bad, and the political one uncertain. 
In the event of realisation of the democratic scenario in Russia, Ukraine's independence 
will  strengthen. But should the first scenario materialise, it would be come doubtful. 
This  survey  of the  relations  between  Central  European  countries  and  their  eastern 
neighbours leads to the conclusion that these relations are extremely uncertain. In view 
of the  complex  character  of these  relations,  foreign  policies  of Hungary,  the  Czech 
Republic, Poland and Slovakia need much attention and flexibility.  It seems that these 
countries should  also  conduct consultations  all  the time  on this  issue  and elaborate a 
common standpoint.  Uncertain political  existence  of Byelorussia and Ukraine as  inde-
pendent states should, no doubt, make Central European countries focus their attention 
on Russia. The situation is  certainly very delicate because they should be careful not to 
worsen the relations with their nearest neighbours, since such deterioration might cause 
much damage, especially to the interests of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, which directly 
border on Ukraine, and Poland additionally on Byelorussia. 
The prospects for economic cooperation and exports of the Visegrad Group to eastern 
markets will  gradually improve unless  the scenario of the prolonged chaos  is  realised. 
Central Europe is  also a 'bridge' between Western Europe and Russia as well as  a vast 
-7-part  of the  Asian  continent.  This  geographical  situation  creates  chances  for  Central 
European countries to draw economic profits from transit movement provided that they 
rebuild and modernise the railway and road network. 
Rumania.  In  connection  with  a  very  unstable  situation  in  the  area  of  the  former 
Yugoslavia,  the importance of Rumania as  a transit country to Turkey and Greece may 
be likely to increase. But the main barrier is the small traffic capacity and quality of exist-
ing  road  connections  and  frontier  crossing  points,  especially  between  Rumania  and 
Bulgaria.  Rumania has  also water connection (the Danube) for  Hungary and Slovakia 
with  the  Black  Sea.  This  might  result  in  the  need  for  closer  cooperation,  between 
Hungary and Rumania in particular. 
However,  this may be impeded by  a long-standing conflict over Transylvania which was 
taken from  Hungary and granted to  Rumania by  the Treaty of Versailles.  In this  area 
there  also  lives  a  numerous  native  Hungarian  minority,  which  during  the  communist 
regime was  discriminated. At present, too, the situation of this minority leaves much to 
be  desired.  All  this  causes  that Hungaro-Romanian  relations  are  rather tense,  which 
adversely affects possibilities for cooperation between the two  countries. 
Croatia,  Serbia,  Slovenia. On the southern border of the Visegrad group the situation 
is strained and complicated. Disintegration of Yugoslavia and ethnic fighting, particularly 
in  Voivodina,  threaten Hungary, the more so  as  quite a numerous Hungarian minority 
inhabits the area. The Croatian problem is far from being solved, and the military conflict 
between the Croats and Serbs, backed up by Belgrade, is likely to destabilise the situation 
in the areas adjacent to the Hungarian border for a long time to come. Under the perma-
nent conflict the economic cooperation with southern neighbours of the Visegrad group 
will  face  great difficulties, deepened further by the UN embargo on trade with Serbia. 
The native Hungarian minorities in many countries of Eastern and Central Europe are 
a major concern, and will remain in the future -maybe in modified forms - an impor-
tant element of the official Hungarian foreign policies. This minority is also a major fac-
tor in the Balkan policy of Hungary, e.g. towards Serbia. For example, one-sided support 
of Croatia could endanger the North-Serbian Hungarian minority as  a Fifth Column of 
the enemy. 
The  Adriatic  Sea  region  is  of great  importance  for  such  countries  as  Slovakia  and 
Hungary, since the access to the Adriatic ports permits an opening to the Mediterranean 
countries. Slovakia has lately signed an agreement with Slovenia upon the access to one 
of its ports. 
1.4.  Intra-regional relations of the Visegrad Group 
The Central European countries have similar history;  they were not independent states 
for a longer or shorter period, they are also connected by cultural ties and share a com-
mon  past in  the so-called  'socialist camp'. It is  therefore natural that they established 
economic and political cooperation regulated by the treaty signed at Visegrad. However, 
the prospects for close cooperation in this  quadrangle are less  promising than it might 
stem from  the initial declarations. 
Firstly, these countries have very unequal economic potentials. The Czech Republic and 
Hungary  are  economically  somewhat  stronger  as  compared  to  Poland  and  Slovakia. 
Poland,  on  the  other  hand,  is  larger  than  all  the  remaining  three  countries  taken 
together. This may cause that smaller countries will  be afraid of the domination of the 
largest partner. 
Secondly, there is  a widespread belief, especially of the Czechs and Hungarians that the 
economic links should first  and foremost be tightened with the West, which is  regarded 
-8-as  a priority by  the leaders of these  countries.  This  conviction  may  lead  - and  such 
examples have already been observed- to emergence of direct competition among Cen-
tral  European  countries  over  political  contacts  with  the  European  Union;  it  is  not 
unlikely that this competition may slow down the integration with the Union of all four 
countries as  a group and of each individual country. 
Thirdly,  the structure of Central European economies is  similar, which  is  the result of 
labour division in the former CMEA and of the imperial interests of the former USSR, 
that did not let the economies of the satellite states be too complementary towards one 
another. 
Generally,  the  intra-regional  relations  are  good,  except  for  some  tension  between 
Hungary and Slovakia. There is a dispute over ecological and frontier problems and over 
a continuation, if any, of the construction of the water dam on the Danube at Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros, as well as over the problem of indemnity, should the construction be discon-
tinued. The issue is  currently dealt with by  the International Court of Justice in Hague. 
There  is  also  some  tension  over  the  situation  of a  numerous  Hungarian  minority  in 
Slovakia. At the same  time,  however,  the Slovako-Hungarian border zone has been an 
area of intensive  economic co-operation. At present, there are some 500 joint venture 
Slovako-Hungarian companies. 
The intra-regional cooperation of the Visegrad group,  despite certain difficulties  men-
tioned above, has, however, chances of success. The tightening of this cooperation gives 
each  country  better  chances  of  its  integration  with  the  European  Union  and  closer 
cooperation with NATO, because the ability of establishing mutual cooperation may be 
an extra argument in their striving to achieve integration under the European Union. On 
the  contrary,  mutual  competition  for  'Europe's  favour'  and  the  individual  race  for 
integration  with  European  institutions  diminish  these  chances.  On  the  other  hand, 
however, conceptions are put forward to create other configurations in the area of Cen-
tral Europe. 
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SCENARIO OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNTIL 2005 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the summary survey of scenarios of economic development until 
2005 of the so-called Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
the Slovak Republic). 
In  this  summary  no  attempt  was  undertaken  to  produce  independent  projections  of 
macroeconomic developments. The survey  is  based on the projections executed by  the 
national  teams.  Since  the  scope  of this  paper  is  restricted  to  an  overview  only,  the 
Readers are advised to refer also to the countries' papers where a more detailed discus-
sion of assumptions and results can be found. 
In an elaboration of economic scenarios for the Central European countries (CEC) the 
challenges of the coming years had to be taken under consideration. Those challenges 
relate to introduction of market mechanism, new for  all Central and Eastern European 
economies,  and to  the loss  of traditional  econom~ security.  Possibility  of a successful 
economic development of the CEC depends on to what extend the countries will be able 
to respond to these challenges. 
Severalsecurity preconditions should be mentioned. 
1.  CEC have lost their previous stability anchor. This anchor was created by large COM-
ECON markets, sometimes direct economic support, cheap raw material sources and 
strong  structural  linkages.  All  these  elements  had  obvious  impact  on  production, 
productivity, R + D capacities, competitiveness and employment. In the years to come 
a  new  anchor has to be  found  in  order to create medium-term stability during  the 
painful and risky process of transformation. (The Association Agreement with the EU 
has only partly filled this vacuum). 
2.  The abrupt trade reorientation requires open and predictable markets. Free access to 
dominant markets  has  always  been a precondition for  the fast  economic growth  in 
small,  open economies.  Gaining  acces~ to large  markets is  one of the main reasons 
for  new regionalism. 
3.  Free  access  to  technologies  is  a  particularly  important  issue  for  countries  at the 
medium level of development, and with good chances to join the club of the developed 
economies. There is  no  doubt that the limited access to the Western technology has 
substantially contributed to a decline of the communist economic and social system in 
the eighties. The free access to the modem technology is a precondition of successful 
transformation and a fundamental element of a long-term economic growth. 
4.  Economic security of the CEC  largely depends on the stable and safe supply of the 
energy,  raw materials and other vital inputs for consumption and production. Most 
of the raw  materials may be purchased on the world market (some  countries did  it 
long before the collapse of the COMECON). Nevertheless, the level of dependence 
on energy deliveries from the area of the former USSR remains strong in spite of the 
economic  and  political  transformation:  the  energy  infrastructure  (oil  and  gas 
pipelines) cannot be replaced overnight. Even a gradual establishment of alternative 
energy networks needs time and a huge investment. 
5.  The successful adjustment of the CEC economies needs a  predictable medium-term 
supporting financial  framework.  The transforming economies need a free  access  to 
- 11-external financing,  appropriate debt management policies, an inflow of private capital 
and  a  direct  assistance.  All  these  elements  should  secure  a  positive  net inflow  of 
resources into the reforming economies (at least in  the next 5-8 years). 
6.  Social and political security principle implies a  permanent monitoring of the social 
costs  of economic  transformation  (living  standard, unemployment,  income  polarisa-
tion). 
In  some  cases,  the  Central  European  countries  security  preconditions  may  directly 
influence a situation of the EU economies.  Free access  to Western markets, combined 
with low wages  and relatively skilled labour in  CEC, can be seen as  a major threat for 
interest of Western European producers. It should be, however,  stressed that the long-
term impact may be overwhelmingly positive for both sides.  Both the EC and CEC are 
also interested in reducing the social risks of the transition: any social or political distur-
bance in  Central and Eastern Europe may lead to massive  migration to the neighbour 
European countries. Both for  the mutual interests and for  the efficient support to  the 
systemic  transformation,  a broad cooperation,  including  medium-term  assistance  pack-
ages  is  urgently needed. 
2.1.  The Central European countries vis-a-vis  the European Union 
Some of these problems have  already been discussed in chapter 1.  Here we  come back 
to them, stressing in  more detail the economic aspects of their interrelations. The four 
Central European countries (  CEC) represent a big economic and demographic potential. 
However,  mainly  because  of  unfavourable  historical  conditions,  the  actual  level  of 
development is  much lower than in  the case of the European Union countries. 
The  table  presented  below  summarizes  the  general  geographic,  demographic  and 
economic characteristics as  compared to the EC. 
Table 1. The Central European countries vis-a-vis  the European Community in 1991 
European  Central European countries  Categories  Community 
Index (EC=JOO) 
Area (thous.square km)  2,371  534  22.5 
Population (min)  328.7  64.3  19.6 
Age structure (in%):  25.7  31.3  - below  19 years old 
- between 19 and 6  60.0  57.5 
- over 64 years old  14.3  11.1 
GDP (PPP,  $ bin)  6,088  352  5.8 
GDP per capita in  $  18,518  5,468  29.5  - according to PPP 
- to exchange rates  2,410  13.0 
The Central European countries represent about 1/5 of the EU area and population. The 
population density is  similar to this one observed in  the EU. The age  structure is more 
favourable  than in  the EU: the Region is  still relatively well developing (in spite of the 
continuing process of getting older). 
The aggregate level of development of the Region measured by  the GDP per capita is 
much lower than the level of the EU and shows  a relative backwardness of the Region 
resulting mainly (but not exclusively) from unfavourable historical and social circumstan-
ces of the last half century of the command economy. While measured according to the 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), the total GDP of the CEC accounts only for less than 
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6%  of the  EU GDP.  The per 
capita  GDP  of  the  Region 
represents less then 30% of the 
EU  average.  The  level  is 
smaller than in the case of any 
of the EU countries (according 
to  the  ICP  comparisons,  the 
per capita GDP level reached$ 
8,331  for  Greece  and  $  9,938 
for Portugal, it means 20% and 
45%  more respectively than in 
the  richest  country  of  the 
Region,  the  Czech  Republic). 
The  economic  development 
distance  increases  while 
measured  by  the  GDP  at 
~~-~-r-e_L_G_D_P_i_n_ili_e_C_e_~_rn_1_E_m_o_~_a_n_oo_u_m_ri-~-~-d-ili_e_E_u_ro_p_e~-U-n-~~a  rurre~  eEhW~  r~es  ~h~ 
PPP standards.  measure is  in  our opinion less 
reliable). 
The relatively low GDP level is  only one of the problems of the Region. The economic 
structures also  show the backwardness of the Region (see table 2). 
Table 2. Economic structures of the Central European countries and the EC in 1992 
Central European 
European  Community  countries 
Value Added by sectors (in%): 
- agriculture &  forestry  5.9  6.9 
- industry &  construction  30.1  52.9 
- services  64.0  40.3 
Employment by sectors (in%): 
- agriculture &  forestry*)  2.0  24.1 
- industry &  construction  31.6  35.9 
- services  66.4  40.0 
*) The share of employment in agriculture and forestry in the Central European countries may be overestimated due to 
statistical methods used. 
The service sector is  particularly underdeveloped in the Region both from the point of 
view of employment and its contribution to the GDP. The big role of the agriculture may 
be observed particularly in the case of the employment structure (although a presented 
share seems to be overestimated, mainly due to a weakness of official statistics). 
The transition from  planning to the market economy was  accompanied by  high social 
costs. Unemployment- a phenomenon that did not exist at all in command economies 
- was  growing  rapidly  during  the  last years,  reaching  the  level  well  above  the  EU 
average (although smaller than in the case of some EU countries). Prospects of reducing 
the  unemployment  rate  are  not  encouraging,  as  the  Region's  economy  in  1992  has 
stagnated (the modest GDP growth was observed only in Poland, when the other coun-
tries were still in  a recession). 
High inflation rates,  resulting both from price  adjustments after the price control was 
abolished and from the process of approaching world market prices of the energy and 
raw  materials,  are still  observed in the Region in spite of restrictive monetary policies 
applied by  the governments. The average Region's CPI inflation rate in 1992 was twice 
as  high as  in  Greece (EC worst result) and several times higher than the EU average. 
- 13-The level of inflation shows, that 
the  economies  of CEC  are  still 
far from  the equilibrium level. 
The  role  of  the  CEC  in  the 
world  division  of  labour  is 
relatively small. The share in the 
world  trade reaches around  1% 
both in exports and imports (EC 
share  is  around  40%).  This 
share was continuously shrinking 
during  the  years  1980s  and 
1990s. 
The  links  with  the  EU have  a 
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For the EU, the region still has 
a very small meaning as  a trad-
ing  partner. The exports  to  the 
CEC represented only  1.3%  of 
the total EU exports, when the 
share  of  imports  from  the 
region  in  the  total EU imports 
was  even lower (1.2% ). 
The  actual  trade links  between 
the  CEC  and  the  EU  do  not 
correspond  to  the  potential 
intensity  of  the  cooperation. 
The  Central  European  coun-
tries may represent in the years 
EC  Visegrad countries  to  come  an  absorptive  market 
L.----------------------J  for  the  EU  exports  of capital 
Figure  3.  Inflation  rate  in  the  Central  European  countries  and  the  goods and (to a smaller degree) 
European Union.  consumption  goods,  as  well  as 
for  the capital investment. 
2.2.  The  starting point:  economic  situation in  1992 
The economic situation of the Central European countries (CEC) in 1992 vary both from 
the point of view  of long-term problems  that are to be solved  and  short-term macro-
economic imbalances. However, there are important similarities in the overall economic 
situation and in  the path of economic reforms that all  the countries follow. 
At  the  beginning  of the  1990s  the  countries have  precised  their  economic  and  social 
development strategies, leading to establishing of the Western-type, private ownership-
based market economies and pluralistic, democratic societies. The general social consen-
sus  was  worked out, that the scope of the state intervention into the economics should 
be drastically limited, the majority of production factors should be shifted to the private 
- 14-sector, the private entrepreneurship should play a decisive role in the development and 
the market mechanisms should not be disturbed. 
However,  the  specific  macroeconomic  policies  that  were  introduced  to  balance  the 
economy and to ease the way to the free market system were chosen differently. Various 
approaches were  chosen,  ranging  from  the Polish  'Big  bang'  approach  (a drastic  anti-
inflationary program combined with  a fast  liberalisation of the economy)  through less 
radical  and  more  pragmatic  former  Czechoslovak  program  until  the  most  cautious 
Hungarian macroeconomic policy of a 'soft landing' in capitalism. Such a choice was also 
due to differences in  the starting point for  the reforms:  Poland, with its  hyperinflation 
and  huge  macroeconomic  imbalances  was  not able  to  choose  a  slower,  but less  risky 
Hungarian  or  Czech  way.  Quite  different  situation  appeared  in  the  privatisation 
approach. This time  it was  Czechoslovakia (and then the Czech and Slovak Republics) 
that was  forced  to  choose  the  most  radical,  but  also  the  most  risky  'Big  bang'  (the 
voucher privatisation). Poland and Hungary, with their expanding rapidly private sectors 
and  relatively  well  developing  capital  markets  were  able  to  introduce  much  more 
deliberate  policies.  In Hungary the  application  of the 'Bib  Bang'  approach would  not 
have been justified, since the transition was prepared in many respects and inflation was 
held under control. 
The problems that all the countries had to face also depended on the starting point situa-
tion.  However,  in  spite  of initial  opinions,  a  big  similarity  occurred  in  the pattern of 
economic problems. All the CEC economies have suffered important drop in the output 
level (in the state-owned sector), growing unemployment, a strong inflationary pressure. 
The collapse  of the COMECON trade has  led to  a dramatic decrease of their exports 
to the Eastern markets. 
-Poland 
100  - CzechRep. 
95  - Hungary 
90 
- Slovak Rep. 
85 
:  -----,~- --~- ---,-- --.---- ,--------
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Different  policies  were  leading 
to  similar  phenomena:  the 
economies  have  reached  'levels 
near  to  macroeconomic  equi-
librium',  market  mechanisms 
(based on free prices) started to 
work,  links  with  the  world 
market (especially with the EU) 
significantly  strengthened, 
national  currencies  became  in 
practice convertible (internally), 
a share of the private sector in 
the  GDP  has  increased  radi-
cally.  On  the  second  hand, 
significant  differences  can  be 
observed  in  the  path  of  the 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  economic  stabil~ation  and 
Figure 4.  GDP  index  for  Central European  countries  (1989 = 100);  1993 
estimates)  recovery.  The  graphs  show 
paths of the GDP and inflation 
in  the four countries. Polish policies occurred to be the most successful in  overcoming 
recession and entering the recovery period ·(the Polish GDP started to grow from 1992, 
with the Europe-highest growth rate projected for 1993). 
In the same  time  it  is  the  Czech  macroeconomic policy  that has  resulted in  the  most 
efficient reduction of macroeconomic imbalances  (the smaller inflation and unemploy-
ment rates). 
The low unemployment rate, however, may be also explained by a relatively slow advan-
cement of restructuring process, mainly due to a relatively low scale of the private sector 
- 15-at  the  beginning  of reforms  (the  privatisation  in  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics  is 
speeded up in  1993  thanks to the voucher privatisation scheme). 
From  the  long-term  point  of 
view,  a lot of similarities may be 
found  in  the  economies  of the 
four countries. The similar situa-
tion can be observed in the case 
of the supply of production fac-
tors. A lion's share of the fixed 
capital,  that was  installed in  the 
period of the central planning is 
out-of-date and needs modernis-
ing.  In  general,  the  productive 
equipment does  not correspond 
to  the  modern  technological 
standards  (the  situation  differs 
among  countries:  the  Czech 
Republic  has  the  most  modem 
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machinery,  when  it  is  Poland  Figure 6.  GDP and share of investment in 1992, CEC and countries. 
and  Hungary  that  are  in  much 
worse  situation,  mainly  because  of considerable  slowing  down  of investment  in  the 
1980s).  The branch  structure of the fixed  capital  does  not correspond to  the  demand 
structure (on contrary, this is the Czech and the Slovak Republic that are in a relatively 
worse  situation than Poland and Hungary from  this point of view). 
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Figure 6 shows the dynamics of the process of building up 
the  fixed  capital  in  CEC and  in  the  less  developed  EC 
member countries in 1992. The share of GDP spent on the 
fixed  capital formation was rather low both in Poland and 
Hungary,  reaching  only  the  EC average  (similar  to  the 
Greek share).  The  share was  much  higher in  the  Czech 
and  Slovak  Republics  (around  Portugal  level,  above 
Spanish level). Nevertheless, taking into account low level 
of GDP in  the  Central  European countries  resulting  in 
Figure 5.  Central European countries, 
inflation rates, 1989-1992  high  needs for the new fixed  capital,  the share of invest-
ment  in  GDP is  not  satisfactory {the  share  is  to  low  in 
Hungary and Poland and in the Czech and Slovak Republics it is mainly the problem of 
allocation and efficiency). 
The Central European countries have  at their disposal relatively high  supply of a good 
quality labour. The labour force  is well educated and relatively cheap (it does not con-
tradict  the  phenomenon  of scarcity  of various  skills,  mainly  of an  organisational  and 
managerial character). However,  some problems also  appear. Table 3 gives  some ratios 
characterising social and economic tensions connected with the labour supply in the four 
countries. 
Table 3. Population and labour: selected characteristics in 1992 
Units  Czech Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovak Rep. 
Unemployment rate  %  2.6  12.7  13.2  11.5 
Activisation rate  %  82.0  79.4  81.1  79.3 
Dependency ratio  ratio  0.71  0.71  0.66  0.71 
Social productivityof labour 
(GDP/empl.)  $  14.717  14.005  12.641  13.116 
- 16-In 1992 the four countries have substantial problems in utilizing the disposable supply 
of labour. The unemployment rate was high in all the countries but the Czech Republic. 
High unemployment partly resulted from  a  relatively high ratio of activisation  (around 
80%  ). The dependency ratios (informing how many persons below and after the working 
age fall to one person in working age) are relatively high in all the countries but Poland. 
The situation on the labour market is  socially difficult to accept.  Relatively high open 
unemployment, together with still existing hidden unemployment are combined with the 
low social productivity of labour that does not supply sufficient funds for financing the 
social safety net. 
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Efficient use of the production 
factors is  limited by the prevail-
ing share of the slowly adjusting 
public sector (figure 7). 
The  privatisation  advancement 
differs in the Central European 
Private Sector  countries.  In  1992  it  was  only 
Poland that has  approached an 
Public Sector  average  50%  participation  of 
the  private  sector  in  GDP1• 
Privatisation  was  much  less 
advanced in the other countries 
(see graph). However, the com-
mon  problem  of all  the  coun-
Slovak Republic  tries lies  in  the privatisation of 
~m-~-r-e-~-Th-e-~-~-e-o_f_ili_e_p_ri_w_k_~_ct_ru_i_n_G~D-P-,-w-n-.----~their  huge  state-owned 
industrial firms (high Polish and 
Hungarian average shares of the private sector in GDP result mainly from privatising 
services  and  traditionally  overwhelming  share  of the  private  sector  in  agriculture  in 
Poland). 
In all the Central European countries the privatisation proceeded in two steps. The first 
one was  so  called small privatisation, based on changing the ownership or establishing 
new  businesses,  mainly  in  trade,  construction,  light  and  food-processing  industry  and 
other  services.  This  process  was  particularly  successful  in  Hungary  and  Poland.  The 
second step is  aimed at the privatisation of big state owned firms. This process has not 
been finished yet in  any of the countries.  Different paths of privatisation were chosen 
in the Central European countries (from the general voucher Czech and Slovak schemes 
to more market based Hungarian approach). One should stress the role of the so called 
capital  privatisation:  either through  direct  sales  of firms  (mainly  to foreign  investors; 
Czech Republic and Hungary are particularly successful in such a type of operations) or 
through selling  shares on the emerging stock exchanges  or through public offers  (the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange is  particularly fast developing one). 
Economic  structures  of all  the  Central European  countries  are  another  obstacle  for 
efficient use of the production factors.  The structures are hindered by relatively high 
shares  of the  heavy  industry,  mining  and  agriculture.  The  service  sector  is  relatively 
underdeveloped  (especially  market services,  as  communication,  business  and financial 
services). Such a structure forces excessive use of energy and raw materials, reduces the 
1  The share of ilie private sector presented in the graph does not include the so· called hidden economy, which is mainly 
private.  According  to  very  preliminary  estimates  the  share  of  the  hidden  economy  is  relatively  high  in  Poland  and 
Hungary and probably much smaller in the  Czech and Slovak Republics. 
- 17-share of value added in total output and badly hurts the environment. The value added 
and employment structures are presented in table 4. 
The transition  to  the market systems was  accompanied  in  all  the countries by  serious 
problems.  These  problems  resulted  from  lacking  market  infrastructure,  shortages  of 
managerial abilities (adjustment of behaviour of firms to the market conditions appeared 
to be much more difficult that it was in the case of households), problems with the men-
tality,  social  and political instability and macroeconomic imbalances inherited from  the 
central planning. These imbalances have been leading to high inflation rates and substan-
tial problems with financing of the social security net, sometimes referred to as the crisis 
of public  finance  system.  Table  5  gives  some  measures  of the  1992  financial  policy 
problems.  High  inflation  rates  force  elevated  interest  rates  (the  Czech  and  Slovak 
Republics are in much better situation from that point of view compared with Poland and 
Hungary).  Budget  deficits  are  disturbingly  high  in  all  the  countries  but  the  Czech 
Republic (sometimes with  substantial problems of financing them). 
Table 4. Structure of value added and of employment by  branches in 1992 
Czech  Rep.  Hungary 
Total GDP  100.0  100.0 
Mining & quarrying  2.8  2.7 
Agriculture & forestry  5.1  8.5 
Manufacturing  50.4  28.9 
Construction  8.4  6.0 
Services  33.3  53.9 
Total Employment  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  2.8  1.3 
Agriculture & forestry  8.3  13.5 
Manufacturing  37.9  27.2 
Construction  5.3  6.0 
Services  45.7  51.8 
Table 5. Financial policy measures in 1992 
Czech Rep. 
Inflation rate (%)  11.1 
Interest rate (1  year deposits)  8.1 
Budget deficit as% of GDP  0.2 
Budget deficit as% of M2*  0.3 
*  M2 (broad money)  - according to national definitions. 
*  * Gross, subject to 20% income tax. 
Hungary 
23.0 
20.0** 
7.0 
n/a 
Poland 
100.0 
2.4 
6.8 
46.6 
7.1 
37.1 
100.0 
3.1 
33.8 
22.3 
6.2 
34.6 
Poland 
43.0 
38.0 
6.1 
16.8 
Slovakia 
100.0 
1.6 
6.5 
46.4 
9.5 
36.0 
100.0 
0.9 
12.0 
32.4 
10.0 
44.7 
Slovakia 
10.0 
8.1 
3.3 
4.0 
Another set of problems faced by the Central European countries result from the major 
change in their external relations. A collapse of the COMECON trade, and particularly 
of the Soviet market resulted in substantial problems for the huge part of industry. The 
shift towards  the EU market, although spectacular (see figure  8), was  not sufficient to 
compensate for the fall  of the foreign  demand in the case of many industrial branches 
(some  of them were  totally Soviet market-tailored and not able to  shift towards other 
markets). More detailed information about shifts in the exports structure by main trading 
partners are presented in 6. 
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The  Central  European  countries 
complain  also  of problems in  access 
of their goods to the EU markets. In 
spite  of  the  liberalisation  of  trade 
resulting  from  the  new  agreements 
with  the  European Union,  the CEC 
find  the market access rather narrow 
and  constrained  by  various  protec-
tionist trade policy tools (particularly 
in  the  case  of food  products,  met-
allurgy and textiles). All the countries 
suffered  considerable  deterioration 
of their trade balance with  the EU, 
leading  to  general  problems  with 
equilibrating  their  balances  of 
Figure 8.  Exports of the Central European countries by main areas.  payments. 
Table 6.  Exports structure by  main foreign markets 
Czech Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovak Rep. 
Exports structure 1989  (in%)* 
European Community  26  35  38  26 
Central Europe  21  15  14  21 
Eastern Europe  30  22  18  30 
Other  24  28  30  24 
Exports structure 1992 (in%) 
European Community  42  50  48  22 
Central Europe  25  6  7  54 
Eastern Europe  16  14  15  12 
Other  17  30  30  12 
* in  1989  Czechoslovak structure for both Czech and Slovak Republics 
Another long-term challenge the Central European countries have to face  is  connected 
with the external debt burden. The characteristics of the debt problem for the four coun-
tries are presented on figure  9. 
The scale of the problem vary:  from the relatively good situation of the Czech Republic 
to substantial problems of Poland. The per capita debt ranges in 1992 from $500-600 in 
the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics  to  around  $1260  in  Poland  and  Hungary.  That 
represents from  22%  of GDP in the Czech  Republic (exchange  rate converted;  8% if 
measured by  the Purchasing Power Parity), to 58% in  Poland (but only around 25% if 
measured by  the PPP).  This share is  much more favourable  for  Hungary compared to 
Poland if measured with the current exchange rate, but almost the same if measured with 
the PPP.  The current problems of debt servicing  are the highest in  Poland due to the 
smallest per capita exports. 
- 19-The patterns of utilizing GDP 
are different in  the CEC. The 
ratio  of the  fixed  capital  for-
mation  in  GDP,  traditionally 
surprisingly  (and  also  non-
efficiently)  high  in  centrally 
planned  economies,  has  fallen 
significantly  in  Poland  and 
Hungary, but remains still high 
in  the  Czech  and  Slovak 
Republics2.  The  current  pat-
terns are presented in table 7. 
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high share of food  in the total  Czech Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovak Rep. 
Personal  Consumption  is  the 
most striking example of a dis- Figure 9.  Net foreign  debt as  %of GDP and exports, 1992 (debt burden) 
tance  in  final  demand  struc-
tures between the CEC and the EU (this share in  the EU countries varies from  10 to 
29%  in  the United Kingdom and Greece respectively). 
The aggregate measure of the development of the Central European countries - Gross 
Domestic Product per capita (measured with the Purchasing Power Parity) - is substan-
tially  (3  times)  lower  than the average  GDP of the EU (see table 8).  The differences 
within the four countries are not so big (within the brackets of 30% ). Poland, the poorest 
country of the four in  the terms of the per capita GDP, has the biggest GDP in global 
terms (by far higher than all  the other countries together). 
Table 7.  Final demand pattern in  1992 
Czech Rep.  Hungary*  Poland  Slovak Rep. 
Total GDP  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Personal Consumption  54.5  69.2  60.3  51.1 
Public Consumption  16.5  12.5  18.1  23.4 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation  29.2  20.4  19.2  27.9 
Net exports  4.0  -1.2  -0.3  -5.2 
Change in inventories  -4.2  -0.9  2.7  2.8 
Spending on food as% of  31.3  33  39.7  39  expenditure 
* Methodology used for calculation of public and private consumption is  different than in other countries. 
Differences  between  the  Central  European  countries  became  bigger  if  measured  by 
current  exchange  rate  converted  GDP.  The  sequence  of the  countries  changes  with 
Hungary leading,  and the Slovak Republic taking place  of the country with  the lowest 
GDP. Such an outcome results from significant differences in the ratio of exchange rates 
to  the  real  purchasing  power  of domestic  currencies.  The  ratio  ranges  from  60%  in 
Hungary, to only 35-43% in the other countries. However, such differences may be only 
of temporary nature depending on the current situation of the countries (mainly on the 
balance of payments situation). 
2 Economic reforms which started in Hungary already in late 60-ties and in Poland in 80-ties have changed to some extend 
the economic system before the year 1990. 
-20-Differences  in  per capita  Personal  Consumption  are  even  bigger  than  in  the  case  of 
GDP. The highest level  obtained in  Hungary is  mainly  due  to  the highest share of the 
Personal Consumption in  GDP; quite an opposite phenomenon may be observed in the 
case of Slovakia. Let us  note, that some indicators (as for example the share of food in 
expenditures or physical indicators) clearly show the Czech Republic as  a leader in the 
field  of the Personal Consumption as well. 
All  the Central European countries had to  face  enormous problems in  their transition 
towards the market economy. They have managed to obtain spectacular successes on this 
way.  However, their economic situation in 1992 remained still difficult. All of them have 
reached (or are about to reach) the bottom of the post-communist recession. Until now, 
only  the Polish  economy has started to  grow,  but probably the Czech economy  is  also 
approaching the  turning point. All the economies have  been liberalised,  and the long-
term  programs  aimed  at  building  the  basis  of  the  new,  efficient  economic  system 
(privatisation first  of all)  have  been started. 
Table 8.  GDP level compared to the European Community in  1992 
Czech  Hungary  Poland  Slovak  EC average  Republic  Republic 
GDP per capita in  $*  {Purchas- 6,867  5,650  5,065  5,320  18,518  ing Power Parity) 
Index: CEC = 100  125.6  103.3  92.6  97.3  338.7 
Index:  EC=100  37.1  30.5  27.4  28.7  100.0 
Personal Consumption per  3,743  3,910  3,054  2,719  11,408  capita in  $ (PPP) 
Index: CEC = 100  114.3  119.4  93.3  83.0  348.4 
Index: EC = 100  32.8  34.3  26.8  23.8  100.0 
Exchange rate as%  of Purchas- 36.9  60.7  43.0  35.2  X  ing Power 
* The  numbers  presented  in  the  table  are  estimated  by  each  country  on  the  basis  of the  1990  ICP  comparisons; 
preliminary direct results of the ICP  1992 are the following:  Czech Republic $7,925,  Hungary $6,685,  Poland $4,710, 
Slovakia $5,850. 
2.3.  The  scenario:  general assumptions 
2.3.1.  Outline of the  approach  and  common  assumptions 
The  scenarios  of the  economic  development  of the  Central European countries  sum-
marized  in  this  paper may  be described  as  optimistic  but realistic  in  the same  time. It 
means,  we  assume  that  an  'average  optimistic  coincidence'  of all  factors  influencing 
favourable rates of growth will take place3• There is a possibility, that certain factors may 
occur even  more favourable  than assumed  (e.g.  greater inflow of capital from  abroad) 
but then probably others may be less favourable (e.g. lower increase in domestic propen-
sity to save). 
The methodology of studies for all the countries vary significantly. The tools used by the 
Polish team were the most formal (a set of aggregated and disaggregated models, includ-
ing the Social Accounting Matrices SAM-based models). The Czech team has also used 
SAM for  analysis;  however,  only  a part of the Czech research was based on the model 
tools.  The  Slovak  and  Hungarian  scenarios  were  worked  out  mainly  with  the  use  of 
experts'  opinions.  In spite  of differences  in  constructing scenarios,  all  the teams  have 
3  Such an assumption differs the scenarios presented in this paper from a standard forecast {forecasts seek for the most 
probable state of all the factors,  in  the scenarios the 'optimistic coincidence' was  assumed). 
-21-used  the  uniform  methodology  to  assure  internal  consistency  of the  scenarios  (con-
sistency checks that were agreed during the common workshops). 
It is  still difficult to say,  to what extent the scenarios are coherent in the regional scale. 
The problem is  that the levels of the 'realistic optimism' may differ among the experts 
and national teams. An example of such a problem may be found in assumptions concer-
ning the ICOR (Incremental Capital Output Ratio)  - the most aggregate measure of 
efficiency of investment process. Making the summary survey we  have tried to uniform 
the presentation of results and to give a common interpretation of assumptions: changing 
important assumptions underlying national scenarios was beyond the scope of this sum-
mary4. 
In spite of a relatively short period covered by the analysis  (  13  years) the character of 
the scenarios is long-term rather than medium-term. Consequently, they skip the effects 
of short-term fluctuations  connected with  the business cycle.  It should be noted,  that 
short-term fluctuations  may cause much  higher rates of growth  in  selected years than 
average in the scenario5.  One should be also cautious about interpretation of the num-
bers or growth  rates presented in  the  scenarios. A  relatively high  level  of accuracy in 
presented growth rates is an outcome of using the formal model tools. One should think 
about the range of values rather than about a precise value (the rates of growth of 3.9% 
or 4.1% should be interpreted as  'the rate about 4%'). 
Generally speaking, the 'external factors' were assumed by all the teams as following: 
1.  The end of a recession in Western Europe around 1995  and a long-term 3% growth 
of the world trade. 
2.  A wider access to the EU market; successful integration into the European economy 
(including the future membership in  the European Union). 
3.  Partial revival of the trade with the former Soviet republics. 
4.  A broad stream of the foreign capital and growing interest in direct investment in the 
Central European countries. 
5.  An unlimited access to the modem technology and know-how. 
6.  Reducing the debt burden (mainly for Poland; more favourable conditions of servicing 
and principals payments for all the countries). 
7.  Political stability in Europe (especially in Eastern Europe). 
The list of the 'internal factors' that were assumed by the national teams is  as following: 
1.  Successful  transformation  and  privatisation  of the  economies  resulting  in  growing 
economic efficiency (growing productivity of production factors). 
2.  Successful restructuring of the economies (not disturbed by a political instability and 
social tensions). 
3.  Growing propensity to save  and to invest. 
4.  Improvement of managerial abilities on micro level. 
4  The Czech scenario was judged by us  as  the least optimistic, the Polish and the Slovak scenarios as the most optimistic. 
The Hungarian approach was  moderate. 
5  Let us give  an example: one can not exclude even 6 or 7%  GDP growth in  Poland in  1994 or 1995). However, so high 
growth  rates  could  not  be  maintained  in  the  longer  period,  because  of imbalances  between  output and  disposable 
production factors (fixed assets) that would appear. Short-term speeding up of the demand and output would be com-
pensated then by the temporary slowing down of the economic growth. From the long-term point of view such temporary 
phenomena do not have big importance. 
-22-5.  Improvement  of  efficiency  of  the  macroeconomic  policy  formulation  (on  the 
governmental level). 
2.3.2.  Assumptions concerning the production factors: labour 
The supply of labour in the scenarios is  determined by  the demographic trends in the 
CEC. Apart from  this, some general assumptions were made: 
1.  The Central European countries are well  endowed with  a high quality labour force. 
Special  skills  required by  the market economy  (marketing,  trade,  finance,  banking, 
etc.) can be acquired relatively easily thanks to a solid educational structure. 
2.  The global  demand for  the  high-skilled  manpower will  be increasing rapidly,  while 
unskilled labour is  likely to face  growing employment difficulties. 
3.  The choice of technology by investors and the development path of the economies will 
result in a faster growth of the labour supply than of the demand for labour. Conse-
quently,  a relatively high  level  of stagnating unemployment will  maintain in  all  the 
CEC (with  a possible exemption of the Czech Republic). 
4.  In spite of a huge difference of cost of labour, the flows  of the labour force between 
the EU and Central European countries will  have marginal meaning. 
A high supply of labour and its relatively low cost might be prompting a labour-intensive 
path  of  development  of  the  national  economies.  However,  in  a  long  run  such  a 
phenomenon may  result in standing off the world  scientific and technical mainstream. 
Consequently, problems of an effective use of the available labour factor, optimal choice 
of technology and reduction of unemployment will become crucial issues in the social and 
economic policy. 
2.3.3.  Assumptions concerning the production factors: capital 
Unlike labour, capital is a scarce factor of production in all Central European countries. 
A drop in real incomes in the nineties and a low average propensity to save result in the 
limited  domestic  resources  for  financing  investments.  At the  same  time  high  interest 
rates, connected with high inflation, restrict the propensity to invest. 
The following  assumptions about the capital availability were made: 
1.  Increase in domestic saving in all the CEC (increased average households' propensity 
to  save,  growing  number  of  pension  funds  and  insurance  institutions,  increased 
propensity to  invest  in  private companies,  increased profit-earning capacity of com-
panies in the public sector and a real growth of depreciation funds). 
2.  Broad  inflow  of  the  foreign  capital  (requiring  the  political  and  social  stability, 
legislative support and inventiveness, clear and stable rules of game). 
3.  Limited possibility of the use of an existing idle fixed  capital (mainly machinery and 
equipment; the East German example shows  that only a small part of them may be 
efficiently utilized in the competitive market economy). 
2.3.4.  Assumptions concerning the production factors: science, technology, organisation 
Upgrading technology and improving organisation is a major task for all the CEC if their 
economies  are  to become  competitive  and efficient.  A  big  part of available  resources 
should be devoted to this task. 
In the scenarios the following  assumptions were made: 
1.  The lion's share of the modern technological and organisational know-how will be sup-
plied by  imports (mainly from the EU). 
-23-2.  No results  of the domestic R&D important from  the macroeconomic point of view 
may be expected before the year 2000.  However,  the growing  spending on  R&D is 
necessary from  the point of view of the future development. 
2.4.  The scenario: Results 
2.4.1.  Population 
The population of the Central European countries will  increase in the years 1992-2005 
by  3.6%, i.e.  by  2.3  mln persons. The situation of the four countries differs  (see table 
9). The highest growth of population will be observed in the Slovak Republic (by 6.8%) 
and in Poland (by  5.1%). The Czech population will  be growing very slowly  (by  0.7%) 
and the population of Hungary will  fall  (by 0.8% ),  see fig.  10. 
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Figure 10. Population of the Central European countries, 1992-2005 
In all the countries the population will be getting older (see table 10). The share of the 
population before working age will decrease, when the share of old persons will increase. 
The number of working age population will grow considerably, mainly in Poland and the 
Slovak  Republic  (together  by  almost  2.8  min).  Consequently,  the  dependency  ratio 
(informing  how  many persons below  and  after the working  age  fall  to one person in 
-24-working  age)  will  decrease  (especially in  Poland). It does not contradict a conclusion, 
however, that the demographic situation will become more difficult: growing share of the 
old people (pensioners) will  require growing social security benefits. 
Table 9.  Demographic trends in  the CEC 
Population  1992  Population  2005 
Before  Working  After work- Before  Working  After work- Total  working  Total  working 
age  age  ing age  age  age  ing age 
Czech Republic 
In million  10.315  2.166  6.034  2.115  10.387  1.870  6.149  2.368 
Structure  100.0%  21%  58.5%  20.5%  100.0%  19.0%  59.2%  22.8% 
Hungary* 
In million  10.337  2.010  6.031  2.205  10.250  1.980  6.350  1.920 
Structure  100.0%  19.4%  58.3%  22.2%  100.0%  19.3%  62.0%  18.7% 
Poland 
In million  38.365  9,553  23.057  5.755  40.323  8.647  25.474  6.203 
Structure  100.0%  24.9%  60.1%  15.0%  100.0%  21.4%  63.2%  15.4% 
Slovakia 
In million  5.300  1.288  3.095  0.917  5.659  1.253  3.398  1.008 
Structure  100%  24.3%  58.4%  17.3%  100.0%  22.1%  60.0%  17.8% 
Population growth  1992-2005:  Structure of  population increase 
Index  (1992=100)  1992-2005 
Before  Working  After work- Before  Working  After 
Total  working  Total  working  working 
age  age  ing age  age  age  age 
Czech Republic  100.7  86.3  101.9  112.0  0.072  -0.296  0.115  0.254 
Hungary*  99.2  98.5  105.3  83.6  -0.087  -0.030  0.319  -0.376 
Poland  105.1  90.5  110.5  107.8  1.968  -0.906  2.417  0.448 
Slovakia  106.8  97.3  109.8  109.9  0.359  -0.035  0.303  0.091 
* Reckoning with  an  increase of the pension age. 
A very high increase of the working age population (especially in Poland and Slovakia), 
together with an existing unemployment (registered and hidden) will result in continuous 
tensions on the labour market (table 10). Dealing with unemployment will be one of the 
most  urgent  (and  difficult)  tasks  for  the  economic  policy  of the  CEC.  None  of the 
national  scenarios  foresees  a  possibility  of a  substantial  reduction  of the  number of 
unemployed  persons  until  the  year  2005.  A  slight  decrease  is  expected  in  Poland, 
Hungary and Slovakia.  In the Czech Republic,  enjoying a very low  level of unemploy-
ment in 1992,  an increase of its level is  expected in the year 2005. 
The quality of the labour force will  be growing.  The higher education rate is  expected 
to rise substantially (the specific numbers are presented only in the case of Hungary and 
the Czech Republic). 
Table 10. The labour market: selected ratios 
Dependency  rate  Employment (mln)  Unemployment  (mln) 
1992  2005  1992  2005  1992  2005 
Czech Republic  0.71  0.69  5.064  5.429  0.135  0.278 
Hungary*  0.71  0.61  4.170  4.060  0.663  0.640 
Poland  0.66  0.58  13.136  14.747  2.391  2.322 
Slovakia  0.71  0.66  2.150  2.400  0.280  0.226 
* Reckoning with an increase of the pension age. 
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The scenarios indicate a relatively high growth rates of GDP in all the Central European 
countries but the  Czech  Republic.  With  an average  yearly  growth  rate of the  Central 
European countries reaching almost 4%,  the Polish an Slovak scenarios show 4.5%  and 
4.1% respectively and the Hungarian scenario 3.4%. The differences among these coun-
tries  are  much  smaller  if  the  social  productivity  of labour  is  taken  into  account:  the 
growth rate range from 3.2% in Slovakia to 3.5-3.6% in Poland and Hungary. The Czech 
scenario shows  only  a 2% growth  of the social  productivity of labour, leading to 2.5% 
growth of GDP (the roots of such an outcome are in the assumptions underlying calcula-
tion of ICOR: rate of growth of investment and rate of growth of GDP, discussed in the 
next paragraph). 
Tables  11,  12 and 13  and the figure  11  show the main outcome of the scenarios. 
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Figure 11. Gross Domestic Product in the Central European Countries, 2005 
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Total  GDP (constant US$ 1990,  bln)  Per capita  GDP (constant US$ 1990) 
1992  Purchasing Power Parity  1992  Purchasing Power Parity 
Exchange  1992  2005  Exch.  rate  1992  2005  rate 
Czech Republic  26.1  70.8  98.3  2531  6867  9463 
Hungary  35.4  58.4  90.3  3429  5650  8809 
Poland  23.6  194.3  343.2  2180  5065  8510 
Slovakia  9.9  28.2  47.6  1873  5320  8405 
Per capita GDP  (measured in  constant  1990  US$  according  to  the  Purchasing Power 
Parity)  grows  significantly  in  all  the  countries.  The  differences  among  the  Central 
European  countries  tend  to  diminish:  in  1992  the  highest  p.c.  GDP  of the  Czech 
Republic was higher by 36% than the smallest p.c. GDP of Poland. In the year 2005 the 
highest p.c.  GDP (still the Czech one) will  be only higher by  14%  than the lowest p.c. 
GDP in Slovakia. The GDP will  reach the level ranging from $ 8,287  in Slovakia and $ 
8,510  in Poland to  $ 8,940  in  Hungary and  $ 9,463  in the Czech Republic
6  (over 50% 
of the EC average p.c.  GDP in  1992). 
Table 12. Social productivity of labour, employment and unemployment 
Index 2005  Average rate of  growth 
1992=100  1995=100  2005/1992  2005/1995 
SOCIAL PRODUCTIVITY OF 
LABOUR 
Czech Republic  129.4  127.3  2.0  2.4 
Hungary  158.8  n/a  3.6  -
Poland  157.3  136.9  3.5  3.2 
Slovakia  151.2  147.5  3.2  4.0 
EMPWYMENT 
Czech Republic  107.2  103.2  0,5  0.3 
Hungary  95.0  n/a  -0.2  -
Poland  112.3  112.3  0.9  1.2 
Slovakia1  111.6  111.1  0.8  1.1 
1995  2005 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
Czech Republic  5.0  5.0 
Hungary  n/a  11.7 
Poland  14.1  11.6 
Slovakia  13.3  8.0 
6  It  means, that two poorer countries (Poland and Slovak Republic) will reach in 2005 the level of development of Greece 
from 1990, while two richer countries (Czech Republic and Hungary) will be stillS-10% below the level of development 
of Portugal in 1990 (comparison based on the results of the International Comparison Project of the UN). 
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Index 2005  Average rate of  growth  Structure of increase 
1992=100  1995=100  2005/1992  2005/1995  1992-2005  1995-2005 
Czech Republic 
GDP Total  138.7  131.4  2.5  2.8  100.0  100.0 
Personal Consumption  136.0  129.2  2.4  2.6  50.7  50.6 
Public Consumption  114.1  133.1  1.0  2.9  6.0  14.1 
Capital Formation 
(Gross)  150.7  142.7  3.2  3.6  38.2  39.7 
Net exports  35.1  120.7  -7.7  1.9  -6.8  0.7 
Hungary* 
GDP Total  154.6  151.6  3.4  4.3  100.0  100.0 
Personal Consumption  136.0  131.8  2.4  2.8  45.4  43.1 
Public Consumption  114.1  131.8  2.4  2.8  8.4  7.8 
Capital Formation 
(Gross)  150.7  200.4  6.7  7.2  49.8  45.3 
Net exports  266.7  227.9  7.8  8.6  -3.7  -3.4 
Poland 
GDP Total  176.6  153.7  4.5  4.4  100.0  100.0 
Personal Consumption  154.4  135.2  3.4  3.1  42.8  39.3 
Public Consumption  147.0  139.9  3.0  3.4  11.1  12.3 
Capital Formation 
(Gross)  295.3  243.1  8.7  9.3  49.0  54.1 
Net exports  533.3  324.8  13.7  12.5  -1.7  -1.8 
Slovakia 
GDP Total  168.7  163.8  4.1  5.1  100.0  100.0 
Personal Consumption  161.1  167.8  3.7  5.3  45.4  50.6 
Public Consumption  129.9  147.6  2.0  4.0  10.2  14.9 
Capital Formation 
(Gross)  167.0  144.0  4.0  3.7  27.2  21.6 
Net exports  23.0  44.9  -10.7  -23.4  5.8  2.2 
* The original scenario for Hungary was  constructed for different time  intervals (1993-1996  and  1997-2005)  than in  the 
other scenarios.  For the  sake of comparability of results,  all  figures  based on the year 1995  were  interpolated. In the 
original scenario for Hungary the consumption is  projected as a one consolidated category with  a single average rate of 
growth  (2.4%  p.a.). 
All the scenarios show a significant increase of the social productivity of labour. Its level 
in 2005 is over 50% higher than in 1992 in all the countries but the Czech Republic (only 
30% increase). In a result of such differences the three countries suffer higher unemploy-
ment rates in 2005 than the Czech Republic (the dynamics of unemployment is quite dif-
ferent: unemployment rates fall by around 2 per cent points in the three countries, while 
it  increases by 2.4 points in the Czech Republic). 
The average growth rates in the whole period 1992-2005 are influenced by the develop-
ments  in  the  subperiod  1992-95.  The  situation  of the  CEC  in  that  subperiod  varies 
significantly among countries, as  timing of the economic recovery is  not the sam in  all 
the countries (in Poland the turning point was obtained in  1992, in the Czech Republic 
it  is  expected  in  the  end of 1993,  in  Slovakia  in  1994  and in  Hungary  1997).  Conse-
quently, it is  rather the growth rate in the subperiod 1995-2005 that indicates better the 
long-term  differences  in  the  economic  dynamics  of the  CEC.  The  highest  economic 
growth in the years 1995-2005 is foreseen in the Slovak scenario (5.1% ), the Polish and 
Hungarian growth rates are very similar (  4.4-4.3%  ), while the Czech growth rate is  still 
lagging behind (2.8% ). 
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in  the increase of GDP. It absorbs about 50% of the increase in  Poland and Hungary, 
38% in the Czech Republic and 27% in Slovakia. Interpretation of this result should take 
into account the fact, that initially (in 1992) the investment ratio in Poland and Hungary 
was  considerably smaller than in  the two  other countries (see figure  6). 
Figure 11 illustrates additionally the share of four mine sectors of the economy: industry, 
agriculture, construction and services in the GDP levels of the Central European coun-
tries in the year 2005. According to national scenarios the share of the service sector in 
the GDP is expected to exceed one half only in the case of Hungary (56%). In Slovakia 
the service  sector is  expected to participate in originating of GDP by 50%, whereas in 
the Czech Republic and in  Poland these shares are forecasted to be low  and similar to 
each other (39.4% and 39.2% respectively). It should be however noticed that the 1992 
prices used in the scenarios distort the structure of value added in 2005.  Relatively low 
prices of services in all the CEC countries and especially in the Czech Republic under-
estimate the forecasted shares of the service sector in  2005  in the GDP. 
2.4.3.  Selected characteristics of the economic growth 
The economic growth of the Central European countries in  the period 1992-2005  may 
be characterized by  a set of ratios and coefficients. 
The most important characteristics of the efficiency of the economic growth is  given by 
the Incremental Capital-Output Ratio (ICOR), see table  14.  The coefficient is  defined 
as  a relation of increase of fixed  capital to an increase of GDP, and informs how mani' 
units of capital are necessary to obtain an increase of GDP by 1 unit (in a given period) . 
Table 14. Incremental Capital-Output Ratio 
!COR 1996-20051  !COR 1992-2005 
Total  Gross  Machinery &  Total  Gross  Machinery & 
Investment  Equipment  Investment  Equipment 
Czech Republic  10.9  5.5  11.7  5.8 
Hungary  6.3  n/a  7.2  n/a 
Poland  5.8  2.7  5.5  2.5 
Slovakia  5.8  3.0  6.9  3.5 
*According to authors of the Hungarian scenario the values of ICOR should rather stay within the range from 8 to 9. 
The ICOR values are extremely high  in  the years  1992-95  for  all  the countries except 
Poland. Such a result is  caused by a situation, in which  a new fixed  capital is  installed 
and no aggregate economic growth is observed. Output produced by the new fixed capital 
crowds out the old output rather than increases a scale of production. The worst situation 
is  observed  in  the  scenarios  for  Hungary  and  Slovakia,  much  better  for  the  Czech 
Republic. It is  only Poland in which in the period 1992-95 the new fixed  capital is  used 
to  increase the scale  of production and,  consequently,  the aggregate output (in  such a 
situation ICOR values are radically smaller). 
In  the  period  1996-2005  the  ICOR values  are  very  close  in  Hungary,  Poland  and 
Slovakia.  It  is  only  the  Czech  Republic  that suffers  considerably  higher  level  of the 
ICOR.  Such  an  outcome  results  from  less  optimistic  assumptions  about  the  macro-
economic efficiency of investment process. A partial explanation of such a phenomenon 
7  Formula for  the ICOR is  following:  ICOR in  period tO,  tl: ICORto,u  =  (Cn  - Cw)  I (GDPt1  - GDPw], where:  Ct 
- fixed  capital stock in the year t,  GDP  t  - GDP in the year t. A simplified version of ICOR can be calculated with 
the use of gross fixed capital formation (investment) instead of the increase of the stock of capital. As no sufficient data 
on fixed capital increase may be found in the national scenarios (with the exception of Poland), were forced to use the 
simplified formula for calculating ICOR. 
-29-may be relatively higher spending on environmental investment in the Czech Republic 
that in  the other countries of the region8  (the scale of devastation of the environment 
is  worse than in  the other countries). The growth rates of fixed  capital in construction 
which is  almost the same as  that of machinery and equipment may be another explana-
tion. 
Relatively low  level  of ICORs in  the period 1996-2005  in all  the countries except the 
Czech  Republic  assumptions  about  increasing  economic  efficiency  obtained  thanks  to 
privatisation,  structural  changes  (diminishing  share  of capital-intensive,  non  efficient 
branches), imports of know-how and introduction of new technologies. 
Table 15.  Various characteristics of the economic growth 
Elasticities of  Share of  the private  Science and education 
Exports  Imports  sector in% of GDP  as% ofGDP 
with  respect to  GDP 
1992  2005  1992  2005 
Czech Republic  2.04  2.32  20  86  5.0  6.1 
Hungary  1.03  1.62  35  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Poland  1.98  2.01  49  87  4.8  6.0 
Slovakia  2.02  1.78  20  80  2.0  2.2 
Income polarisation  Saving ratio  (saving  Spending on food 
coefficient  as% of  personal income)  (as% of expenditures) 
1992  2005  1992  2005  1992  2005 
Czech Republic  5.0  4.9  7.8  14.0  31.3  25.3 
Hungary  4.1  4.4  14.0  12.0  33.0  26.0 
Poland  3.1  4.7  9.0  15.3  39.7  27.5 
Slovakia  3.3  5.6  8.2  10.6  39.0  30.1 
The share of the private sector, diversified in 1992, rises in all the countries to the level 
of 80-90%. Extensive  imports of technologies results in  the elasticities of imports with 
respect to GDP ranging from 1. 78  in Slovakia to 2.32 in the Czech Republic (elasticities 
of exports are of a similar scale, but lower, that reflects a general tendency of deteriora-
tion of trade balances; Slovakia is  the only exemption from  this rule). 
Relatively high  growth rates in the Central European countries are obtained thanks to 
the wide  investment programs. Financing of these programs  re~uires growing domestic 
propensity to save. The saving ratio grows to two-digit numbers  in all the countries but 
Hungary. The specific position of Hungary results from the fact, that the country initially 
has the highest domestic saving ratio and enjoys the highest ratio of participation of the 
foreign  capital in financing fixed  capital formation  in  the whole  period 1992-2005  (18-
20% ).  In the other countries a similar relative level is  obtained only in the last years of 
the period. 
The economic growth of the CEC, as presented in the scenarios, is not free from macro-
economic tensions. Budget deficits remain considerably high (especially in Poland). The 
main reason for it is  a gap between social needs that are to be financed by  the budget 
and social security system  and the available  resources.  The deficit level remains in the 
8  Such investment does not have direct production effects: consequently, the fixed capital grows more rapidly than outpout 
and the ICOR value increases. 
9  Growing saving ratio results both from growing income and from growing polarization of income. The income polariza-
tion coefficient presented in  the table grows in  all the countries (except Czech Republic) from around 3 in  1992 to 4-5 
in 2005.  In the same time expenditure structures start to be more similar to the structures of Western European coun-
tries:  the share of food  falls. 
-30-scenario  unchanged  in  Poland.  In Hungary  the  deficit  considerably falls,  while  in  the 
Czech Republic grows  (from the very low  1992 level). According to the very optimistic 
Slovak scenario the budget deficit in  2005  completely disappears. 
Also  inflation rates are relatively high  by EU standards. All  the scenarios show  a clear 
tendency of slowing  down  inflation (after 2000  the inflation rate stabilises on the level 
of 6-8% ).  It means, that the scenarios assume that the 4%  growth rate may be realised 
in  the long run without a risk of overheating the economy. 
Finally, table 16 presents how the Central European countries deal with the foreign debt 
burden. The most indebted country,  Poland, manages to reduce substantially the debt-
GOP ratio  (mainly thanks to the debt reduction agreements). The fall  is  much smaller 
in the case of Hungary. Such an outcome results from the assumption about continuous 
Hungarian policy of maintaining its good financial standing by  avoiding debt restructur-
ing. The debt situation of Hungary does not improve substantially, but in the same time 
substantial gains  are obtained in  the field  of attracting foreign private investment. 
Table 16. Macroeconomic imbalances 
Budget deficit  Inflation rate  Net foreign  investment 
as% ofGDP  as% ofGFCF* 
1992  2005  1992  2005  1992  2005 
Czech Republic  0.2  2.5  11.1  6.0  12.4  6.4 
Hungary  7.0  3.0  23.0  7.5  20.7  9.0 
Poland  6.1  6.0  43.0  6.8  4.4  9.3 
Slovakia  3.3  0.0  10.0  8.0  8.3  13.3 
Net foreign  debt  Net foreign  debt  Debt service** 
as% ofGDP*  as  % of  exports  (as  % of exports 
1992  2005  1992  2005  1992  2005 
Czech Republic  21.8  6.6  65.0  32.2  5.9  3.0 
Hungary  36.7  21.1  121.8  57.4  11.0  5.2 
Poland  58.1  10.3  347.1  77.0  31.2  6.9 
Slovakia  35.2  16.8  55.0  60.0  8.7  5.1 
*  For 1992 Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) and GDP according to current exchange rates. 
For 2005  both according to PPP. 
**  Interests due (according to IMF standards). 
In  all  the  countries  the  debt  service-to-exports  ratio  falls  considerably.  The  most 
impressive reduction takes place in Poland (from 31% to 7%) and Hungary (from 11% 
to 5% ). In any of the countries the debt service-to-exports ratio does not exceed 7%  (in 
the case of the Czech Republic it  is  on the level of 3% ). 
2.4.4.  Final demand components 
The general observation one may make about the scenarios' results is that the investment 
demand and exports demand play  a crucial  role  in  development of the aggregate final 
demand in  all  CEC (see table 17). 
-31-Table 17. Growth of final  demand categories 
Index 2005  Growth  rate  Structure  Structure  As% ofGDP 
(1992=100)  1992-2005  1992  2005  of increase  1992  2005 
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
Czech Republic 
Total  150.7  3.2  100.0  100.0  100.0  29.2  31.7 
Machinery &  equipment  153.4  3.3  49.6  50,5  52.2  14.5  16.0 
Other investment  148.0  3.1  50.4  49.5  47.8  14.7  15.7 
Hungary 
Total  233.3  6.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  20.4  30.8 
Machinery &  equipment  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Other investment  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Poland 
Total  295.9  8.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  19.2  32.2 
Machinery &  equipment  465.9  12.6  31.8  50.0  59.3  6.1  16.1 
Other investment  216.7  6.1  68.2  50.0  40.7  13.1  16.1 
Slovak Republic 
Total  167.0  4.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  27.9  27.6 
Machinery &  equipment  184.2  4.8  65.9  72.7  82.8  18.4  20.1 
Other investment  133.7  2.3  34.1  27.3  17.2  9.5  7.5 
CONSUMPTION 
Czech Republic 
Total  130.9  2.1  100.0  100.0  100.0  71.0  67.0 
Personal consumption  136.0  2.4  76.7  79.7  89.4  54.5  53.4 
Public consumption  114.1  1.0  23.3  20.3  10.6  16.5  13.6 
Hungary 
Total  135.9  2.4  100.0  100.0  100.0  81.7  71.8 
Personal consumption  135.8  2.4  84.7  84.6  84.4  69.2  60.8 
Public consumption  136.6  2.4  15.3  15.4  15.6  12.5  11.0 
Poland 
Total  152.7  3.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  78.4  67.8 
Personal consumption  154.4  3.4  76.9  77.8  79.4  60.3  52.7 
Public consumption  147.0  3.0  23.1  22.2  20.6  18.1  15.1 
Slovak Republic 
Total  151.3  3.2  100.0  100.0  100.0  74.4  66.8 
Personal consumption  161.1  3.7  68.6  73.0  81.7  51.1  48.8 
Public consumption  129.9  2.0  31.4  27.0  18.3  23.4  18.0 
FOREIGN DEMAND 
Czech  Republic 
Net exports  35.1  -7.7  - - - 4.0  1.0 
Exports  190.8  5.1  - - - 38.2  52.5 
Imports  209.3  5.8  - - - 34.1  51.5 
Hungary 
Net exports  265.6  7.8  - - - -1.2  -2.1 
Exports  200.6  5.5  - - - 30.2  39.1 
Imports  205.1  5.6  - - - 31.4  41.2 
Poland 
Net exports  545.0  13.9  - - - -0.3  -0.9 
Exports  303.7  8.9  - - - 24.5  42.1 
Imports  306.5  9.0  - - - 24.8  43.0 
Slovak Republic 
Net exports  23.0  -10.7  - - - 5.2  -0.7 
Exports  203.0  5.6  - - - 35.3  42.5 
Imports  180.0  4.6  - - - 40,5  43.2 
-32-The rate of growth of the fixed  capital formation exceeds significantly the average GDP 
growth  rate  (only  in  the  case  of Slovakia  both  rates  are  similar).  Particularly  high 
dynamics  of investment  demand  is  foreseen  for  Poland  (8.7%  yearly)  and  Hungary 
(6.5% ).  The general tendency can be also  observed of a faster than average growth of 
investment in machinery and equipment (particularly in  Poland; the optimistic scenario 
for this country assumes a highly efficient policy of replacing the old equipment with the 
new  one,  with  a maximal  use  of existing  well  developed  productive  structures10). The 
share  of investment  demand in  GDP is  initially  rather high  in  the  Czech  and  Slovak 
Republics  (28-29% ),  but low  in  Poland  and  Hungary  (19-20% ).  In  the year  2005  the 
share is  similar in all  the countries, ranging from 28%  in  Slovakia to 32%  in Poland. 
It is  also  the  case  of the  foreign  demand  (exports)  that  its  growth  rate  significantly 
exceeds the average GDP growth. As  it was  pointed out in  the point 2 of this chapter, 
the rate of growth of exports is  roughly twice  as  high,  as  in  the case of GDP (Hungary 
is  the only  exemption,  mainly due to  an  expected very  poor trade performance in  the 
years 1993-1996). This phenomenon is  due to an assumed good competitive position of 
the CEC,  resulting from  the relatively cheap and highly  skilled labour, but also  due to 
a very low initial share in the world market. The ratio of exports to GDP increases from 
25-30%  in  1992  (38%  for the Czech Republic) to 30-52%  in  2005. 
In spite of the fast growth of the foreign demand, the net exports falls in all the countries 
but Slovakia (in the case of Slovakia, however, the initial net exports is strongly negative, 
and  remains  negative  until  2000).  This  is  due  to  higher  growth  rates  of imports  than 
exports,  resulting  from  the  massive  imports  of investment  goods  and maintaining  the 
openness of all  the CEC economies (the ratios of imports to GDP range in 2005  from 
40%  in Hungary and 43%  in a relatively big Polish economy to over 50% in the Czech 
economy). 
The growth of the personal consumption is more modest than in the case of investment 
in  all  the  countries  (ranging  from  2.4%  in  the  Czech  Republic  to  3.7%  in  Slovakia). 
Nevertheless, it is generally higher than in the case of the public consumption. Total con-
sumption grows  by  3-3.3%  yearly  (only in  the Czech Republic the growth is  limited to 
2.1% ),  and its  share in GDP falls  in all  CEC economies. 
Significant changes take place in the structure of the personal consumption. They result 
from  the average  real growth of income  and adopting Western consumption standards 
as  well as  from changes in the households' income distribution (see the table 18). 
10  The  economic  scenario  for  Poland  assumes  a  radical  'reforging'  of the  fixed  capital  (using  Kalecki's  terminology), 
thanks to the fast  and radical privatization and selling assets by the state-owned firms  to the private sector. 
-33-Table 18. Households' consumption structure 
Index 2005  Growth rate  Structure  Structure 
(1992=100)  1992-2005  1992  2005  of increase 
Czech Republic 
Total  136.0  2.4  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Food  109.9  0.7  31.3  25.3  8.6 
Other goods & services  147.9  3.1  68.7  74.7  91.4 
Hungary 
Total  146.9  3.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Food  115.7  1.1  33.0  26.0  11.1 
Other goods & services  162.2  3.8  67.0  74.0  88.9 
Poland 
Total  154.4  3.4  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Food  107.0  0,5  39.7  27.5  5.1 
Other goods & services  185.6  4.9  60.3  72.5  94.9 
Slovakia 
Total  161.1  3.7  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Food  124.3  1.7  39.0  30.1  15.5 
Other goods & services  184.6  4.8  61.0  69.9  84.5 
As  table  19  shows,  the  maximal  compensation  coefficient  (characterising  the  level  of 
income  polarisation)  increases  significantly  in  all  the  CEC  (growth  ranging  from  1.5 
points  in  the  case  of Hungary to 7 points  in  the case  of Slovakia,  the  country of the 
smallest initial value of the coefficient). In 2005  the coefficient reaches a similar level of 
22-23%,  and the 5th (richest) quintile group accounts for 38.9-39.5% of total income in 
all  the countries. As the result, the saving ratio and the share of services and consumer 
durable in expenditures significantly grows while the share of food in total expenditures 
fall  (from 39-40% in 1992 in Poland and Slovakia and 31-33% in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic to 25-30%  in  2005).  However the share of food in expenditures remains much 
higher than in the majority of the EC countries in 1990 (the highest share among all the 
EC countries in  1990 was  observed in  Greece and was  equal to 29%) 
It is  also worth mentioning, that the significant part of investment spending in the CEC 
is devoted to housing. Despite it, the housing problems are not fully solved in any of the 
countries until 2005.  The level  and the share of investment in housing in  1992 was  far 
below the EC standards). 
Table 19. Households' income distribution 
Maximal 
Quintile distribution  (total households' income =100)  Compensation 
Coefficient (in 
%) 
1st quintile  2nd quintile  3rd quintile  4th quintile  5th quintile 
Czech Republic 
Year 1992  7.5  13.6  18.2  23.3  37.4  20.7 
Year 2005  8.0  12.0  17.0  23.5  39.5  23.0 
Hungary 
Year 1992  9.0  13.7  16.8  21.4  39.1  20,5 
Year 2005  8.5  13.6  15.9  23.0  39.0  22.0 
Poland 
Year 1992  11.3  13.8  17.0  23.0  34.9  17.9 
Year 2005  8.2  12.5  16.6  23.8  38.9  22.7 
Slovakia 
Year 1992  9.9  15.4  18.2  23.3  33.2  16.5 
Year 2005  7.0  13.0  16.5  24.5  39.0  23.5 
-34-2.4.5.  Structural change in the CEC economies 
The economic development of the Central European countries in the period 1992-2005 
results  in  a  tempestuous  structural  change.  In  our opinion,  the  scale  of this  change 
foreseen in the scenarios - although not· enough to reach Western European economic 
structural patterns - seems to be even more important and promising than the projected 
economic growth.  Tables 20  shows  the changes in structures of exports. 
Table 20. Exports by  main trading partners (in% of total exports) 
European  Communities  Central Europe  Eastern  Europe  Other countries 
1992  2005  1992  2005  1992  2005  1992  2005 
Czech Republic  42  55  25  15  16  16  16  14 
Hungary  50  52  6  7  14  12  30  29 
Poland  48  47  7  7  15  15  30  31 
Slovakia  22  45  54  31  12  13  13  11 
Structural changes result both from the wider participation in  the international division 
of labour and adjusting to the new demand patterns. The exports structure is determined 
by  the  growing  economic  links  with  the  EC (the share  of the EC-12  in  total  exports 
ranges from 45 to 55% in 2005. Such a geographic structure (together with the big share 
of the other OECD markets and more and more competitive Central European markets) 
will force a substantial improvement of the quality of production and a continuous search 
for  trade  niches.  The  domestic  demand  pattern  strongly  favourites  the  service  sector 
(mainly  market  services).  Such  an  outcome  results  both  from  changes  in  consumer 
demand  structure  (in  favour  of tourism  and  travel,  cultural  and  recreational  services, 
housing services etc.), and from investment and intermediate demand (financial services, 
consulting,  software,  advertising,  travel,  communication  etc.).  Favourable situation will 
occur for construction. The engineering industry may profit from the growing demand of 
households for consumer durable and transport equipment, as well  as from the demand 
of  firms  for  machinery,  under  the  condition  it  is  able  to  compete  successfully  with 
imports. Tables 21-23  show the changes of value added and employment structures. 
The changes in the value added structure are generally similar in all the CEC economies. 
The share of the agriculture  and forestry will  continuously shrink.  Its value  in  2005  in 
the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics  will  be similar  to  EC standards  (2.3-3.5% ),  while  in 
Poland and Hungary will be still higher (  4.5-6% ). The share of manufacturing will remain 
relatively high  in  the Czech Republic and Poland (  43-46% ),  but will  be much lower in 
Hungary and Slovakia (28% and 34% respectively). The most striking difference between 
the EC economies and CEC economies will be still observed in the share of services in 
GDP.  In spite of the rapid growth, only in  the case of Hungary and Slovakia this level 
will  be close  to EU standards in  2005, while  in  the other countries will be significantly 
lower. 
-35-Table 21. Value added by main economic sectors 
Index 2005  Growth  rate  Structure  Structure 
(1992=100)  1992-2005  1992  2005  of increase 
Czech Republic 
Total GDP  138.7  2.5  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  54.1  -4.6  2.8  1.1  -3.3 
Agriculture &  forestry  62.6  -3.5  5.1  2.3  -4.9 
Manufacturing  118.9  1.3  50.4  43.2  24.6 
Construction  231.2  6.7  8.4  14.0  28.5 
Services  164.2  3.9  33.3  39.4  55.2 
Hungary 
Total GDP  154.6  3.4  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  85.9  -1.2  2.7  1.5  -0.7 
Agriculture &  forestry  109.1  0.7  8.5  6.0  1.4 
Manufacturing  152.5  3.3  28.9  28.5  27.8 
Construction  206.1  5.7  6.0  8.0  11.7 
Services  160.6  3.7  53.9  56.0  59.8 
Poland 
Total GDP  176.6  4.5  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  147.2  3.0  2.4  2.0  1.5 
Agriculture &  forestry  116.9  1.2  6.8  4.5  1.5 
Manufacturing  175.5  4.4  46.6  46.3  45.9 
Construction  199.0  5.4  7.1  8.0  9.2 
Services  186.6  4.9  37.1  39.2  41.9 
Slovakia 
Total GDP  168.7  4.1  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  52.1  -4.9  1.6  0,5  -1.1 
Agriculture &  forestry  93.4  -0,5  6.5  3.6  -0.6 
Manufacturing  123.6  1.6  46.4  34.0  15.9 
Construction  133.2  2.2  9.5  7.5  4.6 
Services  254.9  7.5  36.0  54.4  81.2 
Table 22. Labour productivity by main sectors 
Index 2005  Growth rate  Average rate  Average productivity =  100 
(1992=100)  1992-2005  equal to 100  1992  2005 
Czech Republic 
Average in the economy  129.4  2.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  117.8  1.3  63.2  100.7  91.7 
Agriculture &  forestry  89.7  -0.8  -41.7  61.4  42.6 
Manufacturing  164.2  3.9  194.3  133.0  168.8 
Construction  215.6  6.1  304.3  158.5  264.2 
Services  112.0  0.9  43.7  72.8  63.0 
Hungary 
Average in the economy  158.8  3.6  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  127.0  1.9  51.3  187.5  150.0 
Agriculture &  forestry  209.2  5.8  161.4  43.4  57.1 
Manufacturing  175.1  4.4  121.6  114.9  126.7 
Construction  208.7  5.8  160.8  87.0  114.3 
Services  131.1  2.1  58.2  114.9  94.9 
Poland 
Average in the economy  157.3  3.5  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  369.4  10.6  298.2  77.4  181.8 
Agriculture &  forestry  193.3  5.2  146.7  20.1  24.7 
Manufacturing  126.7  1.8  51.9  209.0  168.4 
Construction  203.5  5.6  158.4  114.5  148.1 
Services  120.3  1.4  40.4  107.2  82.0 
Slovakia 
Average in the economy  151.2  3.2  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  105.0  0.4  11.7  177.8  123.5 
Agriculture &  forestry  125.6  1.8  54.7  54.2  45.0 
Manufacturing  148.3  3.1  95.3  143.2  140,5 
Construction  142.1  2.7  84.8  95.0  89.3 
Services  173.1  4.3  133.5  80,5  92.2 
-36-Table 23. Employment by main economic sectors 
Index 2005  Growth  rate  Structure  Structure 
(1992=100)  1992-2005  1992  2005  of increase 
Czech Republic 
Total employment  107.2  0,5  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  45.9  -5.8  2.8  1.2  -21.0 
Agriculture &  forestry  69.7  -2.7  8.3  5.4  -34.8 
Manufacturing  72.4  -2.5  37.9  25.6  -145.0 
Construction  107.2  0,5  5.3  5.3  5.3 
Services  146.6  3.0  45.7  62.5  295.6 
Hungary 
Total employment  97.4  -0.2  100.0  100.0  -
Mining &  quarrying  67.6  -3.0  1.4  1.0  -
Agriculture &  forestry  52.2  -4.9  19.6  10,5  -
Manufacturing  87.1  -1.1  25.2  22.5  -
Construction  98.8  -0.1  6.9  7.0  -
Services  122.5  1.6  46.9  59.0  -
Poland 
Total employment  112.3  0.9  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  39.8  -6.8  3.1  1.1  -15.2 
Agriculture &  forestry  60.4  -3.8  33.8  18.2  -109.0 
Manufacturing  138.4  2.5  22.3  27.5  69.9 
Construction  97.8  -0.2  6.2  5.4  -1.1 
Services  155.1  3.4  34.6  47.8  155.4 
Slovakia 
Total employment  111.6  0.8  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mining &  quarrying  49.6  -5.3  0.9  0.4  -3.9 
Agriculture &  forestry  74.4  -2.3  12.0  8.0  -26.5 
Manufacturing  83.3  -1.4  32.4  24.2  -46.6 
Construction  93.7  -0,5  10.0  8.4  -5.4 
Services  147.3  3.0  44.7  59.0  182.5 
Changes in  the value added structure, together with the sectoral pattern of changes of 
the labour productivity resulting both from  the growth  of the fixed  capital endowment 
per employee and from restructuring processes (especially in the primary sector), result 
in  the changing employment structure (table 23). 
The  scenarios  presume  the  transformation  of  the  labour  structures,  namely  that  in 
accordance  with  the  international trends  the  proportion of industrial  and  agricultural 
employees will decrease, while the labour demand of the broadly interpreted service sec-
tor will increase significantly (the only partial exemption from this rule is Poland, dealing 
with the major task of the massive shift of employment from  agriculture: consequently, 
the share of industry in employment will  increase). 
The share of employment in agriculture will fall considerably in all the countries. In the 
year 2005  it will  range from  5%  in the Czech Republic and 8%  in Slovakia (both close 
to EC 1990  standards) through 10%  in Hungary to  18%  in Poland. The high  share of 
the  agricultural employment in  Poland will  be maintained despite a fast  process of its 
reduction (the share falls  in the period 1992-2005 by almost 50%). 
The share of mining and quarrying in total employment will  shrink to  about 1% in  all 
the countries (similar level to EC 1990 standards). The share of manufacturing will fall 
to about 25%  in  all four countries. 
Services share in  employment will  grow  quickly,  reaching 60%  in  all  the countries but 
Poland (in Poland it will only reach 48% of total, mainly because of an excessive employ-
ment in agriculture). 
-37-Table 24 shows structural change intensity and similarity with the EC employment struc-
ture coefficients for  the four countries. 
Table 24.  Structural change in  the economics * 
Structural change  Similarity coefficient of the employ-
intensity coefficient  ment structure between the country 
in  the period 1992-2005  and EC 
Value  added  Employment  1992  2005 
Czech Republic  88.3  83.2  80.7  96.2 
Hungary  95.9  87.8  83.4  95.5 
Poland  97.0  81.6  70,5  82.9 
Slovakia  82.7  85.7  81.1  94.9 
*Intensity of the structural change (in a period) and a distance between 2 structures (in the same moment) are measured 
by a coefficient defined as  ~i min(xio  Yi), where  Xj, Yi  mean shares of the sector i in  the first and the second structure 
respectively. If  2 structures are identical, or there was no structural change, the value of the coefficient is equal to 100. 
The smaller the value of the coefficient, the bigger the distance between 2 structures. 
The coefficients show  that Slovakia will  witness  the fastest  change  of the value  added 
structure in  the period  1992-2005  (Poland  has  the smallest change).  On the  contrary, 
Poland has the intensive structural change in employment  11• The employment structures 
in 1992 vary significantly from the EU average in all the countries (the biggest difference 
in Poland). However, until the year 2005  the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary 
approach  the  EC  1990  structure,  and  Poland  substantially  reduces  the  distance  (that 
remains still high). 
11  Such an outcome is possible, because of the specific pattern of the Polish employment restructuring. A radical reduction 
of the  agricultural employment has almost no impact on the value added structure. 
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Figure 12. Employment in the Central European countries, 2005. 
2.4.6.  Overall assessment of results 
The scenarios of the economic development of the Central European countries show a 
considerable progress that may be obtained in all four countries until the year 2005. The 
following figure  13  compares the growth rates of various economic categories in all the 
scenarios with region's averages:  · 
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Figure 13. Economic development of the Central European economies, 1992-2005. 
All  the scenarios end with  the similar balance between the three growth rates and the 
incremental  productivity of capital  (reciprocal  of the  ICOR). All  the  quadrangles  are 
similar to the square. The most striking observation is generally more pessimistic pattern 
of the development of the Czech Republic (the area of the quadrangle much lower than 
the average). One may also note, that the aggregate growth characteristics (GDP growth 
rate  and  ICOR) are better than the average  in  Poland  (the quadrangle is  elongated), 
while  the  characteristics  of  the  social  efficiency  of growth:  consumption  and  labour 
productivity growth are better than the average in Hungary (the quadrangle is widened). 
Figure  14  presents the economic situation of the  Central European countries in  1992. 
The axes  show the major imbalances that the CEC economies suffered. 
The most difficult situation was this one of Poland (the biggest area of the quadrangle), 
the best situation was  in  the Czech Republic. 
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Figure 14. Major imbalances in the Central European economies,  1992. 
The biggest problems of the Czech Republic were the foreign  debt and  inflation (both 
considerably below the region's average). The situation of Slovakia was worse, mainly due 
to the high unemployment rate and the budget deficit (the latter still below the region's 
average).  Hungary suffered more tension that the Czech  and Slovak Republics,  mainly 
because  of the  highest  budget  deficit  out of the  four,  high  unemployment  rate  (also 
above  the  average),  foreign  debt burden and  inflation  (both high,  but below the four 
country  average).  Finally  Poland  had  all  the  indicators  worse  than  the  four  country 
average, with especially big problem of the foreign debt and more than average inflation 
and the budget deficit. Only in the case of the unemployment rate the situation of Poland 
did not differ significantly from the four country average. 
The similar figure  15  presents the situation in  2005. 
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Figure 15. Major imbalances in Central European countries, 2005. 
The  ranking  of  the  countries  by  the  relative  scope  of  macroeconomic  imbalances 
(represented by  the  area of quadrangles)  has  not changed.  However,  the  differences 
between the areas have  diminished considerably,  and all  of them have  approached the 
average (the shape of a square; the only exemption is Slovakia, that has obtained a better 
than the other countries budgetary equilibrium). 
The Czech Republic still occupies the smallest area of the quadrangle. All the economic 
imbalances are smaller than in  the other three countries. Slovakia has the debt burden 
and inflation indicators close to the region's average, but no budget deficit and the unem-
ployment rate considerably smaller. Hungary has all  the indicators close  to the region's 
average, with the exemption of the smaller than average budget deficit. Poland has the 
biggest  area  and  a  widened  shape  of the  quadrangle,  resulting  from  the  bigger  than 
average  budget  deficit  and  foreign  debt  problems.  Generally  speaking,  the  Central 
European countries in the year 2005  are more resembling each other from the point of 
view  of the major macroeconomic problems to deal with than it was  in  the year 1992. 
It could  be noted  that  the  Czech  Republic  having  the  best  situation  as  far  as  major 
imbalances  are  concerned,  has  at  the  same  time  the  lowest  indicators  of economic 
development in  the period 1992-2005. 
2.5.  Major challenges for  the economic scenario 
The challenges for the scenarios for all the Central European countries are manifold and 
often common for all four countries. It is impossible to deal with them in the framework 
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important challenges of key systemic importance are: 
2.5.1.  Availability of resources to finance ambitious investment programs 
The resources may originate from both internal and external sources. As far as internal 
sources are concerned there is  a need to increase households' propensity to save (  espe-
cially in Poland and Hungary). The basic preconditions are: stable money, low inflation, 
obvious incentives for savings  including taxation and interest rates policy. 
Another important element of the internal sources are savings of firms.  An accelerated 
depreciation should be allowed and investment tax relives should be expanded. The tax 
system should allow for the increase of the profitability of both private and state owned 
firms.  Public sector deficits should be reduced to avoid the crowding-out effect. 
The second important source of investment funds is the foreign capital. All the measures 
should be undertaken to  encourage  the  inflow  of foreign  investments.  The basic pre-
conditions  for  attracting  foreign  investors  are:  political,  social  and  economic  stability; 
stable rules of economic game; transparent ownership rights; systemic inventiveness (con-
ditions not worse than in the competitor countries - including the poorest EU countries, 
Latin American countries and ex-Soviet countries). 
Sensitivity analysis showing the importance of the problem of disposability of investment 
funds  for  the scenario was  executed only  for  Poland (presented in  the Part IV of the 
Polish national scenario). The general conclusion is  that a lack of resources and incen-
tives  for  extensive  investment may be one of the most important (or simply  the most 
important) factor that may endanger the realisation of the scenarios in all  the CEC. 
2.5.2.  Foreign debt burden 
All the Central European countries must normalise their situation on international finan-
cial markets. The policies that may be applied to obtain it depend on the initial situation 
of the countries and may vary.  However it is  essential that each country works out the 
solution acceptable for  both the country and its  creditors. Lack of such  an agreement 
may  jeopardize the growth  pattern presented in  the  scenario  (compare  the sensitivity 
analysis  executed for Poland). 
2.5.3.  Access  to major foreign markets 
A broad access to the EU markets is  of a crucial importance for the Central European 
countries. Favourable trade conditions may be created in the framework of Association 
Agreements (Europe Agreements) with the EU. The major threat for this process may 
come from the excessive use of protectionist trade policy tools on both sides. 
Every effort should be made to rebuild trade links with the area of the ex-USSR (the 
economic chaos and lack of foreign  currencies in  the former Soviet Republics may be 
a major obstacle). 
The economic cooperation among the Central European countries should be encouraged 
as well. There is a room for a significant improvement in this field, since the current level 
of economic cooperation is  regarded as  not satisfactory. 
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Economic policy inducing a technological change should take into account contradictory 
effects of the choice of the type of technology. 
It is  extremely  important  that  the  countries  follow  the  mainstream  of technological 
development.  Imports  of  new  technologies  should  allow  the  inflow  of  up-to-date 
technological  know-how,  leading  to  an  improvement of the  efficiency  of the  economy 
through the increasing productivity of labour and capital. Only under such conditions the 
competitive  position  of the  Central  European  countries  may  be  maintained  or even 
improved. 
On the other hand the increasing productivity of labour (a product of a capital intensive 
technology)  may create a major danger for the policy of countervailing unemployment. 
The resulting social tensions might jeopardize the path of economic reforms and growth. 
2.5.5.  Creation of the market friendly environment 
In spite  of the  continuous  reform  programs  the  level  of development  of the  market 
infrastructure  in  the  Central  European  countries  still  differs  significantly  from  the 
developed  market  economies.  Further efforts  are  needed for  the  development of the 
economic  institutions  such  as  banking  and  financi~l  system,  financial  regulations, 
insurance  institutions  (including  the  system  of guaranties  and  re-insurance),  labour 
market regulations etc. 
2.5.6.  Microeconomic change on the firms' level and privatisation 
Privatisation  of  the  big  state  owned  firms  plays  a  major  role  in  inducing  the 
microeconomic  change,  crucial  for  the  macroeconomic  success  of  the  transition 
economies. Growth of the share of the private sector (more efficient than the public sec-
tor)  is  a  precondition for  obtaining  high  rates  of growth  of GDP and  of total  factor 
productivity. The role of the State in the economy should be limited. The public sector 
should be reduced to a well defined level and limited to fields of a strategic importance. 
2.5. 7.  Macroeconomic imbalances 
All the Central European countries must proceed the economic policy aimed at a reduc-
tion of macroeconomic imbalances, such as:  cost pushed and demand pulled inflationary 
pressure, balance of payments problems, budgetary problems, unemployment. It should 
be realised by policy makers that cumulation of economic imbalances may slow down or 
even stop the process of growth. As it was  stated before, a persistent situation of high 
unemployment rates and stagnation of the real income may lead to social and political 
tensions. 
2.5.9.  Restructuring the agricultural sector 
The level of development, share in the total GDP and employment, ownership structure 
and the way  of functioning  of agricultural sectors differs among the Central European 
countries.  The Central European countries  are likely to produce important surplus of 
food  and to try to locate it on the foreign markets. 
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policies, first of all promoting growth of efficiency of their agriculture. The policies must 
take into account various constraints: budget constraint (the Central European countries 
can not afford high-costly subsidising systems),  social constraint (the outflow of people 
from agriculture must be controlled to avoid the rapid growth of unemployment, espe-
cially  in  Poland},  external constraint (the effective  foreign  demand for  CEC produced 
food will be probably limited in the EU and the other OECD markets by trade policies, 
and  in  the former  Soviet Republics by  a lack of foreign  exchange;  thus obtaining the 
broadest possible access to foreign markets and maintaining competitiveness of the CEC 
agricultural products have the vital importance for  the agricultural policies). 
Restructuring of the agricultural sector will  create one of the most difficult elements of 
the process of the economic integration between the EU and Central European coun-
tries. The agricultural policies should be aimed at reducing the obstacles in this process. 
2.5.9.  Long term problems of the social security financing 
Serious threat for the economic growth may be also induced by a system of financing the 
social needs. The existing social security systems of the CEC do not correspond to new 
economic conditions  and must be profoundly reformed.  Lack of such  a  reform would 
lead to a growing gap in social security funds and eventually to an increase of the budget 
deficit.  The importance  of the  problem is  enhanced by  demographic processes in  the 
region. 
2.5.10.  Central European countries vis-a-vis Maastricht 
National scenarios assume that the target of joining the European Union will be achieved 
by all the Central European countries. However, the Maastricht convergence criteria may 
be extremely difficult to meet in the horizon of the year 2005. Therefore the preferential 
treatment of the Central European countries by  the European Union has  an essential 
importance for fulfilment the scenario. 
While  evaluating  membership  applications  of  the  Central  European  countries,  the 
European Union should not concentrate only  on their present economic situation and 
level  of development.  Several  factors  of a  potential future  importance  for  the  Union 
should be taken into consideration. They include: 
the social and intellectual potential of the CEC; 
the anticipated size of the market, the likely structure of the demand favourable for 
West European exporting industries 
the possible high growth dynamics of the CEC; 
the special role of a bridge between the European Union and the East (former USSR 
area) that may be played by  the Central European countries. 
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SOCIO-POLITICAL PROCESSES 
3.1.  Social structure 
Social  structure  in  Central European countries  is  largely  the  result  of the communist 
past.  In the early period of the communist rule,  a radical  agrarian  reform was  carried 
out,  dispossessing  landowners;  the industry and then retail trade were  nationalised.  In 
this manner the government put an end to the class of big landowners as well  as small-
scale  owners  working  on  their  own.  In  the  1950s  a  large-scale  collectivisation  of 
agriculture was  undertaken, which dispossessed small farmers. The establishment of the 
collective  farms  was  fully  successful  in  Czechoslovakia  and  Hungary,  but in  Poland it 
ended in  failure,  both because of farmers'  resistance  and due to lack of determination 
of the authorities. After 1956,  the Polish government utterly abandoned collectivisation 
in  agriculture. 
The 'socialist industrialisation' which caused migration of population from rural to urban 
areas and to industry was  another factor of changes in the social structure. In Poland it 
contributed to emergence of a numerous stratum of peasant-workers (called in Polish hi-
professionals) who continued to keep their small farms and at the same time worked in 
factories. 
As  a  result  of this  transformation,  social  structure in the post-communist countries  is 
characterised by a much higher share of hired labour than in Western countries, includ-
ing .the blue collar and the white collar employees, and additionally by  a high share of 
farmers.  However,  there  the  middle  class,  entrepreneurs  and  well-paid  specialists  are 
poorly represented in the socio-professional structure. 
It should  also  be added that structural transformation of the society  after the Second 
World War overlapped the previously existing differences. In the Czech Republic and in 
Hungary there existed  a strong lower  middle  class,  but in  Poland and Slovakia  it was 
much  weaker.  In  the  two  latter countries,  the  stratum  of peasants was  numerous;  in 
Poland there was also a class of the gentry deeply rooted in the tradition of the nobility. 
The results of comparative studies on social stratification show that peculiarities of social 
structure in  Central European countries are well perceived, because the persons inter-
viewed see their place in the society in a different way than the citizens of Western coun-
tries (see table 25). 
Table 25. Self-ranking on the stratification axis  of social position in 1991 
Country/ranking  Low  2  3  4  High 
Czech Republic  9.1  34.9  47.4  8.2  .5 
Hungary  14.2  37.6  43.1  4.8  .2 
Poland  15.3  30.6  43.7  9.1  1.3 
Slovakia  5.0  42.4  47.4  4.0  1.2 
West Germany  2.8  16.4  49.8  29.0  2.0 
Netherlands  1.2  6.0  43.0  47.6  2.1 
Source:  M.Tucek:  Social class structure of Society in the Czech Republic. 
The table shows  that a considerable part of respondents, in the West and in post-com-
munist countries alike, place themselves in the middle of the scale. The greatest differen-
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themselves on the lower levels of the scale, unlike the Western countries, where a larger 
number of respondents declare themselves as upper middle class and upper class. A sub-
jective dimension of social structure is well depicted by its real, flat and peakless charac-
ter. 
Four years of systemic transformation gave rise to transformation of social structure: first 
of all, the category of entrepreneurs increased and the process of restoration of the mid-
dle class  (see table 26}. 
Table 26. Socio-professional structure in 1992 and the prospected structure in 2005,  in % 
Country  Higher pro- White  collar  Entrepreneurs  Blue collar  Farmers  fessionals  employees  workers 
1992 
Czech Republic  8  34  8  43  7 
Hungary  8  38  7  33  14 
Poland  6  27  7  40  20 
Slovakia  8  35  5  46  6 
2005 
Czech Republic  10  32  16  37  5 
Hungary  12  34  12  32  10 
Poland  10  31  9  36  14 
Slovakia  12  32  13  38  5 
In all countries, despite the difference in  percentage value,  in  the particular categories 
there occur similar tendencies of changes in social structure: increase in the number of 
entrepreneurs and of intellectuals workers,  as well  as  decrease of the share of workers 
and farmers in  social structure. The share of peasants, except Poland, will be similar in 
all  countries to that of the EU. 
Modernisation of the socio-professional structure will  entail the following  processes: 
Continuing transfer of labour from agriculture to non-agricultural occupation; 
Continuing privatisation and increase of the number of self-employed; 
Progress of tertiary education; 
Increase of employment in services, including those of high  quality; 
Decrease of industrial employment  and  of manual  and partly also  of routine  non-
manual work. 
The transformation process will entail considerable disparities in population incomes and 
strong social  stratification.  On the one hand,  the gaining strata, i.e.  entrepreneurs and 
highly qualified specialists, will become clearly distinguished; on the other hand, anum-
ber of population groups will appear which will relatively lose or benefit solely to a small 
extent  due  to  transformation.  The  losers  will  chiefly  include  workers,  especially  low-
qualified ones, some groups of pensioners and part of rural population. High unemploy-
ment,  which  will  range  from  10  to  20%  (depending on the  country),  will  give  rise  to 
severe social tensions. 
3.2.  Social attitudes during systemic transformation 
3.2.1.  Factors determining socio-political attitudes 
The most important factors affecting socio-political attitudes in Central European coun-
tries in the early 1990s are as follows:  1.  class and stratum position; 2.  cultural tradition; 
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political crisis as well as  shattered hopes related to the fall  of communism
12
• 
1.  The attitudes of higher staff and white collars,  including managers and entrepreneurs, 
differ from the attitudes of blue collars with reference to major economic problems, such 
as: social inequalities, priorities in price regulation, worker's self-government, acceptance 
of the authority in the enterprise, and attitude toward state intervention in the economy. 
Blue collars - more often than other social categories - are opposed to social inequalities, 
approve of the administrative regulation of incomes, are the supporters of participation 
of the employees in the management of the enterprise, and are in favour of state inter-
ventionism.  Since  the percentage of blue collars  in social structure is  very high,  their 
attitudes are of great social importance. 
2.  Cultural factors determining social attitudes are the outcome of historically accumulated 
common experiences, the most persistent and common being the influence of religion 
and the related institutions and habits.  Despite an all-embracing influence of modern 
civilisation, these differences appeared to be long-lasting and the Catholics differ from 
the  Protestants  not  only  in  case  of comparisons  between  countries  but  also  within 
individual countries. The attitudes of adherents of a given religion result not so much 
from current recommendations of the Church authorities as from the character of world 
outlook, particularly from definite relations between God and people. 
The results of current investigations show that - in general - the Catholic milieu exhibits 
greater tendency than the Protestants to collectivism,  group unification  of behaviour, 
greater political and moral tolerance, preference of cooperation to competition, justice 
to the property laws  and demand for state interventionism. 
This leads to the conclusion that the influence of the Catholic religion, due to seemingly 
uniform character of the society - in terms of the religion professed - is greater in Poland 
than in the Czech Republic or in Hungary, where the influence of Protestantism was 
much stronger. 
Apatt from the impact of religion on social attitudes, of importance is also the tradition 
of the burger's culture which was much stronger in  the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
but much weaker in Slovakia and Poland. 
3.  Communism and its economic and political institutions are other factors which shaped 
socio-political attitudes of Central European societies. (So far, no systematic comparative 
studies were conducted to evaluate how communism shaped people's attitudes). It used 
to refer  to earlier  popular  archetypes justice, wise  authority  and  perfect equality of 
people,  which  enables  unlimited  social  promotion.  Besides,  communist  institutions 
created  a  specific  system  of  group  interests,  clearly  emphasising  their  etatist  and 
revindication  character.  However,  the  influence  of communism  on social  attitudes is 
often overestimated, since the cultural background of Central European societies, as well 
as the influence of traditional values preserved in the family,  and in Poland the force of 
influence of the Catholic Church, in some way levelled the ideological pressure of the 
regime. 
4.  Another factor shaping socio-political attitudes in post-communist countries was the type 
of social  identification  through  family-colleague  groups,  which  certainly  exist  in  any 
society, but in countries which experienced communist regime, family-colleague groups, 
due  to  their protective  functions  against  the  institutions  of an all-embracing  state, 
acquired an exceptionally great influence on the life of individuals. This indicated that 
12  In Czech opinion polls, age  is an important independent variable. 
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and  continue  to  constitute  the  principal  forum  for  political  expression.  Thus,  these 
groups have come to be the basis for the structuring of the society and a strong field for 
social identification. 
This situation resulted in the demand - learned in  the course of everyday socialisation 
-for  emotional contact in  the  public  sphere with  members  of one's own  group;  thus, 
people adversely react to  impersonal characters of ties  indispensable in economic and 
political organisations. The displacement of the economic or political activity beyond the 
micro-group impairs its system of ties. This counteracts the establishment of associations 
that might be a field  of different social identification than the micro-group. 
The  relations  in  micro-groups  are  usually  informal,  therefore  the  stress  is  laid  on 
equality  and  consistence  of views  and  behaviour.  The  groups  shape  people  in  an 
egalitarian  way,  emotionally  rather than pragmatically,  and  react  negatively  to  any 
aspects of competition. 
5.  The influence of the place of residence on socio-political attitudes is  quite important, 
too.  For example,  the  investigations  conducted  in  Poland  show  that differences  in 
town  size  -regardless  of  structural  differentiation,  including  the  type  of  industry, 
education level, or professional structure - are significantly bound up with differentia-
tion of socio-political attitudes. There is  a clear-cut division between the syndrome of 
attitudes of a large  town,  differing from those prevailing in smaller towns.  In bigger 
cities we observe a relatively stronger feeling of alienation, political radicalism, weaker 
authoritarianism and lesser psychical comfort. Against this background, the attitudes 
of rural inhabitants are quite distinct, being characterised by equally great feeling of 
alienation as in a large town, high intensity of authoritarian attitudes and greater sense 
of psychical comfort. 
6.  Strong indications of pessimism, both with regard to the situation of the country and 
of an individual's own situation, result not only from the objective economic situation, 
which, for example in  Poland has shown some symptoms of improvement since 1992, 
but first  of all  from  shattered hopes.  Instead of a radical  improvement of material 
standards - as  had been expected - the standard of living of the majority of Central 
European societies has considerably decreased (though to various extent in  the par-
ticular countries), unemployment appeared, which was not known before, free or half-
free social benefits were cut. It is,  therefore, easy to understand that pessimism and 
frustration are gaining in strength, the latter - especially in Poland - finding its expres-
sion in  attempts to  protest: numerous strikes and demonstrations. 
3.2.2.  General assessment of transformation 
The investigations conducted in four countries of the Visegrad Group on the assessment 
of systemic  transformation have  brought fairly  pessimistic results13• In June 1992 more 
than  50%  Czechs  and  Slovaks  (before  the  split  of the  federation)  believed  that  the 
economic situation in  their country would  improve  in  the future.  The Poles  expressed 
almost  the same  economic optimism in  October 1992.  In June 1992  some 50%  of the 
Hungarians did  not expect economic improvement, while in October 1992,  the number 
of the pessimists in this country rose to 60% 14• 
13  The MACRO P.J.G.  surveys conducted in June and October 1992  in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. 
14  The chapter includes information from public opinion polls in four countries. But it should be borne in mind that these 
data cannot be fully compared because the questions asked were not always identical. Thus, the results of the investiga-
tions are barely estimates. 
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was  similar.  The respondents pointed to  the following  factors  endangering social  equi-
librium:  increasing  risk  of unemployment,  decreasing  incomes  and  growing  distrust of 
public opinion vis-a-vis  the policy of systemic transformation. 
The assessment of a new system based on the market economy and a democratic system 
of government has by no means been univocal, which is  evidenced by the answer to the 
question:  'How  do  you evaluate the present regime  as  compared to  the previous one' (see 
table  27).  In June  1992,  over 50%  of the  Czechs  and Slovaks  (before  the  split of the 
federation)  believed that the economic situation in their country would  improve  in  the 
future. The Poles reached almost the same level of economic optimism in October 1992. 
In June  1992,  some  50% Hungarians did  not  expect  economic  improvement, while  in 
October 1992 the number of pessimists in  this country rose to 60%. 
Table 27.  Evaluation of the present regime* 
Country  much better  better  the  same  worse  much worse 
Czech Republic  26  45  14  11  4 
Hungary  4  28  28  31  9 
Poland  18  33  26  11  12 
Slovakia  8  35  22  20  15 
* The question was:  'What is  the present regime like, compared with the former one?' 
Source:  M.  Thcek:  Popular  Attitudes  Towards  the  Transformation  of Czech  Society.  According  to:  the  International 
Research Dismantling of Social Safety Net (1991). 
The results  show  that only  the Czechs univocally evaluate systemic change.  Only some 
15% of the respondents hold that the present regime is worse than the previous one. The 
Poles  are more sceptical,  sharing this opinion in 23%.  On the other hand,  35% of the 
Slovaks  and 40% of the Hungarians state that the previous regime was  better. 
Also the investigations conducted by 'Eurobarometer' in 1992 in  18 countries of Eastern 
and Central Europe as well as  in  the former Soviet republics confirm sceptical feelings 
vis-a-vis  the results  of democratic  and market reforms.  Many  citizens  believe  that the 
communist political system  was  better than the present variety of unstable democracy: 
53% of the Hungarians and 39% of the Poles held that the previous system was better 
(only 34% of the interviewed Poles answered that they were more satisfied with the pre-
sent democracy). 
General  assessment  of the  market  economy was  less  negative  than  the  evaluation  of 
efficiency of democratic institutions.  In all  countries under investigation the number of 
people dissatisfied with democracy exceeded the number of those who were satisfied. A 
certain  improvement  in  the  assessment  in  1992  (in  comparison  with  'Eurobarometer' 
1991) was  recorded in  the Czech Republic (by  10  points)  and in  Poland (by  5 points). 
However,  in  Slovakia  and Hungary positive perception of democracy was  less frequent 
than in  1991. 
There were also great differences in the degree of approval for  the governments, their 
achievements  and  efficiency  in  pursuing  their  policies.  More  than  two-thirds  of the 
Hungarians disapproved of the policy of their government, and only less than 10% were 
ready  to  support the  style  and  contents  of this  policy.  The  Poles  were  sceptical with 
regard to the achievements of H.Suchocka's liberal-Catholic coalition, but the number of 
supporters was  slightly  higher than the  number of opponents in  October 1992.  In the 
autumn  of  the  same  year,  the  Czechs  and  Slovaks  were  most  satisfied  with  the 
achievements of their government despite some anxiety in view of the split of the federa-
tion. 
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mation are twofold.  On the one hand, there are opponents of capitalist transformation 
of the economy (retrogrades); on the other hand, there are people expressing discontent 
regarding the rate and compromise character of changes (radicals). 
The citizens of Central Europe are  afraid of their future  and this feeling  is  shared by 
the majority of the respondents in four countries (see table 28). 
Table 28.  Anxiety of the future* 
Country  Definitely yes  Definitely no 
1  2  3  4  5 
Czech Republic  29  33  24  10  4 
Hungary  57  28  13  2  0 
Poland  52  35  8  4  1 
Slovakia  48  31  15  5  1 
* The question was:  'Are you afraid of losing your social security? Are you  uneasy about the future?' 
The inhabitants of Central European countries are afraid of their social security and they 
are also full of anxiety about their future. The greatest pessimists are the Hungarians and 
then come the Poles, Slovaks and Czechs. 
In all post-communist countries there is a common element- an 'enforced optimism'. In 
all  four countries the majority of public opinion expected that their country will  be the 
first one to catch up with Western standards. Even the most pessimistic Hungarians (only 
5% declared that they were better-off thanks to transformation) thought that they would 
be the first among the four countries to fill  in the civilisation gap and join the Western 
societies. In 1992 the Poles thought that Hungary and Czechoslovakia will be the first to 
attain the expected well-being, but in October 1992 their self-confidence grew and most 
of them believed that Poland will be able to win this race (Hungary was expected to be 
in  the  second  place  and  Czechoslovakia  the  last  one).  The Hungarians  continued  to 
believe they would be in the first place and their optimism was greater in October than 
in June. 
The enforced optimism may be interpreted as  a variety of psychological adjustment to 
the risk of being forgotten, left to oneself or play a secondary role. Eastern Europeans 
inherited  a  bad legacy:  the feeling  of being  dominated by  stronger states and fear of 
isolation from the West. Even though the risk of new dependence on banks (instead of 
Soviet  tanks)  is  high,  many Eastern Europeans believe  that catching up with  Western 
standards of modernity is  the only and best road of development. This delayed moder-
nisation and strong tendency towards acceptance of Western culture was rightly called die 
nachholende Revolution by  J.Habermas. Thus, many people who  are pessimistic about 
the achievements of their country are inclined to express a kind of optimistic self-con-
fidence  relative  to  their  future  status  under  West  European  institutions.  They  may 
possibly  feel  that they must be optimistic if they want to avoid  being removed  to  the 
margin and subordinated by  exclusion. 
3.2.3.  Evaluation of economic transformation 
Social attitudes vis-a-vis economic transformation may be divided into two major orienta-
tions: individual-market and egalitarian-regulation. The former accepts the view that the 
economy and individual life  history should be regulated by  impersonal market-oriented 
mechanism  to  be  based  on  competition  and  rivalry.  Such  attitudes  are  relatively 
widespread, which points to strong acceptance of capitalist economic institutions. 
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economy,  coupled with  income redistribution to level social inequalities.  Such attitudes 
clearly evidence the lack of acceptance or at least a reserve with regard to pro-capitalist 
economic reform. 
An  indication  of  egalitarian-regulatory-oriented  attitudes  may  be  the  opinion  about 
unemployment, as well  as  a postulate of direct state intervention in the economy. 
In the post-communist countries there is a tendency to back up the policy of full employ-
ment and state interventionism. For example, in  Slovakia only 10%  of respondents are 
definitely  opposed  to  state  intervention  in  the  economy,  and  the  further  15%  are 
moderately opposed.  The sizable  percentage of the respondents  (  41%)  is  in  favour  of 
mixed  economy coupled with some market and socialist elements. 
The Central European societies are still characterised by the egalitarian-regulation-orien-
ted attitudes. The results of the investigations also show that a progressing differentiation 
of the living standards leads to considerable frustration. They also show a defensive reac-
tion to increasing social inequalities, stemming probably from distrust of own abilities to 
cope with  a new situation. The occurrence of inequalities does not entail inclination to 
achieve more than the other people, but rather the fear that one will lose in competition 
for  a better social position.  For example,  in  the Czech Republic some  60%  of citizens 
hold that there should not be too great differences between the rich  and the poor. A 
similar view  is  expressed by 58%  of respondents in Poland. 
Table 29. The egalitarian-regulation-oriented attitudes 
Categories  Country  Support 
Implementation of policy of full  Absolute  More  or less  employment 
Czech Republic  55  32 
Hungary  70  -
Poland  46  31 
Slovakia  75  -
The State should regulate the  Czech Republic  32  48  economy 
Hungary  70  -
Poland  40  34 
Slovakia  80  -
3.2.4.  Attitudes towards private property and privatisation 
The attitudes towards  private property in  post-communist societies is  fairly  ambivalent. 
Although the majority considers private property as the fundamental right of each man, 
when it comes to  more concrete situations views  are more diversified.  For example, in 
the Czech Republic 87% of the persons interviewed approve of the privatisation of small 
manufacturing workshops, and 75% of shops and restaurants, but in the case of large fac-
tories the percentage of supporters of privatisation is hardly 24%. In Poland it is distress-
ing from  the point of view of chances for  the acceptance of systemic change in Poland, 
that the attitude of the Polish society toward privatisation has changed since the percent-
age  of advocates  of state-owned large  industrial enterprises and banks  increased from 
58%  in  1991  to 65%  in 1993. 
Attitudes towards privatisation in Slovakia are much more restrained than in the Czech 
Republic.  In Slovakia  27%  of respondents are of the opinion that privatisation causes 
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in  Poland 18%.  On the other hand, 40% of the Slovaks  and 32%  of the Czechs have 
ambivalent attitudes towards privatisation holding that it has just as  many good  as  bad 
sides.  In Hungary, privatisation is  backed up by some 50% of the society, in the Czech 
Republic by  43%, in Poland by  32%, and in  Slovakia only by  17%. 
The  attitude  towards  reprivatisation  is  moderate,  too.  For  example,  in  the  Czech 
Republic as  many as  73% of respondents hold that real estates should not be returned 
to the former proprietors, except for restaurants and small workshops. 
3.2.5.  Attitudes towards democracy and democratic institutions 
In all post-communist countries one can observe critical assessment of the operation of 
democratic  institutions.  This  does  not differ  from  the  situation  in  Western  countries, 
where critical opinions about democratic institutions are widespread, too. As compared 
to other Central European countries, the Polish  society's attitude is  more critical with 
regard to the operation of democratic institutions (see table 30). 
Table 30. Confidence in principal political institutions 
Institution  Country  Confidence 
President  Czech Republic  72 
Hungary  -
Poland  29 
Slovakia-
Government  Czech Republic  58 
Hungary  -
Poland  28 
Slovakia  -
Parliament  Czech Republic  34 
Hungary  -
Poland  20 
Slovakia  -
The social attitudes in Central European countries toward democratic systemic change, 
just as with regard to the market-based economy are fairly ambivalent. For example, in 
Poland the fall of the communist system did not principally affect the opinions regarding 
a  democratic  or  non-democratic  character  of the  state,  because  the  number  of the 
answers that Poland is  a democratic country, has increased since 1984 by only 14 points. 
A  big  section of the society holds  that democracy comes  to  be a positive  system  only 
when it gives well-being, whereas only a minority considers it as  an autotelic value. 
In Hungary, about 70% of respondents hold that their country has a democratic system, 
but the majority does not approve of the way  of functioning of public institutions (80-
40%) and as  many as  60% are of the opinion that the professional level of the present 
government is  lower than that of the last communist government. 
In post-communist countries one may observe authoritarian tendencies. For example, in 
the Czech Republic as  many as  59% hold that the society needs a strong government, 
while in Poland, 36% of the persons interviewed are of the opinion that non-democratic 
governments may sometimes be better and more desirable than the democratic ones. In 
Slovakia  as  many  as  two-thirds of those interviewed  in  1992  held  that they 'needed a 
strong man who would make order'. In the subsequent interviews, maybe  due to a dif-
ferent way of putting a question, the percentage of the supporters of strong government 
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increased. 
However,  such  a  distribution  of opinions  might  suggest  that  a  sizable  section  of the 
society  in  post-communist countries would be inclined to accept,  or at least not to be 
opposed,  under some  circumstances,  to  instalment of authoritarian  rule.  This  may  be 
interpreted by the absence of democratic tradition and getting accustomed to the situa-
tion when the authoritarian and paternalist state takes decisions for its citizens and tries 
to solve their fundamental problems in a better or worse way. It is well-known that the 
'fear of freedom' was described in sociological and psychological literature, i.a. by Erich 
Fromm, as a hypothesis explaining a relative social popularity of the various authoritarian 
regimes. 
The increasing importance of localism,  emergence of the various forms  of interplay on 
a regional scale,  and the arising cooperation of transborder regions reveals the impor-
tance  of local  initiative  and should encourage the reform of the governmental institu-
tions. 
Local authorities are perceived slightly differently and in a more positive way than cen-
tral governing  bodies,  the number of positive  assessments  being on the increase.  For 
example,  in  Poland in  the interviews made in summer 1992,  35%  of respondents held 
that their locality changed to better over the previous two years. A similar question put 
in April1993, received a positive answer from 41% of respondents. Young people (aged 
up to 24 years) perceive the improvement even more clearly. In 1992 the percentage of 
optimists amounted to 40%  and a year later it already reached 58%. 
Table 31. The confidence in  local government 
Country  confulence rate in  % 
Absolute uncon- Confidence with great  Confidence with  Absolute confidence  fidence  objections  small objections 
Czech Republic  5  18  50  27 
Poland  15  37  29  19 
Slovakia  11  33  40  16 
The data show that the overwhelming majority of the respondents expresses confidence in representatives of local govern-
ment,  the highest percentage of confidence being found in  the Czech Republic and the lowest one in  Poland. 
3.2.6.  Attitudes toward  national minorities 
In all Central European countries there live national minorities, but their situation varies. 
As compared to the number of population, the greatest percentage of national minorities 
is  to  be  found  in  Slovakia.  The  largest  nationalities  in  Slovakia  are  the  Hungarians 
(10.8%)  and the Gipsies  (  4.8% ).  In the remaining countries national minorities play  a 
minor part. 
In Hungary, there are also national minorities, chiefly Gypsies, Germans and Slovaks. 
For example, in Poland, apart from the native Silesian population, inhabiting a compact 
area in Katowice and Opole voivodships, which declares its German nationality, there is 
also  the Byelorussian minority, living  in north-eastern Poland, dispersed Ukrainian and 
Gipsy  minorities,  small  number  of Lithuanians  inhabiting  several  villages  in  Suwalki 
voivodship,  as well as  a couple of others whose number ranges from  a dozen or so  to 
several thousand people. Generally, however, national, ethnic and cultural minorities in 
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homogenous. 
In  all  post-communist  countries  there  are  cases  of xenophobia  and  nationalism.  For 
example, almost 40% of the Poles hold that national minorities may cause damage, while 
45% is of the opinion that they are of no use whatsoever. Fifty percent of the Polish pop-
ulation say that they were always  better for other people, for which  the Poles received 
more damage than the good.  Other investigations show that 63% of the Polish society 
hold that foreigners- mainly Jews and Germans- are getting rich at the cost of the Poles. 
About 50%  of respondents  feels  reluctance  vis-a  vis  Gipsies.  In  the  Czech  Republic, 
negative  attitudes  towards  Gipsies  are  declared  by  65%  of respondents,  towards  the 
citizens of the Balkan countries by 31% and towards the Germans by  13%. These data 
do not differ from similar information coming from other countries (though in Hungary 
they are reported to be lower); nonetheless, they evidence the occurrence of xenophobia 
in Central European countries. 
3.2.9.  Attitudes toward foreign  policy 
The policies aimed at integration with the European Union, NATO and closer relations 
with the West are widely accepted by Central European societies. For example, in Poland 
74%  of respondents are in favour of integration with the EU, only 9% being opposed 
to  it.  In the Czech  Republic,  in the interview conducted in  March  1993,  over 90%  of 
citizens recommended the President to tighten relations with  Western Europe and the 
United States, 83% approved of contacts with the Visegrad Group, 80% pointed to Ger-
many, and 74% mentioned the contacts with the former USSR countries. Thus the open-
ing  of the Czech society is  great. 
Slightly different opinions have been recorded in the Slovak society, where 33% says that 
'you  cannot find  support in anybody and you must only count on yourself, while  14% 
is  in favour of Slovakia's neutrality, 24% backs up closer contacts with the West, includ-
ing  the  EU and  NATO  membership,  15%  supports  relations  with  Central  European 
countries, and 4% is  in favour for closer ties with Ukraine and Russia. 
A fairly peculiar psychological situation observed in Slovakia is no doubt the result of the 
split of the Czecho-Slovak  Federation, and the speed of the process  surprised a  con-
siderable part of the Slovak society. 
The simulated referendum in a research in September '92 showed that in Slovakia 40% 
of citizens would have voted for the split of Czecho-Slovakia  and 36% would have voted 
against it.  In November '92 the support for  the split increased to the maximum of the 
46%. Never before and never after has the split been supported by so great a minority. 
At the moment it was influenced not only by an upsurge of illusion, but also by a climate 
of non-alternativeness. New political representation went too far at that moment. Trying 
to stop it could have led to rampant processes. 
The  retrospectively  simulated  referendum in  March  '93  showed  a  distinct  decrease  in 
those people approving additionally the split. Only 29% of citizens would have voted for 
it  ('if a referendum would have been hold then'), another 50% of citizens would have 
voted against it.  This shift is  a reaction to a recent experience with the reality of wors-
ened relations,  with  civic  complications.  This  shift  resulted  from  'an exemption  from 
situation' too. We may suppose that in the spring of 1993 the above-mentioned 'situation 
trap' dwindled from the minds of the voters. 
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a state independence yet. An edge of the reproach is partially oriented against the Slovak 
political  representation;  and  partially  against  the  inflexibility  of  Czech  part  and  its 
'unwillingness for  a partnership based upon equal relations.' 
In Poland,  for  example,  a  positive  opinion  about the  European integration is  related, 
however,  to  important reservations:  32% of respondents express  fear  that it  might be 
associated with the exploitation enabling the location of technologies harmful to health 
and environment in Poland. At the same time, 52% of respondents point to the advan-
tages of the accessibility of the latest technologies and world markets. 
However, the approval of closer contacts with the European Union is not uncritical and 
is  subject to certain fluctuations  under the influence of the attitude of the Community 
vis-a-vis  Central  European countries.  For example,  restrictions  in  agricultural  exports 
from  Poland and Hungary to western markets introduced in  1993,  cause  a decrease in 
the number of advocates of the policy of European integration in these countries. 
3.2.10.  Attitudes toward  religion and the Church 
The attitude toward religion and the Church in post-communist countries is  highly dif-
ferentiated. The greatest degree of attachment to religion occurs in Poland and Slovakia, 
while  it is  considerably lower in  the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
Table 32. Relation of respondents to religion (in %) 
Country  Believe in  God 
Czech Republic  24 
Hungary  30-50 
Poland  85 
Slovakia  64 
In Poland, the percentage of people declaring their faith in God is highest, but the faith 
is  certainly not tantamount to behaviour as  recommended by  the Church. The number 
of people who practised regularly in Poland in  the years 1984-1985 was  42%, while the 
number of those who  practised irregularly was  less  than  37%. There were  13-15% of 
those who  participated in  the most important, occasional religious practices,  and 5-7% 
of people who did not practise at all. Seven years later, there was a conspicuous increase 
in the number of regularly practising people and a slight decrease in the number of those 
who  practised  irregularly.  This  must  result  from  the  fact  that  in  the  previous  period 
people who held high posts in government and even in the party, hid their religious prac-
tices, because it was disapproved by the superiors. A similar situation occurs in the Czech 
Republic, where the number of believers rose from  17% in  1980 to  24% in  1992. 
In Hungary, despite historical tradition, the political role of the Church is relatively small. 
It is  due to the absence of a dominating religion in  this country.  The relationship with 
religion is  very weak because only  11% to  15% of adults are regular church-goers. 
Inasmuch as the percentage of the population declaring faith in God differs from country 
to country, the attitude toward the public role of the Church is more similar. In Poland, 
a considerable reluctance is  observed vis-a-vis  non-religious involvement of the Church. 
Only 26% of respondents hold that the authorities should consult the important decisions 
with the Church, and 32% approve of the opinion that the divorce law should be consis-
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should have the right to influence the school curricula. 
In  the  Czech  Republic  the  influence  of  religion  on  people's  life  is  evaluated  in  a 
definitely positive way by 22%, and rather positively by 47% of citizens. Religious educa-
tion is considered as useful by 54% of respondents. A considerable percentage of citizens 
is  also  against the restitution of the nationalised property to the Church. 
However,  non-religious activity of the Church is  clearly disapproved by  the majority of 
the society. These views  are respected in  all Central European countries except Poland, 
where  the  policy  of the  authorities  after  the  fall  of communism was  subordinated  to 
recommendations of the Church and its hierarchy. 
3.3.  Political developments 
3.3.1.  Political elites 
In the communist system there was one system of nomination and co-opting of the elites 
- the  so-called  'nomenclature'.  Thus,  the  oligarchic  political  elite  was  relatively 
homogeneous and one-dimensional. However, this system was neither coherent nor fully 
effective, since the problems\  of the governing caused a constantly recurring division into 
internal orientations, differentiated the sources of recruitment and ways of promotion to 
the particular posts in  communist elites. The party apparatus did  not provide sufficient 
base  for  recruitment  and  despite  the  shrinkage  of its  field  due  to  the  principles  of 
ideological loyalty  and personal obedience to  the key central leaders,  there must have 
appeared  differences  stemming  from  generation  experiences,  educational level  or the 
play of personal ambitions. 
Preservation of the monopoly of political elite in  public life  was  particularly important 
for  the maintenance of the position of one party.  The right  to  exclusive  initiative  and 
decision-making of the politicians was  assured by two parallel activities: making intellec-
tual and cultural elites dependent on political elites, as well as preventing crystallisation 
of financial  and industrial elites by reducing private property to a minimum. 
The structural shortcomings of the monocentric system  led to its disintegration, but an 
important factor, especially in Poland and partly in the Czech Republic and Hungary, was 
the presence of the groups of intellectual opposition, which constituted an important part 
of the intellectual elite, being able to act independently of the nomenclature elite. But 
the politicised protest of the intelligentsia did not go  beyond the dissenting actions, by 
their very  nature  isolated  from  the  popular consciousness  and  unknown  to  the  over-
whelming majority of the citizens of Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
It was  not until  the large-scale workers' strikes in  Poland in  summer of 1980,  and the 
fact that they were joined or even controlled by rebel dissenters that the political opposi-
tion emerged - first legal, as  a trade union, and after 13  December, 1981, illegal in the 
form  of loose conspiracy movement. 
The ways of recruitment and selection of the political elite in Poland after 1989 were not 
shaped during  16  months of open and legal activity of the mass  movement but chiefly 
before August  1980  and  after  13  December,  1981,  i.e.  under the conspiracy based on 
mutual trust of a narrow circle  of people.  This  fact  is  of extreme importance, since it 
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ethos of the struggle with the common enemy.  This  resembled the situation after the 
Second World War, when power in Poland was overtaken by the elites educated during 
conspiracy operating before the war and during Nazi occupation. Conspirators may be 
efficient in destroying the system inherited but they are not prepared for the construction 
of the institutional framework for  the new one. 
The analysis of changes of composition, structure, criteria of selection and the form of 
government  shows  that  political  relations  have  been  transformed  in  post-communist 
countries to a large extent. Many people, institutions and strategies of action have been 
changed but the quality and style of government are still incompatible with the standards 
of a  democratic state. The qualifications of the governing elites and the level of their 
professional efficiency are comparatively low, and the highly skilled and stable civil serv-
ice  is  too limited. 
The patterns of recruitment and structure of the political elite are subject to three types 
of change: 
1.  Reproduction of part of the old elite is  done in two ways.  Some adapt themselves to 
a new situation and keep their position or are even promoted thanks to their organisa-
tional skills  and to different political situation.  This  specially  applies  to  officials  of 
public administration, army and police officers. Others have made a conversion by tur-
ning  their  political  or  administrative  position  to  that  of  a  private  entrepreneur. 
Reproduction of the old elites can be observed in all post-communist countries. For 
example, in  the Slovak parliament out of 150  parliament members 99  had the com-
munist past.  Their experience from  the  activity  in  the previous system  makes them 
more competent (know-how). 
2.  Elite circulation is  the process which brings back to the political arena part of pre-
communist elites, e.g. gentry, capitalists and political leaders of the years 1945-48, and 
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia from the period of the 'Prague Spring' of 1968. 
In Hungary,  on the other hand,  there  are  active  participants of the  1956  develop-
ments, who later became opposition leaders. The extent of returns of these elites in 
Poland is  not large. It can be found in diplomacy and in some fields of government 
and self-government; but it is  far greater in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
3.  Exchange of the elites consists of the replacing of the old elites by new people - either 
from the old opposition or promoted from tertiary positions in administration thanks 
to their professional skills and competence (know-how). The political parties emerging 
after 1990 play an increasing role in the exchange of elites. Some of them appeared 
to be a strong trampoline moving high numerous, though often incompetent, groups 
of new politicians. 
One of the characteristics of the way of recruitment in post-communist countries are per-
sonal connections within family-colleague groups; thus, the elite is entered thanks to per-
sonal acquaintance of the people who are already its members (know-whom). 
After four years  of systemic change  the exchange  of elites with  clear-cut elements of 
reproduction of part of the old communist elites dominated. As the new political system 
stabilises, there will appear new natural channels of elite promotion, emerging from the 
rising middle class and graduating from good Polish and foreign schools. 
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Trade unions in  the previous system were  not self-dependent and were entirely subor-
dinated  to  the  communist party.  Their function  was  confined  to  the  sphere of social 
problems of their members and protection of working conditions. Only sporadically did 
they raise revindication postulates. 
The exception to this  rule was  the establishment in  Poland in  1980  of an independent 
'Solidarity' trade union. The role of 'Solidarity' in overthrowing the previous system as 
well as the emergence, after it was banned, of a new trade union OPZZ {All-Polish Trade 
Union Agreement), which played the part of a licensed opposition in the 1980s, caused 
that trade unions are much more important in the Polish political system than the syndi-
cal  organisations in  other European democratic countries.  Trade unions,  being a mass 
social  organisation, substituted in  the 1980s  the institutions of a civic  society and were 
a  field  of expression  of not  only  employees'  claims  but  also  of social  and  political 
demands. 
The situation was different in other Central European countries, where trade unions did 
not  play  any  role  in  the  overthrowing  of the previous  system.  After the  fall  of com-
munism,  trade unions were reorganised in  these countries.  In the Czech Republic the 
Council of the Bohemian-Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions, having 600.000 members, 
was  established. In this country the trade unions have developed important role as  one 
oh  the  actors  in  social  bargaining.  In Hungary  the  National  Confederation  of Trade 
Unions consists of seven head offices and concentrates some 40-60% of the employees. 
In Slovakia, the Confederation of Trade Unions is composed of 46 branch offices, having 
1.8 million nominal members. Generally, trade unions have much less members than in 
the  previous  system,  when  the  percentage  of the  employees  being  members  of trade 
unions amounted to 90%. 
In Poland, the 'Solidarity' Self-Dependent Trade Union, which used to have millions of 
members in the 1980s, ranks second at present (1.6 million members) after the All-Polish 
Trade Union Agreement (OPZZ). The latter comprises 112 federations organised in 24 
branches and totals 4.5  million adherents. 
Unlike the other countries, the influence of trade unions, particularly of the 'Solidarity', 
on the political life in Poland has been very high in recent years. It could be compared 
to the importance of the strongest political parties. First of all, the two trade unions had 
a notable representation in the parliament, as well  as  great influences in the particular 
parties and  government structures.  The dilemma of 'Solidarity'  in  the years  1989-1993 
consisted in that it took the role of a guarantor of the systemic transformation underway 
by  giving  and denying recommendation to the successive coalition governments, and at 
the same time it raised claims vis-a-vis  those governments. 
3.3.3.  Political scene 
The attitudes of the major political groupings with regard to fundamental development 
issues vary in terms of methods and rate of economic transformation, European integra-
tion and the ensuing partial abandoning of sovereignty, attitude toward communist past, 
and - especially in Poland - toward the role of religion and the Church in the society and 
state. 
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debatable, these conceptions do characterise the attitude toward  economic transforma-
tion and social issues. 
Regardless of ideological disputes, differences between the left and the right consist in 
accepting different values in economic and social spheres. 
state versus  private  ownership  of means of production (rate and scale  of privatisa-
tion), 
strong versus weak role of government in economic planning extent of state interven-
tionism), 
support versus protest against redistribution of income from the rich to the poor (tax 
policy), 
development versus limitation of government social programmes (social policy). 
The systemic transformation in post-communist states has also been characterised by part 
of the political class as the 'comeback to Europe' and its purpose is to attain the highest 
civilisational standards by adapting the economy and government institutions to the situa-
tion in Western Europe. However,  the opinions are quite often expressed that Central 
Europe does not have to come back to Europe at all because in the cultural sense it has 
always been part of European civilisation. There are also opinions that the 'comeback to 
Europe' is  an  unreal problem because Western Europe seeks  identity by  itself,  as  was 
shown  by  diverse  attitudes  of many  societies  toward  the  integration  envisaged  by  the 
Maastricht Treaty. Thus, the discussion on the future of Europe focuses on two opposing 
conceptions: 
gradual disappearance of national states in favour of supra- national structures on the 
one hand, and regions and local communities on the other hand; 
union of independent states, i.e.  'Europe of motherlands'. 
The  political  scene  in  all  Central  European  countries  is  fairly  differentiated,  but  its 
fragmentation decreased after the second elections (since the fall  of communism), which 
were held in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland. 
The discussion regarding the future of Europe has been going on in the West and in the 
East alike. The particular political groupings also take a stand in these disputes, no mat-
ter whether their representatives have seats in parliament or whether they form the so-
called 'extra-parliamentary opposition'. 
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Name  Type  of economy  Character of the state  European option  Political  Support in 
socio-technique  % 
ODS  conservative liberal  decidedly secular  moderately European  coalition of reform-
oriented right-wing 
groups  32 
LB  state interventionism,  decidedly secular  decidedly anti- alliance of prosocialist 
populist  European  groups  7 
CSSD  moderate state inter- decidedly secular  decidedly European  alliance of democratic 
ventionism  centre left groups  13 
ODA  decidedly liberal  secular  moderately European  coalition of reform-
oriented right-wing 
groups  8 
KDU-CSL  social-liberal  denominational  moderately European  coalition of reform-
Catholic  oriented right-wing 
groups  4 
SPR-RCS  state interventionism,  secular  anti-European  antidemocratic with 
populist  nationalist  stress on political 
purge  4 
ODS:  Civic  Democratic Party; LB:  Left Bloc;  CSSD:  Czech Social Democratic Party; ODA: Civic Democratic Alliance; 
KDU-CSL: Christian Democratic Union; SPR-RSC: Republican Party. 
Table 34. The scheme of the political scene of Hungary 
Name  Type  of  economy  Character of the state  European option  Political  1990 
socio-technique  election 
results 
MDF  social market economy  secular  moderate European  cooperative structures  25 
SZDSZ  social-liberal  secular  European  negotiations, clients  21 
FKgP*  'farmers' utopia'  secular  partially anti- purge among 
European  economic elites  12 
MSZP  market economy with  secular  European  corporative structures, 
state interventionism  some negotiations  11 
Fidesz  liberal  secular  European  negotiations, clients  9 
KDNP  social mark~t economy  secular with moderate  European  partly negotiations, 
role of Church  clients, partly cor-
porate structures  6 
MIEP**  populist  secular  anti-European  political purge  -
MDF:  Hungarian  Democratic  Forum;  SZDSZ:  Alliance  of Free Democrats;  FKgP:  Independent Small-Holder  Party; 
MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party; Fidesz: Federation of Young Democrats; KDNP: Christian Democratic People's Party, 
MIEP:  Party of Hungarian Justice and Hungarian Life. 
*  exploded into 5-6 smaller factions. 
**emerged in  1993  from a split inside of the MDF. 
Footnote: the values, size and political style of the parties are rapidly changing. The table reflects some proportions and 
orientations of 1992-early 1993.  The parameters in the late 1993  - early 1994 might be significantly different. 
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Name  Type  of economy  Character of the state  European option  Political  1993 elec-
socio-technique  tion 
results 
SLD  state interventionism  decidedly secular  moderately European  social agreement20 
PSL  state interventionism  secular with important  anti-European  social agreement 
in agriculture  role of the Church  15 
UD  social market economy  secular with moderate  decidedly European  alliance of reform 
role of church  oriented group  11 
UP  state interventionism  decidedly secular  moderately European  social agreement  7 
KPN  state interventionism,  secular, with moderate  anti-European  political purge in the 
populist concept  role of the Church  economy and in public 
life  6 
BBWR  liberal  unclear  European  alliance of reform 
oriented groups  5 
SLD: Alliance of Democratic Left; PSL: Polish Farmers Party; UD: Democratic Union; UP: Labour Union; KPN: Con-
federation of Independent Poland; BBWR: Non-party Bloc in Support of Reform. 
Table 36. The scheme of the political scene of Slovakia 
Name  Type  of economy  Character of the state  European option  Political  1992 elec-
socio-technique  tion results 
HZD  Sstate interventionism  ideological secular  moderately European  political purge  37 
SDL  state interventionism  neutral secular  decidedly European  social agreement  15 
CDM  decidedly liberal  secular with moderate  decidedly European  alliance reform-orien-
role of Church  ted groups  9 
SNS  moderately liberal  ideological secular  moderately European  social agreement  8 
MKDH  liberal  neutral secular  decidedly European  alliance reform-orien-
ted groups  7 
HZDS: Movement for a Democratic Slovakia; SDL: Left Democratic Party; CDM: Christian Democratic Movement; SNS: 
Slovak National Party; MKDH: Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement. 
In Slovakia, the leftist groupings of communist origin are in power, though the program-
mes of some of these parties and political goals realised are similar to the Western social 
democracy. However, a certain peculiarity is the Polish Farmers' Party, enjoying relatively 
strong  social  support,  which  is  an  archaic  class  grouping,  mostly  representing  small 
holders. The present-day Hungarian political scene was shaped in  1990, but it experien-
ced major shifts ever since. The largest grouping (MD  F) split up and the extreme rightist 
nationalist wing set up a new party: Party of Hungarian Justice and Hungarian Life. The 
latest polls have also shown the increasing influences of the left. In the Czech Republic, 
on the other hand, since  the latest elections in  1992,  the rightist parties are in  notable 
majority in parliament. 
No  matter what  perturbations  and  changes  in  political  systems  are  likely  to  occur,  it 
should be  noted that the political scene  of post-communist countries was  shaped very 
rapidly  and  it  exhibits  a  tendency  to  polarisation  and  emergence  of the  political con-
figuration resembling the one existent in the European Union countries. 
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The Central European countries lack the continuity of law, so characteristic for the stable 
states. Especially difficult situation existed in Poland, since in the period of formation of 
modern law Poland was  under foreign occupation and in particular parts of the country, 
belonging to the three partitioning powers, various legal systems were in force:  Prussian, 
Austrian and Russian. In the period between the wars an enormous work was performed 
on unification of law  and on its adaptation to European standards. 
The establishment of the communist regime  in  1945  entailed an important divergence 
away  from  the  norms  valid  in  the  civilized  countries  through  introduction  of  the 
revolutionary  'law'  based  upon  the  class  and  political  criteria.  In connection with  the 
takeover of the economy by the state and the introduction of central planning numerous 
fields  of law  went out of use  and remained forgotten. It is  now  necessary not only to 
nullify the laws proper for the communist system, but also to elaborate new legal regula-
tions that would  set the rules of functioning of the institutions of market economy and 
of many domains of social life. The present section is meant to show the most important 
domains of law,  requiring adaptation to European standards. 
The legal systems inherited from the times of real socialism have to be deeply readapted 
to the principles of market economy and multi-party political system. The basic principle 
of the 'state of law'  is  gradually being implemented, though several tasks will  still have 
to be fulfilled. 
Tables 37-39  present the spheres of respective national law  systems which will  have  to 
be fast  adapted to the requirements and standards of the European Union. 
Table 37.  Inadequacy of the Czech economic legislation to  the standards of the European Union 
The constitution 
The constitutionThe existing constitutional system is satisfactory as far are requirements stemming from the association 
of the Czech Republic to the EU are concerned. It will  need adaptation in  terms of future  accession of the CR to 
EU and of its  membership in  the Communities.  Constitutional implication of the vertical subordination towards the 
EU will  have  to be implemented. 
Legal regulation of domestic trade 
The Business Act: 
- restrictions concerning possibilities to perform business activities and setting-up of foreign persons inside the coun-
try  should be lifted. 
The Commercial Code: 
The code reflects modern legal principles and institutions that are in force in the EU countries, though not always 
in  optimum form.  Inadequacies concern: 
- conditions for  operation of foreign persons in  the CR, especially as  far  as  the right to acquire, use,  rent and sell 
real property is  concerned (this is  the single  most outstanding inadequacy); 
- requirements for publicity of a company, its financial  organisation, merger law  etc. 
- legal regulation of some contractual business relations. 
Legal regulation of foreign  trade 
The customs Act: 
- corresponds to EU principles; further liberalisation of exports and imports is  envisaged. 
Act on Economic Relations with  Foreign Countries: 
- is  an outdated piece of legislation originating from  1980, since then mostly repealed; new Act is  needed. 
The Foreign Exchange Act: 
- restricting free movement of capital, provides for certain limitation concerning foreign exchange residents and non-
residents; restrictions will  have  to be gradually lifted, full  convertibility of Czech currency should be reached. 
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- The general concept of the tax system corresponds to modern principles; however, the reform is not complete and 
has  to be further developed. 
Environmental protection 
- Present Czech legislation provides for relatively solid formal legal standards for environmental protection (Act on 
Environmental Protection, Act on Protection of Nature, Act on Wastage, Air Protection Act, Water Protection Act). 
The actual problem is  the factual  situation of environment, not the legal regulation thereof. 
Table 38.  Inadequacy of Polish legal  regulations to the standards of the European Union 
Finances and the capital market 
- Quota and subject restraints in the domain of purchase of goods and services abroad. 
- Limitation on the possibility of taking and granting credit across the border. 
- Limitation on the nature of activity of companies with foreign  share. 
- Prohibition of access  to  Polish market for  foreign insurance companies. 
- Licensing of land purchase by  foreigners. 
- Lack of currency exchange. 
- Obligatory supervision of the foreign banking operations by the central bank. 
Labour market 
back of protection of employee interests in case of change of ownership of a firm. 
- Lack of obligation of applying countermeasures against the causes of unemployment. 
- Lack of regulation guaranteeing equal wage for equal work for men and women. 
- Lack of regulation concerning wage  negotiations in an enterprise. 
- Lack of freedom in  employment of foreigners. 
Civil rights 
- Excessive  repressiveness of penal law. 
- Application of the subjectively assessed category of 'social danger of and act'. 
- Communist definition of economic offence. 
Environmental protection 
- Lack of product norms on pollution of environment. 
- Excessively severe, non-realistic norms on admissible air pollution. 
- Too lax  admissible levels of pollutants in  liquid discharges. 
- Lack of regulation in the domain of solid waste. 
- Lack of adequate legal regulations in the domain of investment project impact on environment. 
- Lack of obligation of informing public opinion on the state of environment. 
Territorial self-government and spatial planning 
- Low share of communes in realisation of public expenditures. 
- Too  high share of the subject-oriented subsidies. 
- Lack of the spatial planning system. 
- Lack of regionalisation of the country. 
Product norms 
- Lack of assessment of the degree of fitness  of Polish norms to the European ones. 
Intellectual property 
- intellectual property (including software) is  not sufficiently protected by  the author's law. 
On the basis of the overview of Polish legislation, as presented here, one can notice that 
during the recent years  a significant progress has been made in  terms of adaptation of 
Polish  law  to  European  standards.  Simultaneously,  however,  numerous  domains  still 
require adequate new regulation, and the scope of work to do is  yet very big. 
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Human rights 
- the state language law 
Labour market 
- regulation of foreigners' employment, 
- no legal guarantee for  equal wage  for  equal work for men  and women.  Finances and capital market*taking and 
granting foreign  credits needs Central Bank's licence, 
- activity of foreign  insurance companies is  prohibited, 
- purchase of land for foreigners  is  prohibited, 
- lack of hard currency for private  (non business) persons, 
- access  of the Slovak capital market for foreign  shares and share holders is  prohibited, 
- Central Bank's supervision of the activity of foreign  banks. 
Environmental protection 
- lack of real effective penalties for environmental pollution. 
Self-government 
- high  share of state subsidies in  the expenditures of self-government, 
- lack of self-government's own  incomes caused by  impossibility to install new local taxes, 
- the tax  rate of city bonds is  the same  as  for commercial bonds while  the state bonds are taxed lower. 
Intellectual property 
- intellectual property (including software)  is  not sufficiently protected by the author's law. 
In formal  legal  view,  the  existing  legal  regulation  of economic relations  in  the  Czech 
Republic is already comparable with legislations of advanced western states. Such regula-
tions are, however, not yet fully coordinated with one another and are accompanied with 
problems  typical  of  new,  often  hastily  drafted  and  adopted  legislation.  Further 
approximation to the Community Law must take place. This will  be implemented more 
by  adaptation and/or amendments of already existing  legal  rules  than by  creating new 
rules and institutions. 
As Slovakia  is  the legal  successor of the CSFR,  the legal  environment is  basically the 
same as  in the CSFR and in  the present Czech Republic. The largest part of the legal 
transformation was done in the years 1990-1993, so most of the legal regulations are com-
patible to the European standards already. However, there are some areas not yet ade-
quate enough. 
3.5.  Scenario of socio-political change until the year 2005 
The scenario of socio-political change is based on the analysis of hitherto changes accom-
plished in  the economy, society and state of Central European countries, starting with 
1989. The analysis enables the statement that the principal element of systemic transfor-
mation,  i.e.  transfer to  the  market  economy,  is  virtually  irreversible,  and the  estab-
lishment of democracy as a lasting element of the state system seems highly probable. 
The observation of on-going processes allows  us  to formulate  prerequisites for further 
transformation of social structure and domestic political set-up in these four countries. 
This  certainly  does  not  mean  that  the  current  conditioning,  occurring  to  a  lesser  or 
greater extent, will  be permanent and invariable.  Whether these processes can be con-
tinued depends on both the external factors in the neighbourhood of Central European 
countries - in the East and in the West alike - and on internal factors, including economic 
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systemic transformation is by no means evident and the list of risks is a long one. These 
risks  must be presented in  order to determine the likelihood of realisation of develop-
ments included in  the scenario. 
The  scenario  is  based  on  certain value  assumptions.  It considers  as  advantageous  the 
phenomena and processes which may facilitate and speed up transformation of post-com-
munist  societies  into  democratic,  lay  and  liberal  societies,  comparable  to  western 
democratic standards. 
General premises of the scenario 
The  scenario  is  based  on  the  analysis  of data on  transformation  of soda-professional 
structure, which  show  the beginning  of important structural transformation of Central 
European societies. The analysis  of data concerning evolution of social attitudes in the 
first half of 1993 reveals that many citizens of the four countries under investigation are 
unable  to  find  a  place  in  a  new  situation,  are  dissatisfied with  the  hitherto course  of 
systemic  transformation,  with  the  functioning  of democratic  institutions  and  with  the 
results of the policy of post-communist governments. These attitudes are largely condi-
tioned by  social  costs  of the reform,  especially decreasing living  standards and loss  of 
social security. 
Regardless of discontent caused by social costs of reforms the labour market is emerging, 
which  enforces  competition  and  enterprise  in  people's  behaviour,  a  market  of highly 
qualified  labour has  emerged,  stimulating  the  raising  of qualifications,  increase  in  the 
price of education, and encouraging higher labour efficiency. 
Despite heritage of the communist period and remnants of acquired habits, in the past 
three years there have appeared clearly visible changes of attitudes of many citizens who 
have become: 
subjects of political life able to take part in free elections and decide about their fate; 
consumers having possibilities of making free choice on the free market of goods and 
servtces; 
due to  the lifting of travel limitations,  Central European countries have  opened up 
to  the world  and their citizens have  attained the feeling of freedom; 
due to  the possibilities of operation on the market, entrepreneurship has expanded, 
and several million citizens have undertaken a risk on their own; 
about one-third, and in the Czech Republic even 50% of citizens approve of and sup-
port the changes underway; 
due to  emergence of local self-government local social activity has been developing. 
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CONDITIONS 
Moderate  economic growth: 
decline in employment in industry, 
increase in employment in services, 
stabilisation of unemployment at a level of «10%. 
Restructuring of agriculture: 
growth of productivity of farms; 
outflow of population from rural areas; 
in  the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia privatisation of agriculture. 
Pro-investment change of structure of the state budget: 
- increase of expenditures on education and higher schools. 
SCENARIO OF CHANGES 
Due to industrial restructuring the employment in industry will decline and there will 
be a development of services, both simple and those requiring the highest qualifica-
tions.  In the  nearest future,  the  number of people with  secondary  and  university 
education  is  likely  to  increase,  and  the  number  of the  higher  personnel  and  of 
intellectual workers is  likely to double by the year 2005. 
The wage system will be gradually restructured. There will be an increase in incomes 
of the  higher  personnel  and  intellectual  workers  (especially  physicians,  scientific 
workers and teachers), as well as  a relative decline of workers' wages, unqualified in 
particular.  The income  of entrepreneurs will  also  increase.  The  middle  class  with 
clearly crystallised interests will slowly be shaped. As a result, polarisation of incomes 
will deepen and social differentiation will increase. The growth of the latter, especially 
high incomes of entrepreneurs and of part of the higher personnel in private enter-
prises and state administration, will in turn cause intensification of wage claims, and 
sometimes even social protests. 
Social  structure of Central European countries around the year 2005  will  be com-
parable to  the present structure in the EU countries.  Poland will  be an exception, 
where  the  percentage  of farmers  will  be  considerably  higher  than  it  is  today  in 
western countries. 
Transformation of consciousness 
CONDITIONS 
Higher share of the middle class. 
Increase in  education level of society. 
Rationalisation of the system of wages. 
SCENARIO OF CHANGES 
Changes in social structure and positive effects of systemic transformation, which will 
soon become visible  in  the society,  will  lead to improvement in  social feelings  and 
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influence  of  nationalist  slogans  and  anti-European  moods  will  be  decreasing; 
xenophobia will be disappearing, and customs will be changing. 
The position of the Catholic Church, in all Central European countries except Poland 
and  - to some  extent - Slovakia,  is  similar  to  that in western Europe. However,  in 
Poland  and  Slovakia  alike,  the  role  of the  Church  will  be  decreasing  and  the 
secularisation will  proceed.  In  some  areas,  where religion  is  associated with  ethnic 
affinity,  the Church may become a destabilising factor. 
Due to  democratisation of the society,  the extent of the authoritarian attitudes will 
be decreasing in favour  of open attitudes. Slowly,  the 'open' and democratic proce-
dures of solution of conflicts will be strengthened in social consciousness. Social con-
flicts  will  increasingly be settled by way  of negotiation, anarchy in public life will be 
restricted,  and anarchist groups will  come to be an  insignificant margin. 
Stabilisation of political scene 
CONDITIONS 
Changes in social structure. 
Limitation of extent of revindication attitudes. 
Decreasing authoritarian attitudes. 
Democratisation of state structures. 
SCENARIO OF CHANGES 
Changes in social structure and transformation of consciousness will  be reflected in 
the structure of political scene. Groupings rooted in the communist set-up, as well as 
populist  and  nationalist  parties  will  gradually  disappear.  Parties  open  to  Europe, 
reflecting principal social interests, will be growing in importance. The role of trade 
unions,  especially great in  Poland,  along with  privatisation and restructuring of the 
economy,  will be gradually decreasing,  as was  the case  in western countries. 
The background of the parties will shape various groups of pressure: organisation of 
entrepreneurs in  industry,  banking,  insurance;  civilised  trade unions,  taking care of 
working conditions as well as workers' wages, profits of enterprises, and maintenance 
of jobs.  In some countries, for  example in  the Czech Republic and Hungary a new 
model of cooperation among various groups of interests ('Soziale Partnershaft'), pat-
terned after Germany and Austria, may  appear. 
The structures of state administration will considerably strengthen, and the clear-cut 
division of competence between government and self-government administration will 
follow.  In at least some of Central European countries, especially in Poland, regional 
structures will  be established. 
The  structures  of territorial self-government will  strengthen  and  the  trust  in  local 
authorities, as well as the conviction that the undertaking of the activity is needed to 
improve one's own situation without waiting for the assistance of the state, will con-
tinue to  grow. 
New  social  movements will  emerge,  e.g.  ecological  movements  and various  ad-hoc 
associations. 
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gradually decrease, along with privatisation and restructuring of the economy, just as 
was  the case in western countries. Trade unions are largely based on big enterprises 
operating in  heavy industry and large-scale production plants. As the importance of 
mining,  metallurgy,  engineering  industry etc.  decreases,  and  as  the employment in 
services increases, the trade union base will shrink and so will their social and political 
importance. Chances of establishing trade unions - as western experiences show - in 
the new sectors of the economy,  such  as  tourism, banking,  services,  administration, 
as well as in factories and privatised sectors, where professional skills are decisive, are 
very  small.  In Poland,  the  'Solidarity'  myth  has  been exhausted  and the particular 
claims  of the unions representing selfish professional interests meet with increasing 
reluctance in  the society.  This is  confirmed by  the results of the latest elections in 
which 'Solidarity' gained less  than 5%, much less  than it might have been expected 
considering the nominal number of its  members. 
The democratic play will  result in a well-ordered political scene and a consolidation 
of parties and groupings having similar views  and referring to those groups of voters 
which are not marked by incompatible conflicts of interests. The similar political for-
mations on the left and on the right will enter pre-election alliances and then perma-
nent agreements, which, by the year 2000, will lead to the formation of a strong social 
democratic party on the left and a conservative party on the right, in some national-
and/or  Catholic-oriented  countries.  The  political  map  will  also  encompass  centrist 
liberal-democratic groupings.  Under such  a  set-up, which  will  manage  most  of the 
political scene, it will be comparatively easy to form a stable majority government by 
the two  dominating political parties. 
External threats 
World  and  European recession,  trade  restrictions  of the European Union and the 
USA, weak inflow of foreign capital and investment. 
Instability,  or even  long-lasting  chaos  in  Russia  and  other republics  of the  former 
USSR limiting exports to this area and increasing the inflow of emigrants. 
State of permanent destabilisation in the Balkan Peninsula stemming from economic 
and political situation, as well as from  ethnic conflicts. 
Internal threats 
One of the major factors endangering modernisation of social structure may be dif-
ficulties in restructuring traditional and inefficient sectors of industry, and in Poland 
the increasing influence of the farmers' lobby which is  striving to protect traditional 
agriculture by  way  of customs barriers and subsidies.  The influence of the farmers' 
lobby  may  impede  rural  transformation  and  delay  modernisation  of  the  entire 
economy and society. 
A  real danger to modernisation process may be the educational barrier, which will 
result  in  difficulties  in  the  proper  training  of highly  qualified  personnel  for  the 
economy and public administration. On the other hand, however,  development may 
be  hampered  by  the  excess  of  highly  qualified  personnel,  which  will  not  find 
appropriate jobs. This may cause discontent and increasing social frustration. 
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general trends in  the EU countries but may resemble that of the southern part of it 
(Greece,  Spain).  Social  structure  and  economic  structure  in  this  period could  nor 
become independent from each other. There is a real danger of the dualisation of our 
societies (like in all other dependent societies): small, or bigger islands of modernisa-
tion  or westernisation  +  third world  (Latin-American type  of underdevelopment). 
Generally, besides the West-European scenario, the Latin American variant in all the 
other spheres is probable. In the middle class and the elite, the formation of confron-
tative  fronts  between  the  national-economic  interest-minded  Elites  and  the  Com-
pradors becomes more and more important. 
Economic  stagnancy,  growth  of  social  disparities,  and  deterioration  of  the  living 
standards  of a  big  section  of the  society  may  lead  to  increasing  social  discontent, 
which  might  be  used  by  populist  left  and  right  political  groupings  organising  the 
actions  of  protest  and  destabilising  the  state.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
authoritarian solutions might be sought. Taking into account that in all societies there 
are authoritarian attitudes, it may be expected that a vast part of the society might 
accept authoritarianism provided that it could stabilise  and improve  - at least tem-
porarily  - the standard of living.  One of the  two  varieties  of authoritarianism may 
occur: either the populist authoritarianism of conservative and nostalgic character, or 
the authoritarianism of a strong government striving to ensure great economic growth 
(Taiwanese-Korean type strong government state version). The increasing social dis-
content may  lead to  the 'search for  the guilty', which  may  be expressed in  growing 
nationalism and xenophobia. This may lead to strong anti-European tendencies and 
attempts at isolation. 
The left and/or populist rule may  severely impede the process of reform, thus ques-
- tioning hitherto achievements. The programmes of some parties operating in Central 
European countries postulate direct state interventionism, including e.g. price control, 
protectionism, debt clearing and subsidies for unremunerative state enterprises and 
inefficient  agricultural  sector,  free  issue  of money  and  cheap  credit  to  counteract 
recession,  as well  as  excessive  social expenditures. Such projects may waste hitherto 
achievements, cause hyperinflation and ruin the economy. 
Another serious danger is the lack of mutual cooperation inside the Visegrad Group, 
both political and economic, as well as the absence of a common standpoint vis-a-vis 
the European Union and NATO.  The tendencies of the 'individual race to Europe' 
may cause severe damage to all  Central European countries. 
Should many of the above-mentioned disadvantageous circumstances occur, it may hap-
pen  that  Central  European  countries  are  not  to  take  the  road  to  a  liberal  market 
economy  and  a  parliamentary  mass  democracy.  Very  possibly  other  modernisation 
models and patterns will  shape the region. 
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SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND EDUCATION 
4.1.  Introductory remarks 
By  'Science, Technology and Education' we  understand both the institutions of science, 
technology  and  education  (e.g.  universities,  schools,  research  and  scientific  institutes, 
etc.),  and activities  performed by  these institutions,  as  well  as  activities  in  science  and 
technology (mainly in research and development - R&D) carried out by other institu-
tions  (e.g.  industrial enterprises, public administration, etc). 
As in other chapters of this report, the presentation of possible future developments will 
be  preceded by  a  description  of the  starting  point,  i.e.  the  outcomes of political  and 
economic  conditions  in  the post  -war  period  under which  the  science,  technology  and 
education were developed and shaped, as well as by an analysis of the impact of the pro-
cesses transformation after 1989. 
This  report deals with  all  countries concerned and tries to point out both to common 
characteristics  of all  of them,  and  to  specificity  of individual  countries.  Given  some 
incompatibility and incompleteness of statistical data concerning science, technology and 
education in particular countries and differences in  approaches to this issue in national 
reports, it was  impossible or useless to present exact figures for  the Central European 
region as  a whole. Instead, with regard to this region we  confine our attention to some 
general qualitative problems and tendencies. We  supply statistical data when examining 
situation in individual countries. 
4.2.  The  heritage from  the 'old regime' 
Many characteristics of the present state and of possible chances and challenges in the 
years to come for science, technology and education in Central Europe, result from the 
heritage of the past post-war period. The shape and development of the science, technol-
ogy  and  education  in  Central  European,  as  in  other  socialist  countries,  were  highly 
influenced  by  the  ideological,  political  and  economic  factors.  It should  be  stressed, 
however, that the influence of those factors was not uniform in all analyzed countries and 
it also evolved over time. Only in the first period of the communist ideology and political 
system  (late  1940s  and early  1950s),  the situation in  socialist  countries was  fairly  the 
same. Since the mid-1950s (especially since 1956) the situation started to change, and it 
changed in  considerably different directions and in different pace, so  that in the 1970s 
and 1980s little was  left from  the original uniformity. 
As far  as  the role of the ideological factor  is  concerned, it consisted in priorities given 
to these actions and activities  (in the field of science, technology and education) which 
were considered favourable for the marxist-communist idea, while neglecting, hindering 
or stopping the other actions or activities considered neutral or contradictory to the rul-
ing ideology.  There were several practical consequences of such a situation: 
1.  A  high  priority was  given  to  elementary  education.  This  priority  resulted from  the 
treatment of the education (in particular, extension of the elementary education to the 
whole society)  as  a goal and measure of social justice and social progress. This goal 
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immediately after World War Tho. Free and obligatory school education, which was 
based on uniform (for a given country) system of public schools, was extended to all 
children.  The  policy  of raising  educational  level  of the  society  was  supported  by 
several measures, e.g. low prices of books, etc. Due to this policy the countries of Cen-
tral Europe now represent a  higher level  of basic education than other countries of 
similar (and even higher) level of economic development, including some countries of 
the European Union. 
2.  The ideology with regard to the university (higher) education was  quite ambivalent. 
On the one hand higher education was considered as an important factor of economic 
and technical modernisation and thus as an instrument in the competition of socialism 
with  capitalism.  Moreover,  large  access  of all  social  strata to  higher education was 
regarded  as  an  important goal  and  achievement  of socialism.  On the  other hand, 
however, the university education was considered, to some extent, as  a 'luxury good', 
which led to imposing some limits on the share of employees with higher education. 
As a result, limits were introduced on the number of students in most (if not in all) 
university-level schools and a system of selection of candidates based on meritocratic, 
but  also  on  socio-political  criteria,  was  introduced.  Consequently,  the  number  or 
university  students  and graduates in  the  Central European countries  rose  and was 
higher (in  relative terms) than in the pre-war period, but it remained lower than in 
the most developed Western countries. 
The average level of university education in the socialist countries was probably com-
parable to Western Europe or America. 
3.  The  ideological  factor  imposed  some  specific  attitudes  and  approaches  to  science. 
Generally speaking, it divided science into 'ideologically irrelevant' (technical, exact, 
biological  sciences)  and  'ideologically  relevant'  sciences  (mainly  human  and  social 
sciences,  including  economics).  'Ideologically  irrelevant'  sciences  was  given  a  large 
margin  of independence  while  'ideologically  relevant'  sciences  were  demanded  to 
serve the ruling ideology15• 
The ideological principle in social sciences was introduced with mixed success in par-
ticular Central European countries.  In Poland since 1956  and in  Hungary somewhat 
later the  ideological  control  over  sciences  was  dramatically  reduced  and  a  modus 
vivendi  among  scientific  community  and  authorities  was  established,  according  to 
which  the authorities resigned  ideological demands from  scientists  and at the same 
time were free  to neglect material needs of scientists. Czechoslovakia was  less lucky 
than Poland and Hungary in this respect. Intellectuals were the main victims of the 
tough 'normalisation' process, which was introduced after the 'Prague spring' of 1968 
and this regime in social sciences collapsed as  late as in the 1980s. 
4.  Due to the believe that specialistic technical skills are the most useful (productive) for 
the  economic  development,  the  specialised,  vocational  education  was  preferred  to 
general education and technical education was  preferred to education in social  and 
human  sciences.  This  resulted  in  relatively  high  (in  comparison  with  the  Western 
countries) shares of pupils in vocational schools and students in technical universities. 
There were,  however,  considerable  differences  in  this  respect.  Czechoslovakia went 
more far in this direction than Poland and Hungary. In Poland this tendency was more 
felt at the level of secondary than university education. 
15  There were also some attempts to distinguish between 'progressive' and 'reactionary' sciences. For instance cybernetics 
was  (especially in  the Soviet Union until the 1960s) classified as  'bourgeois' discipline of science. 
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field of science and technology. Cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries were  of the highest  priority,  which  led  to isolating  the  domestic  sciences 
from contacts with the West. As in the case of political control over science, the con-
trol  over  international  contacts  of science  in  Poland  and  Hungary  gradually  faded 
which resulted in growing networks of cooperation with western partners, so that for 
instance  in  the  1980s  contacts with western  partners were  much  more  intense than 
those with other socialist countries. In Czechoslovakia where the ideological-political 
grip on international contacts of scientists and researcher remained until the collapse 
of the old regime. 
The  political  factors  influencing  science,  technology  and  education  in  the  Central 
European countries can be  divided into internal and external (international) ones. The 
internal political factors  manifested themselves in  the importance  attributed to science 
and  technology  (and  their  individual  elements)  in  the  economic  strategy  by  national 
authorities. 
The differences became visible in the early 1970s. All Central European countries tried 
to  accelerate  their economic growth through increased efficiency  and productivity.  For 
the Czechoslovak  authorities technical modernisation of the  economy based mostly on 
domestic research and development was the main instrument in this policy. This allowed 
avoiding  incurring  external  debts  and  at the  same  time  avoiding  institutional  reforms 
which  would  undermine  the  communist  system.  Such  a policy was  pursued, with  little 
changes, until 1989.  Relatively favourable conditions for expansion, mainly quantitative, 
of the national research and development basis, were the main result of this strategy. 
Polish  authorities  in  the  early  1970  also  tried  to  modernise  the  technical  basis  of the 
economy,  but their attempts were more rapid and relied mostly on transfer of western 
technology (equipment and licences) financed by credits. This strategy left the national 
research  and  technology  basis  only  the role  of helping  the  economy  absorb  imported 
technology. It also collapsed in  the late 1970s because of the debt crisis and turned out 
to be a trap in which Poland has been caught until now. Although the strategy of import-
ing  technology was  abandoned, the permanent economic difficulties  in  the  1980s  made 
it  impossible  to  dedicate substantial resources for  the  domestic  research and develop-
ment. 
Since  the  economic  reform  of  1968  in  Hungary  much  greater  than  in  Poland  or 
Czechoslovakia  attention  was  given  to  strictly  economic  (institutions,  interests) 
mechanisms  of economic growth  and to  the transfer of western technology via foreign 
investment (in the 1980s).  Consequently, less  emphasis was  put on development of the 
domestic  technologies  and  relatively  favourable  conditions were  created for  economic 
and social sciences which were to help introducing the economic reform. 
The external political factors were related to the political, military and economic division 
of the world into the East (Warsaw Pact,  CMEA) and the West (EEC, NATO)  and to 
the fact  that the three analyzed countries belonged to the Eastern block.  This resulted 
above  all  in  the  isolation  from  the  main  world  sources  of the  high  technology.  The 
COCOM sanctions against socialist countries were of special importance. 
The 'moonlight economy' which was  in operation in  the socialist countries left its clear 
mark  on  the  structures  of science,  education  and  technology  in  these  countries.  The 
influences of the economic factor were the following: 
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by  no  means forced  to  invent and  to  introduce new  products or to reduce costs  by 
implementing  new  technologies.  Big  innovations  were  contrary  to  the  bureaucratic 
system of administrative economy. Therefore real innovations had to be invented out-
side the sphere of enterprises (e.g. in the R&D centres) and inflicted upon enterprises 
through the system of central planning.  Consequently, if the economy had to create 
and implement innovations, separate innovation-making centres had to be created and 
the  intensity  of introducing  innovations  into  the  economy  depended  on  the  R&D 
efficiency  of  innovation  centres  and  on  the  executive  efficiency  of  respective 
authorities in breaking the indifference of the bureaucratic machine of central plann-
ing  and resistance of enterprises against (big)  innovations. 
2.  At the same time the economic system was quite effective in inventing and implement-
ing small innovations, which  - however  - were often useless or even harmful. Per-
manent shortages, insecurity of deliveries of materials and equipment as  well  as  the 
system  of 'planning  of  innovations'  forced  managers  and  engineers  to  continuing 
'innovations'  consisting  in  material  substitution,  inventing  and producing tools  (that 
otherwise were already produced in higher quality by specialistic producers}, etc. With 
all  its  deficiencies,  this  system  forced  managers  and  engineers  to  well  master 
technological process of their factories and to be open-minded in solving unexpected 
technological problems. 
3.  Economic  incentives  to  innovate,  like  desire  for  financial  success  or  fear  of 
bankruptcy,  were  very  weak  or  non-existent.  Such  a  situation  frustrated  and 
demoralised  R&D  staffs  making,  in  general,  R&D  centres  another  bureaucratic 
institutions with  all  their  characteristics  (  overemployment,  inertia,  simulating  work, 
etc.). 
4.  Permanent shortage of foreign currencies forced the socialist countries to invent and 
develop products and technologies that otherwise could be bought or transferred with 
foreign investment, which was another argument for developing extensive R&D base. 
This  was  especially  true for  such  countries  as  Czechoslovakia which,  as  mentioned 
earlier,  attached  great  attention  to  technological  modernisation  and  were  strongly 
separated from  the West. 
5.  The  aforementioned  shortages  characteristic for  the  socialist  economy  applied  also 
and  foremost  to  labour.  Factory vocational schools  played  an  important role  in  the 
education system. These schools 'tied' students to the factory and in this way secured 
labour in the conditions of a supply-restricted labour market. 
The  institutional system of science  and  technology in  the  Central European countries 
was  established in  the late 1940s  and the early 1950s.  The main element of this system 
were: 
1.  The Academies of Sciences. 
2.  Universities (many of them professionally specialised}. 
3.  Research institutes of central state organisations (such as planning commission, mini-
stries etc.). 
4.  Autonomous R&D institutes, laboratories etc. 
5.  R&D departments, laboratories, construction offices or working places in enterprises 
or their associations 
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authorities in pursuing policy in science, technology and education. 
Some elements of the above system, e.g. academies of sciences, did exist before introduc-
tion of the communist system,  but they were different from  the point of view  of their 
internal organisation and the role in the whole system of science, education and technol-
ogy. 
All those institutions were directly or indirectly financed from the state budget. 
A very important place in  the institutional system of science and technology was  taken 
by  the  Academy  of  Sciences.  Soviet-type  academies  of  sciences  were  introduced 
throughout the socialist countries and replaced the scientific academies which had existed 
in these countries even since the 19th century. Academies were composed by  a number 
of institutes,  committees,  commissions,  etc.  of different degrees of dependence on the 
leadership  of the  academy.  The  aim  of  the  academy  was  to  curry  out  research  in 
fundamental (theoretical) sciences and to supply its knowledge to universities and institu-
tions carrying out applied sciences. The academy had no students and had no direct con-
tact with teaching students. Only in Poland the domination of the academy has been not 
so evident and the universities have retained a great deal in fundamental sciences, so that 
one can speak of a balance between the academy and universities in this country. 
Apart from 'proper' universities, a large number of specialised professional universities: 
technical, agricultural, medical, economic, etc. universities (or 'academies') were set up. 
In these schools research work was of secondary importance to teaching. A slightly dif-
ferent situation has been, again,  in  Poland, where university professors have had lesser 
teaching obligations than their colleagues from other (ex-) socialist countries and could 
dedicate more attention to research 
1 
• 
Applied  sciences,  research  and  development were  carried  out mostly  by  autonomous 
research institutes, institutes of branch ministries and R&D departments or laboratories 
of enterprises. A special role in this respect was played by institutes related to the army 
or ministry of internal affairs. 
The above  described institutional system  of science,  technology and education, despite 
changes in subjects of research and in the degree of independence of scientific work, sur-
vived until the end of the 'old regime'. 
4.3.  General tendencies of transformation 
The political and economic transformation started in 1989 brought important change the 
system of science, technology and education in  all countries under analysis. 
4.3.1.  General processes 
1.  Due to the overall recession and the necessity to fight  inflation and to balance the 
state  budget,  substantial  cuts  in  the  state  budget  were  introduced  in  all  Central 
16  Poland was  unique in its institutional setting of higher education also  in  one other aspect. The Catholic University of 
Lublin,  a university absolutely independent from  the state, existed there even in  the hardest times of the communist 
regime. 
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of science,  technology  and  education.  In  result,  both  the  outlays  for  science  and 
R&D and also  employment in this sphere have declined considerably in all Central 
European countries since 1989 (employment by half, outlays - in real terms - even 
by two  thirds). This processes affected mostly in-house research units of enterprises 
and autonomous research institutes. Many R&D institutes were liquidated, many sur-
vived  and  are  struggling  for  existence  by  reducing  staff and  switching  to  another 
activities like renting or selling their property, running commercial activity, servicing, 
producing, etc. 
2.  Financial strain, instability and uncertainty in state-owned firms, which brought about 
financial squeeze of those firms, shortening of the time horizon of their activity and, 
consequently,  cuts  in  spending on research and technology.  Relationships between 
the enterprise sector and the technology and R&D have changed deeply. On the one 
hand the demand for old-type domestic research is dramatically decreasing in favour 
of imported  technology,  goods  and  equipment,  on  the  other hand  the  imported 
technology (also due to foreign investment) quite often raises the technological level 
of enterprises  and there are  signs  of emergence of a new kind  of demand  - for 
product development (designing, reliability, quality control, etc.) aimed at a very con-
crete market rather than for large-scale research. 
3.  A  great  part  of  formerly  commissioned  technical  development  projects  were 
motivated  not  by  the  former  (pseudo  )market  demands,  but  by  the  existence  of 
development funds stimulated by state administration. With that inducement by the 
state gone or diminished, some of the commissioned projects were also dropped for 
lack of real market stimuli. 
4.  Short-sightness  of the  private  sector.  The emerging  and growing  domestic  private 
business  has  been  too  poor,  impatient  and  reluctant  to  spend  money  on  R&D 
activities which do not bring immediate profits. As a result, the still growing part of 
the economy spends very little on R&D. 
5.  Intemationalisation  of  the  Central  European  economies  and  substantial  real 
appreciation (higher inflation rate than exchange rate devaluation) of their curren-
cies,  as  well  as  inflow  of foreign  capital made purchasing or transferring of ready 
foreign  technologies or products cheaper and quicker than producing them home. 
6.  Buy-outs of Central European firms by foreign capital often led to closing down local 
R&D centres and laboratories and limiting such activities only to the headquarters 
of the international companies. The foreign actors appearing in Central Europe are 
usually  interested  only  in  marketing  and,  especially  if they  produce  for  non-East 
European markets  as  well,  in  a reliable  and cheap operation of their technologies 
which  have  been tested elsewhere.  They simply  import required management and 
technology  packages.  Of course,  introduction  of them into  the  Central European 
enterprises may often lead to a relative process innovations. This is but rarely a sub-
stitute for product development, most of which was  halted at domestic enterprises. 
7.  Collapse of the 'Eastern block'  and of exports  to  the (former) Soviet Union. This 
affected  also  exports of technically  (relatively)  more  sophisticated goods,  including 
those of military industry. 
8.  Differentiated performance of various branches on the Western markets. Generally 
speaking,  technologically  less  advanced  goods  (as  steal,  textiles,  wood,  glass,  fer-
tilizers, etc.) turned out to be more successful on foreign markets than the high-tech 
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advanced Western goods. 
9.  Appearance of attractive job opportunities for highly qualified, energetic and mobile 
people, both home and abroad. This resulted in  massive  'brain flight'  from  science 
to  other occupations,  mostly  in  private  firms,  especially  foreign  ones,  banks,  con-
sultancy,  etc.  as  well  abroad.  The  selective  outflow  from  or insufficient  inflow  to 
science, research and universities resulted in  deformations of the age  and qualifica-
tion  structures of the  employees.  Universities  and institutes  are  lacking  first  of all 
young assistants and highly skilled professionals. Many of those who remained carry 
out an  extra  activity  outside  of the university  or institute,  to the  detriment of the 
quality of their teaching or research activity. 
10.  New job opportunities and emergence of new economic sectors (banking, consultan-
cies, foreign companies etc.) raised the attractivity and prestige of higher education, 
especially of economics, law, management, western languages (English, German) etc. 
11.  Disappearance of labour shortage and appearance of unemployment, which created 
the need of increasing the number of students and thus introduced some relieve to 
the labour market troubled by  increasing unemployment.  In result,  the number of 
university  students starts to grow.  Universities have  adapted their curriculae to the 
new  economic  conditions  by  updating  the  material  and  limiting  the  overload  and 
excessive  specialisation of education. Despite the financial stress, the equipment of 
universities with computer and telecommunication facilities  has grown considerably. 
At the same time a process of differentiation of universities (division into 'stronger' 
and 'weaker') is  progressing. 
12.  Liberalisation  of commercial  activity  in  education. It brought  about  emergence of 
private and non-state owned schools of all levels and types of education. The educa-
tion system is becoming more flexible;  apart from state schools there are now private 
and other non-state schools (including joint ventures with foreign partners); besides 
regular schools  (primary,  secondary,  universities)  there is  a growing  number of all 
kinds of courses, post-graduate studies, distance education courses etc. 
13.  Changes in the institutional and financial systems of science and R&D. A Western-
style  system  of grants  and  institutions  managing  grants  has  been introduced  sup-
plementing and partially replacing the old forms of financing and old institutions. In 
particular, the position of the Academies of Sciences was questioned and in all Cen-
tral  European countries  there were  attempts  leading  even  to  liquidation  of these 
institutions  - however nowhere successful.  On the contrary, academies of sciences 
along with the research institutes of governmental agencies were generally protected 
from dramatic shocks which were applied to other scientific and R&D institutions. 
The above described tendencies and phenomena concern all the Central European coun-
tries. There were also country-specific processes, for instance those related to the division 
of the Czecho-Slovak federation into two  independent states.  In particular, the Slovak 
science  and  R&D were influences in  a special way.  Not surprisingly,  being an integral 
part of the Czechoslovak R&D system  in  the last decades,  it was  characterised by  the 
same  features  and tendencies  as  the  Czech R&D sector.  The share of expenditure on 
R&D in the GDP was probably even higher than in  the Czech Republic, since Slovakia 
used  to be a net beneficent of inter-republican financial  transfers  and could  afford to 
develop some activities on account of those transfers. 
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detail below. 
4.3.2.  Financial situation 
By the end of the 1990s Poland spent the smallest percentage of its GDP for the R&D 
while Czechoslovakia spent the most. It seems also, that, roughly speaking, proportions 
between the individual  countries in  this respect have remained unchanged. It means a 
considerable deterioration in comparison with the highly developed western economies. 
Depending on the source of information, the GDP share for R&D by the end of the 1980 
ranged from  1.0-1.5% to 3-4%, while now it ranges from 0.6-0.8%  (in Poland) to about 
2%  (in the Czech Republic). 
In Poland in 1989 the share of outlays on R&D in the GDP accounted for 1.0%. In 1990 
it rose to 1.3% {despite an absolute reduction in  outlays on R&D, which was,  however 
lesser than the decline in the GDP). In 1991 this share fell to 0.9% (which meant a sharp 
reduction  in  outlays  given  that the GDP fell  again)  and in  1992  to  0.8%  (against  the 
background of stagnating GDP) and in  1993 to 0.6%. For 1994 a figure equal to 0.58% 
of the GDP has been proposed in the state budget. 
In Hungary the share of expenditures on R&D in the GDP shows a downward tendency. 
Whereas in 1988 R&D allocations accounted for 2.92% of domestically utilized national 
income, in 1990 they represented only 1.68% and in  1991  as  little as  1.18%. 
It is  interesting to note that the figure  for the share of the R&D outlays in the GDP 
for Poland (about 1.0% at the beginning of the 1990s) was considerably lower than that 
for Hungary (about 2%) and especially Czechoslovakia (about 3% ). At the beginning of 
the transformation processes Poland was in the worst economic situation. Polish govern-
ment, preoccupied with current problems, paid little attention to the financing of R&D 
as  to an investment in the long-term development, and the enterprises, freed from the 
central planning and control and squeezed by current financial needs, neither wanted nor 
could afford to spend for R&D. 
Czechoslovakia was  in  the opposite position:  its  financial  (both external and  internal) 
stance  was  good,  the  central  planning  was  strong  and  the  authorities  attributed  the 
domestic R&D a crucial role in the economic development of the country (as an alter-
native  to  undesirable  economic  and  political  reforms).  Consequently,  Czechoslovakia 
wanted and could afford to spend much  more on S&T than Poland did.  Hungary was 
in the middle: its economic situation was better than that of Poland and (slightly) worse 
than that of Czechoslovakia and relied more (than Czechoslovakia) on economic reforms 
and transfer of foreign  capital and  technology,  rather than on results  of the domestic 
S&T. in 1992 the Czech Republic spent 2.3% of its GDP on R&D. In any case, it means 
a considerable contraction of resources available to R&D. 
The structure of financing sources of R&D is  also highly instructive for the situation in 
Poland. The main role in this regard is  played by central state institutions, especially by 
the KBN  (Committee for  Scientific Research  - an institution established a few  years 
ago,  replacing  a  previous  institutions,  whose  aim  is  to  guide  and  finance  scientific 
research, both in basic and applied sciences). The predecessor of the KBN in 1989 finan-
ced  63%  of all  R&D outlays,  in  1981  the  KBN  financed  as  much  as  72%  of outlays 
{despite the absolute decline in outlays). This raise in the share of the central institutions 
in financing R&D was due to a dramatic drop in the R&D outlays by firms. According 
to the same estimates, the share of KBN in  R&D financing in  1992 fell  to 59% which 
-80-would  imply  that  the  economy,  which  in  that  time  revealed  some  sings  of recovery, 
resumed to finance  the R&D. 
In Hungary in  1986  17.1%  of the R&D funds  came from  the state budget, 2,2%  from 
separate  state funds  (National  Scientific  Research  Fund,  etc),  and  0.9%  from  foreign 
sources. The overwhelming part (79 .9%) of the resources available to the R&D system 
was  received  from  enterprises  (directly  commissioned  projects)  or from  the  Technical 
Development Fund (centrally managed and fed  by  a special kind  of tax).  In  1991  the 
share of the state budget increased to 33.7%, the enterprise provided 40.3% of resources; 
15.8%  came from  the  contributions of the Technical Development Fund. The ratio of 
budgetary funds to the total resources of the R&D system was much lower than in most 
of the socialist countries.  (It should be remembered, however,  that a considerable part 
of the contribution of enterprises to the R&D was imposed to them by a law, so, in fact, 
this contribution represented another from of state support of the R&D and should be 
added to the state budgetary funds). 
In Slovakia the share of expenditure on R&D in  GDP fell  down  from 4.4%  in 1989 to 
2.22% in 1992. The decline in financing was even greater than the decline in the emplo~­
ment. Thus, in spite of the decline in the number of personnel by some 50%, the volume 
of expenditures per one worker of the R&D declined (at constant prices) by about 25% 
- from  166  thousand crown to 121  thousand crown. 
The dramatic cuts in inputs have operated not simply to close sources of fund,  to wind 
up certain types of R&D institutions or to reduce them to a nominal existence, but also 
to fundamentally remould possibilities for the survival of the entire system and its actual 
and even future prospects. 
Owing to the collapse in  1991  of the enterprise R&D sphere, the ratio of experimental 
development  within  the  system  is  very  low  compared  with  international  pattern 
(representing  40%  of R&D  inputs  in  1991).  This  process  is  accompanied  by  some 
negative trends that came into play in the second half of the 1980s (like decreasing staff 
of assistants,  negative  shifts in  specific costs  per researcher failing  to compensate even 
for the rate of inflation, drastic fall in research-oriented investments), and persisted with 
increasing momentum in  the early 1990s  as well. 
Yet,  despite  the deepening crisis,  there was  no  appreciable decrease in  the number of 
the (known) research and development centres. While work was probably halted in some 
laboratories, these try to retain the sign-boards or name-plates of the affected units. For 
the  moment,  it  is  difficult  to  judge  the  type  of organisational  possibilities,  physical 
facilities  and intellectual capacities  at hand for  a restart expansion.  Also,  there are no 
reliable data on the attitude of research centres managements and external organisational 
structures  sustaining  research.  There  are  centres where  formal  maintenance  of R&D 
units  (non-removal  of sign-boards)  really  suggests  longer-term  policy  considerations. 
Elsewhere this phenomenon is  simply a sign of organisational inertia. Lastly,  in  a third 
group of centres,  this  is  associated with  motives  of taxation,  non-profit operation, and 
insurance policy or tactical considerations. 
The nominal loss, by no means, should be treated as  a real loss, because a large portion 
of the old R&D sector was simply idle or highly ineffective, or has turned to be useless 
in the new  political and military situation and in the condition of open economies. 
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It is  difficult to measure total manpower active in science and R&D in Central Europe, 
since  statistics  produced by  particular countries  are  hardly comparable.  However,  one 
may  estimate that total employment in  science,  R&D and university-level  education in 
the four countries amounted in 1992 to some 350,000 persons (almost 200,000 in Poland, 
64,000  in  the  Czech  Republic,  over  50,000  in  Hungary  and  30,000  in  Slovakia).  This 
figure embraces all those who are statistically recorded as economically active in respec-
tive sectors of economy. The number of 'scientists' or 'researchers' is by some two-thirds 
smaller and can be estimated as  120,000 persons in all  four countries. 
These  figures  are  much  smaller  than  before  the  transformation  processes.  It can  be 
estimated that some 150,000 employees left this sector since 1985  (i.e. total employment 
in science and R&D in mid-eighties could have been estimated to half a million) and that 
the loss of scientists amounted to some 35,000 people. As the data presented below will 
prove, the deepest losses occurred in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which lost more 
that 50%v of their initial human potential in science and R&D. Poland was exceptional 
in  this  respect that its  truly scientific human potential remained stable throughout last 
10 years, which was  due to some growth  of academic staff at the universities. 
~ 
Changes in  the research potential in Poland are presented in the following  table 40: 
Table 40. Employment in science and R&D in  Poland, 1985-1992 
Institution  l'ears  Employment 
total  in  research* 
Institutions of the R&D sector  1985  107,700  18,289 
of which:  1988  105,261  17,431 
1990  87,356  15,088 
1992  68,627  12,514 
Academy of Sciences  1985  10,785  4,203 
1988  11,393  4.538 
1990  10,960  4,388 
1992  9,202  4,020 
R&D institutes and centres,  1985  96,915  14,086 
auxiliary units  1988  93,868  12,893 
1990  76,666  10,700 
1992  59,066  8,494 
Universities and equivalent schools  1985  46,143 
1988 
1990  50,048 
1992  130,114  50,688 
Total  1985  64,432 
1988  65,136 
1990 
1992  198,741  63,202 
..  * so-called 'scientific workers', I.e.  employed on scientific positions 
As  it can be seen above,  the most dramatic decline of employment took place in R&D 
institutes and centres (outside the Academy of Sciences) which lost altogether more than 
40%  of their  personnel between  1985-1992.  A  considerable  shrinking  of employment 
occurred also in institutions serving S&T - by about 30%, while the Academy of Scien-
ces lost only slightly more than 10% of its staff. The bulk of the decline took place after 
1988, or during the 'explosion' of the transformation process, but it started much earlier. 
A  spectacular drop in  the R&D employment took place in  industrial R&D, especially 
when  comparing  data  for  the  1990s  with  those  for  1980.  This  employment  in  1985 
-82-amounted to 102.7 thousand people; in 1990 it was reduced to 82.8 thousand, and by the 
end of 1992 - to 65.1  thousand. It should be remembered that such an abrupt decrease 
of the industrial R&D employment not necessarily meant an equivalent net loss of R&D 
potential. 
Massive  outflow of scientists to  other professions was  a characteristic phenomenon for 
the science and higher education in Poland, but also in other central European countries. 
The brain-flight to  foreign  countries and to other occupations in  Poland is  one of the 
greatest danger for Polish science. If there were no internal and external brain drain the 
employment level in science in 1991 could have been higher by some 25% than it actually 
was. It is  hard to state, though, whether we  are dealing here with the decrease of Polish 
scientific potential by 1/4, since one would have to be sure that all those who left science 
had been rationally employed in science before. 
The losses of Polish science due to internal brain flight are much higher than those due 
to migrations. The latter decreases the human potential of Polish science by some 10%, 
while  the search for better paid jobs within Poland caused the outflow of some 15% of 
scientists. 
Regardless of the high relevance of the figures on the outflow of scientists, it should be 
remembered that a considerable part of the scientific personnel was redundant and that 
there are no  evidence  that those who  left science belonged to  the best.  Consequently, 
the net loss  of the Polish science resulting from  the outflow was  much smaller. 
The changes in Hungarian research potential during the recent years is presented in the 
following  tables 41  ad 42. 
Table 41.  Employment in R&D in  Hungary, 1986-1991 
Number of employees  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
1  1991 1 
R&D institutes  19,704  19,708  19,180  18,274  15,536  12,951 
Research institutes at the 
universities  22,120  22,179  22,530  22,370  22,787  22,607 
Research institutes in 
companies  30,900  28,720  26,180  23,271  17,134  12,013 
Other research institutes  5,039  4,822  4,625  4,354  4,266  3,647 
Total  77,735  75,429  72,515  68,243  59,723  51,218 
Table 42.  Research personnel in Hungary,  1986-1991 
Number of  researchers and 
high  level professionals  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
R&D institutes  7,501  7,494  7,387  7,234  6,267  5,385 
Research institutes at the 
universities  13,814  13,701  13,991  13,957  14,044  14,192 
Research institutes in 
companies  13,108  12,448  11,157  10,058  7,442  5,027 
Other research institutes  2,936  2,810  2,733  2,587  2,503  2,159 
Total  37,359  36,453  35,268  33,836  30,256  26,763 
As can be seen, the employment in the R&D sector in Hungary, despite some differences 
in  dynamics,  reveals the same tendencies as  in  Poland:  declining numbers of both total 
employment  and  employment  of scientific workers  (researchers  and  high-level  profes-
sionals). The most spectacular fall  occurred in research units of companies which lost in 
-83-1991  more than one half (about 60%) of their 1980 staff. As in the case of Poland, the 
downward tendency did not take place in universities, which are more independent from 
current economic trends. 
By  1991  the  capacities  of the  R&D  declined  sharply  in  absolute  terms,  though  this 
decline was only slightly felt in intellectual output. The staff strength of the R&D sector 
was  59,700 in  1990 and 51,200 in 1991.  The reduced staff was  29,397,  of which  14,471 
were scientific researchers and developers. Since 1989 there has been a sharp fall in the 
size of the enterprise and applied research and development sphere. Therefore, despite 
all reductions in the HAS (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), the weight of HAS research 
network within the total staff strength is  increasing somewhat. For data on dynamics of 
employment in  the R&D sectors in the Czech Republic see the following table 43: 
Table 43.  Employment in R&D in  the Czech Republic, 1985-1992  (in thousands) 
Year  Total employment  Scientists in  R&D 
1985  135.0  17.8 
1988  140.4  20.3 
1990  105.9  15.7 
1991  76.5  14.9 
1992  64.0  -
The above  figures  are  really impressive.  They suggest  that in  the years  1988-1991  the 
Czech Republic lost almost one half of its  R&D employment. The loss of scientists was 
much  smaller which  imply a deformation in  the researcher-supporting staff and in the 
age groups (outflow of the younger people) proportions. If compared the year 1992 with 
1988,  the loss was  even greater it accounted more than 50% of total work force.  The 
available  data do not allow  to examine  the  most  recent trends  of R&D in  individual 
branches of the economy. Nevertheless the above data for 1989 and 1990 also significant 
(see table 44). 
Table 44.  Employment in R&D organisations in the Czech Republic in  selected branches (in thousands) 
Branches  1989  1990 
Total R&D  137.9  105.9 
industry  85.3  62.1 
construction  4.3  3.3 
agriculture  9.6  6.6 
transport, communications  3.9  3.5 
health service  5.5  4.1 
As can be seen, the sharpest drop occurred in agriculture and industry and the mildest 
in transport and communications. 
The dynamics of the employment in the R&D sector in Slovakia is presented in table 45. 
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Categories  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Total employment  63,251  58,815  51,641  40,085  30,284 
of which active in research  35,558  35,535  27,745  21,404  16,286 
of which with university  22,201  21,301  15,550  12,576  10,681  education 
of which with degree in  3,816  3,797  3,652  3,224  2,803  science 
The drop of the R&D employment was substantial. The R&D sector by the end of 1992 
lost more than one half of its total employment in 1988. The reduction in the staff with 
science degree was significantly lower  - it amounted to slightly more than one quarter 
(the same tendency was observable in the Czech Republic). As a result, the share of per-
sonnel with scientific degree increased from 10.7% in  1988  to 15.1 %.  This tendency, as 
in  the  Czech  case,  probably  implies  transformation  in  the  age  structure  and  in  the 
research-supporting  staff proportions of the  R&D  staff (similarly  as  in  other Central 
European countries, the young assistants and technicians more frequently leave research 
institutes for more attractive jobs). 
4.3.4.  The 'scientific product' 
As the scientometric analysis demonstrates, the publication numbers over a longer time 
period (1981-1992) indicate the general capabilities of the science sector in the countries 
of Central Europe. There is  a clear relationship between the GDP per capita and the 
number of scientific publications (quoted in the international databases) related to the 
number of population (see fig.  16). In this light the output of scientific research delivered 
by the academic and R&D sectors in the Central European countries has to be seen in 
due proportions - as  the output of countries on a medium level of development. 
In the 1981 ranking according to the total number of publications related to the number 
of population Poland was  15th,  Czechoslovakia  18th, while  Hungary - 23rd.  By  1992 
Poland dropped down to  18th place, Czechoslovakia to 21st, while Hungary - to 28th. 
It should  be  remembered,  though,  that in  the  ranking  according  to  the dynamics  of 
growth  of  the  number  of  publications  Poland  was  41st  (increase  of  128% ), 
Czechoslovakia 42nd  (increase of 120% ),  and Hungary 44th  (increase of 110% ), while 
the  increase  observed  for  the  leader  of this  ranking,  South  Korea,  was  1078%.  The 
average  increase of the  data base, which  can be taken as  the measure of the general 
increase of the number of publications, was  140%. 
During the  entire period  1981-1992  Poland ranked  17th  in  the world  in  terms  of the 
number of publications, Czechoslovakia 21st, and Hungary 26th. Then, the total number 
of citations gave Poland 21st place, Hungary 25th, and Czechoslovakia - 26th, ahead of 
Greece  (31st)  and  Portugal  (40th),  but behind Spain  (17th),  Belgium  (15th)  and The 
Netherlands (7th). 
The ranks of Poland according to the numbers of publications in particular fields range 
from  11th in  chemistry to  35th in  clinical  medicine, with  14th in engineering sciences, 
material sciences and mathematics, and 16th in informatics and interdisciplinary research. 
This means that a far reaching specialisation of research is  possible, which  might be a 
desired direction in conditions of very limited outlays on research. 
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Figure 16. Relation between GOP/inhabitant and number of scientific publication per 1 million population. 
The above figures  demonstrate the results which  the decrease of funding  and drops of 
employment in science and R&D in the Central European countries had on the research 
results.  In opposition to the world tendencies,  since  the mid-eighties  there has  been a 
steady decrease of the numbers of publications in the Central European countries, which 
lasted  until  1991.  This  entailed  the  shrinking  of the  share  of these  countries  in  the 
respective world  totals.  The changes which have  then been observed after 1991  are in 
agreement with  the  changes  observed  in  the EC countries,  though with  the  two-year 
delay and with  lesser intensity, which  indicates the impact of the overall financial  and 
organisational  difficulties  on  the  functioning  of science  and  R&D  sector  in  Central 
Europe. 
The decrease in  technical sciences and in Poland occurred in 1989 was especially deep. 
Most probably it stopped only in 1992, with the relative magnitude of the decrease reach-
ing  40%. 
Research results  in  particular countries have  different structure.  In comparison to  the 
general international tendencies, the Central European countries are very well balanced 
in  their experimental and theoretical approaches.  However,  they do leave  applications 
seemingly far  apart.  A  high  share  of applied  research is  observed  in  Hungary and of 
fundamental  research  in  Poland  (see  fig.  17).  A  divergence  of the  growth  trends  of 
individual  fields  of technical  sciences,  as  observed in  the  Czech  Republic and Poland 
after  1989,  indicates  that  previously  existing  strong  connections  resulting  from  the 
socialist international division of labour still persist. 
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Figure 17. Scientific publications in the CEC and their structures by  type  of research. 
R&D output may  be also  measured by  patent activity.  The following  table  46  presents 
data for  Poland: 
Table 46. Polish  patent activity in  1980-1992 
Year  Patents applied for  Patents granted 
1980  6,198  5,736 
1985  5,124  3,479 
1988  6,280  2,796 
1990  4,106  3,242 
1991  3,393  3,418 
1992  2,896  3,443 
As can be seen,  the downward  tendency in  the Polish patent activity was  most evident 
in the case of the number of patents applied by  residents. It fell  in 1992 by  more than 
50%  relative to  1988,  and the downward trend since 1988 was clear. A different picture 
is  given  by  the numbers  of patents granted to  residents:  since  1989  it  shows  even  an 
upward trend. It is not clear if it is  attributable to delays in granting patents or to more 
rigorous criteria of granting patents. If the latter is  true, it would mean a streamlining 
of the R&D activity by getting rid of fictive 'innovation' activity for statistic and planning-
bureaucratic purposes. 
4.3.5.  Institutional restructuring 
Science  and  R&D  sectors  in  Central  Europe  are  undergoing  not  only  quantitative 
changes, but also institutional transformation. The transformation process is just getting 
off the ground. The format of public and non-profit institutions in R&D is becoming to 
be legalised.  Industrial research institutes have been partly transformed into joint-stock 
companies. In terms of workforce, some three quarters of R&D capacities are still bound 
-87-up with direct state forms of property, slightly less than the rest has some forms of state 
participation  and only small  margin  is  private  (mostly joint ventures with  foreign  par-
ticipation). 
In comparison with other institutional forms, the autonomous R&D institutes are under-
going biggest cutbacks. Many centres tend to scale down their operations or try to cope 
with  their problems  by  switching  over  to  other activities  - consultancy,  certification, 
development,  servicing  or production.  Three quarters  of all  research  institutes  extend 
their development and production capacities and about one half of them have changed 
their research programmes.  They reduce their staff,  but staff reductions are also  (and 
mostly)  caused by  voluntary outflow of employees because  of low  salaries in  research 
institutions in  comparison with greater pay offered by the private sector. Tendencies in 
the  in-house  factory  R&D units  are similar  to  those  in  autonomous  R&D institutes, 
although not so intense. 
With  the  exception  of Hungary  in  the  sector  of mission-oriented  state  (ministerial) 
research the cutbacks in funding and workforce are not so radical and the main ministries 
have succeeded in keeping alive  a network of research centres even with reduced fund-
ing. In Hungary all such institutions but subordinated to the ministry of agriculture, have 
ceased to exist. 
The academies of sciences are also undergoing a process of streamlining and transforma-
tion  and  are  subjects  of discussions  concerning  its  future.  It seems,  however,  that  a 
rationalistic solution of preserving the research capacities of the Academies will prevail, 
since the losses which would be created by the opposite decision would be enormous. 
The process of transformation of scientific and R&D systems in Central Europe is,  to 
a large extent, chaotic and spontaneous. Only very recently in some countries (for exam-
ple in  1993  in Poland) clear priorities for the scientific polity have been formulated. In 
fact, the situation of particular institutes and other research centres could have been the 
direct result of current performance of a given  set of industrial enterprises and/or the 
resistance of staff to periodical severe cuts of financing. Many good research teams have 
been disintegrated and many other still face  this danger. 
On the other hand, a clear polarisation effect has manifested itself also in  science and 
research. Several institutes have been able to justify their existence by contracting orders 
for research wither from domestic or foreign sources. Such institutions could expand both 
in material equipment but also in human capacities. In many cases they have overtaken 
both employees  and  assets  of collapsing  institutes and centres. This  process has been, 
however, much too weak and the market principles of performance and competition have 
not entered into science and research of the Central European countries with a sufficient 
force. 
4.4.  Technology 
4.4.1.  Innovations 
The ability  to create  and  absorb  innovations  is  the greatest challenge  for  the Central 
European countries at the tum of the XX and XXI century. 
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tion  itself has  changed  from  a  single  event  to  a  complex  of social  mechanisms  and 
phenomena which  are  involved  in  new  production technologies  and patterns17•  In the 
long  historical  experience  of  the  Central  European  countries  those  complex  social 
mechanisms have  never functioned  too well  and the difference between the innovative 
civilisation of Western Europe and the grosso modo imitative18 civilisation of Central and 
Eastern Europe was  more or less visible  in  the differentiated historical conditions. 
Naturally, there were many exceptions in relation to this tentative observation but these 
exceptions are probably not changing the general historical landscape in this field. Espe-
cially important is  the heavy legacy of the communistic past when the whole economic, 
social and political climate did positive inducements for complex mechanisms that under-
line new production processes and the production of new products. In this context, both 
the generally negative and, in some fields,  positive role of the Warsaw Pact and COM-
ECON should be mentioned. 
In the  conditions  of the  new  order - innovation is  the key  to  the technological  and 
economic future of the Central European countries. 
4.4.2.  Industrial technologies 
In this  area the situation is  less  clear than in  the field  of research and education, and 
the developments  in  individual countries are much  less  comparable and hardly can be 
expressed in quantitative terms. Nevertheless, some tendencies and facts are discernible. 
One of them is  the differentiated situation in each country from the point of view of the 
state of industrial technology: beside the rather obsolete technologies of most industries 
and plants, there are considerable enclaves of high-technology and quality. Some of them 
have been created and are maintained by foreign investments, whose role in all countries 
is  growing role (though it is  still rather marginal). 
Their influence on the general technological level and domestic industrial R&D is  not 
uniform.  On the one hand there is  a tendency (that seems to be dominant) of treating 
Central European countries by foreign investors as only markets of their products or/and 
as suppliers of cheap labour, raw-materials, etc. This implies, among other things, neglec-
ting (or closing down) of R&D units in these countries. On the other hand, however, new 
technologies and equipment transferred due to foreign investment raise the technological 
level of the firms concerned; there are also some cases of retaining or even strengthening 
of R&D activity of Central European companies after buying them by Western firms. 
The industries of the Central European countries are being subordinated to  divergent 
influences and tendencies. 
In  Poland  they  are  characterised  by  a  number  of negative  phenomena,  like  growing 
depreciation of fixed  assets, low productivity and efficiency etc. The industrial structures 
are  obsolete  and  retarded  in  comparison with  the  technologically  advanced  world  by 
some 20-30 years. According to estimated high-tech firms produce only 3.5% of the total 
industrial output - in  more advanced countries this share reaches 20%. 
However,  some  significant positive  elements could have  been recently  seen in  Poland. 
There are some industrial branches, or more exactly, some industrial firms which are at 
17  OECD-TEP, op.  cit., p.  16. 
18  This is  a far-going generalisation which should be tested empirically. 
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managers and engineers. Unfortunately, quite often they are 'frozen' in sectors hit by the 
recession,  like  military industry,  but even  there they can  manage to  produce goods of 
high  quality for  civilian  purposes, e.g.  helicopters,  sport and training planes, etc.  Some 
producers  of  durable  consumer  goods  (vacuum  cleaners,  kitchen  utensils  etc.)  have 
managed  to  raise  their output and locate  it mostly  in  the highly  competitive Western 
European and American markets.  Some export under their own  names and labels, but 
even a greater number of producers export their goods to renown Western firms which 
only  add  their labels  and  resell  them  as  their own.  Producers of some  traditional for 
Polish industry products, like ships or building machines, have retained or regained their 
positions in  the domestic and foreign markets due to the high quality of their products. 
There are also some other positive tendencies. A greater care for quality and efficiency, 
in  both private or state-owned firms,  becomes a more popular attitude of the workers. 
The  enterprises  are  undertaking production of high-tech  goods  (like  computers,  high-
quality TV  -sets, etc), mostly in production of details for foreign firms  or in assembling, 
but with a growing share of the final output being produced locally. As it was mentioned 
earlier, there are signs, though questionable, of a renewed interest of (large state-owned) 
firms  in R&D.  Unquestionable is  the fact  that the Polish recovery of industrial output 
in 1992 and 1993 was accompanied by a decrease of energy consumption, which may also 
become  the case  in  other Central European countries. Although it is  probably mostly 
owing  to a better utilisation of energy and exploitation of the  existing  equipment and 
changes  in  the  branch  structure  of the  industry  rather  than  to  modernisation  of the 
industrial equipment, it, still, implies an improvement of the technical factor in the Polish 
industry. 
R&D activities conducted in the Hungarian industrial enterprise was  adversely affected 
by  the new economic situation of Hungary.  From the outset, the economic crisis of the 
1990s  hit  hardest  the  range  of Hungarian large  enterprises which  were  - by  reason 
partly  of  special  prestige  consumption,  partly  of producing  for  the  Eastern  (mainly 
Soviet) markets - the largest customers of the R&D sector. The collapse and often the 
liquidation of these enterprises are the root cause of the fall  in  demand for  R&D. 
A  rather  large  proportion  of the  former  industrial  R&D  capacities  was  tied  up  in 
engineering and import substitution of technology and equipment, either military or non-
procurable for reasons of foreign currency. Almost all such functions came automatically 
to  an end. 
The widening channels of technology transfer have automatically downgraded Hungarian 
technological research, which has no base for instruments or machine-building. The far-
flung  concepts formulated  during the years following  the systemic change seem not to 
have quite come up to expectations: it was not possible to save the Hungarian industrial 
R&D capacity,  employing as  it did  a large pool of staff, by contracting jobs abroad on 
a continuing basis. 
It should be underlined, however,  that in  spite of all  problems, some research units of 
enterprises have  survived,  although reduced in  staff.  Some of them were re-founded as 
private ventures and continue their research activity adapting themselves to needs. 
Research units of some privatised big companies were main trained (e.g. in the case of 
Tungsram, which  is  100%  foreign property now)  or in some rare cases even developed. 
This latter case happened with the Hungarian pharmaceutical company Chinoin-Sanofi, 
the majority owners of which  are French and American companies. 
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On the one hand it is known for high levels of skills and technical culture of the workers 
and engineers (despite 'demoralisation' during decades of easy access to East-European 
markets and lack of international competition), considerable material assets accumulated 
in  various  branches  of industry and a good  innovation  (patent)  activity.  On the other 
hand the new  economic situation uncovers some weaknesses of the Czech industry, like 
insufficient increase in labour productivity (a significant drop in  the output was  accom-
panied by lack of employment retrenchment), shifts towards less  technologically advan-
ced branches (which proved to be more successful in competitive Western markets than 
the high-tech sector), declining industrial R&D activity (as mentioned earlier). 
The current situation in  the Czech Republic's industry is  characterised by  a substantial 
drop  in  overall  output and  heavily  underutilised  production  capacities.  The  extent  of 
these indicators, however, tends to differ from one branch and sector to another. It can 
be  said  that less  technologically  demanding  branches  (such  as  power  generation  and 
fuels,  metallurgy,  food  processing,  paper making  and cellulose manufacture) have  suc-
ceeded in adjusting themselves better to  the new conditions while  technologically more 
demanding  branches  (engineering,  electrical  engineering,  electronics  and  communica-
tions technology) are in the grips of a profound crisis. Branches of the chemical industry, 
and  especially  those  in  the  petrochemical  sector,  have  managed  to  sustain  a  certain 
amount of dynamic.  Reallocation mechanisms have  so  far  been working  more towards 
mobilising  available  technological  resources  (using  the  existing  production  facilities, 
reorganisation  of  enterprises  and  separation  of  good  quality  productions  from  sub-
standard  ones,  utilising  the  possibility  of providing  subcontracting  services  to  foreign 
customers)  rather  than  their  restructuring  (narrowing  down  production  programmes, 
investments,  technology  imports).  The  collapse  of some  technology  based  industrial 
branches,  such  as  electronics,  can  however  be regarded  as  a  correction  of a strategy, 
which  proceeded from  autarchic and no  longer has  any justification in a small country 
like  the Czech Republic and in  an open economy.  The same reasons are applicable to 
the  traditional  technological  branches,  such  as  engineering,  specialised  chemistry  and 
metallurgy,  which  are  also  currently faced  with  the  necessity  of narrowing  down  their 
production  range  and  making  use  of  broader  opportunities  offered  by  cooperative 
options in production. In a global perspective, the ongoing changes may be described as 
a  strengthening  traditional  production  structures  (glass,  ceramics,  textile  and  clothing 
industries) and as  a take-off of selective changes in technology based production areas, 
which could create reliable technological links towards industrialised countries. 
The influence of foreign investments seem to be heading to technologically less demand-
ing branches: 
tobacco  industry,  glass-making,  production  of non-alcoholic  drinks  - 504  million 
USD 
car manufacturing and production of transport technology  - 423  million USD 
food  industry - 190 million USD 
banking  - 178 million USD 
chemical industry - 111  million USD. 
Up to now foreign capital participation in technology based industrial branches has been 
negligible  and  is  applied within  the  framework  of existing  production programmes  of 
enterprises.  In  other  words,  foreign  capital  investments  strengthen  the  otherwise 
dominating tendencies of the branch structure of Czech industries. 
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as  a  growing  interest  of the  Czech  research  community  in  selling  research  findings 
abroad, active  international exchange of technological findings,  etc. 
Slovak industries  are  characterised  by  the  greatest  shares  of the  'heavy'  branches  of 
industry  (metallurgy,  petrochemicals,  military  industry),  by  huge  factories,  high 
dependence on links with  the former Soviet  Union  (as  suppliers of raw  materials and 
customer  of processed  goods),  considerable  underutilisation  of  production  capacities 
(especially after the collapse of exports to  the former Soviet Union and other Eastern 
European countries) and their inadequacy in the new economic condition. 
Slovak industry is,  to  a large  extent,  a result of the forced  socialist industrialisation of 
the  post-war  years  characterised  by  low  level  of  technology  (when  compared  with 
Western European countries) expressed, e.g.  in high energy-, labour-, environment-con-
sumption, etc. It created, at the same time, a large number of highly skilled workers and 
engineers. 
Apart from material problems, Slovak industry, as well as  other sectors, have also some 
institutional  and  organisational deficiencies  resulting from  the  division  of the  Czecho-
Slovak federation, e.g. an insufficient network of industry serving centres (quality testing, 
certificating, etc) which were mostly located in  the Czech Republic. 
When compared to Hungary or the Czech Republic, Slovakia is  less penetrated by  the 
foreign  capital, which  may  create less  favourable  conditions for  technological  advance-
ment of this country. 
4.5.  Education 
The education systems in the Central European countries consist of three levels: primary, 
secondary and  higher (university),  which  are supplemented by  various forms  of short-
term or irregular education. 
Attending primary schools  is  obligatory and almost all  children (98-99%)  in  the age of 
7-14 years attend schools. The ratio for the age group of 15-19 years, corresponding the 
age of secondary schools, is in the range of 80%. Secondary school education still retains 
vocational education bias, characteristic for the socialist countries. 
For example, in Poland pupils of general, 4-year secondary schools constitute only 25% 
of the total number of youths attending secondary schools; 34% attend 4 to 5-year voca-
tional secondary schools and as  many as  41%  attend 3-year vocations schools which do 
not give a secondary school certificate. The latter schools mostly prepare future workers 
for a given enterprise and are very often owned by the enterprise concerned. This type 
of schools  is  undergoing  a  crisis  resulting  from  financial  problems  and  restructuring 
efforts of enterprises (since spending on the factory school is  usually one of the first to 
be cut) and from the changed labour market {firms no longer feel they must run a school 
to  have  new workers). Graduates from  this type of school are among the major victims 
of the unemployment: they are less prepared than their colleagues from secondary gram-
mar  school  to  attend  university  in  order  to  avoid  unemployment  (absence  of  the 
secondary school certificate eliminates such an option) or to take advantage of the new 
job opportunities. 
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developed Western countries. The number of university students per 10,000 inhabitants 
is within the range of 100-125, while in the Western countries it usually exceeds 200. The 
percentage of youngsters who  continue education after completing secondary school is 
also  small  in  and amounts  to  about  15%.  Very  small,  in  comparison with the Western 
countries,  is  also  the student/teacher ratio which  is  of range of 5.5-8.5,  compared with 
more than 15  for Western countries. 
In 1992 there were some 800,000 persons enroled in the university-level academic estab-
lishments in  all four countries. This number is  by far unsatisfactory. 
In recent years in all countries a growing interest in higher education system for subjects 
related to the new  economic situation (e.g.  economics, management, law,  etc)  is  obser-
ved. 
The education systems are undergoing deep transformation, both with regard to subject 
of teaching and organisation of education institutions. For instance, apart from the domi-
nant public schools in  al  countries the number of private and non-public schools  at all 
levels  of education grows. 
In three Central European countries the structure of university-level (higher) education 
offered by respective academic institutions is biased towards the domination of technical 
education. Poland is  the only example of more balanced proportions. 
In the academic year 1992/93,  all  higher schools in Poland had 496  thousand students, 
including  25%  studying  the humanities,  23%  technical  sciences,  12%  economics,  10% 
mathematical and natural sciences, 9%  medicine,  9%  law,  and 5%  agricultural science. 
The  remainder studies  comprise  physical  education  (  4% },  artistic  and  theological  (2% 
each) and other (1% ). 
Very  significative  is  the evolution of the number of university students and teachers in 
recent years. It is  presented in  the following  table 47. 
Table 47. The dynamics of human potential at the higher schools in  Poland, 1980-1993 
Academic year  Number of students  Number of teachers  Student/tea -:her ratio  Students per 
10,000 inh. 
1980/81  453,700  54,681  8.30  127.1 
1981/82  426,500  54,691  7.80  118.1 
1982/83  396,600  56,429  7.03  09.0 
1983/84  369,600  55,887  6.61  107.7 
1985/86  340,700  57,280  5.95  91.3 
1989/90  374,00  60,333  6.20  98.4 
1990/91  403,800  64,454  6.24  105.7 
1991/92  428,200  63,176  6.78  111.8 
1992/93  495,700  63,076  7.86  122.0 
The table demonstrates some clear tendencies:  until the mid-1980  it was  a tendency of 
decrease in  the number of students, in  the student/teacher ratio and in the number of 
students per 10 thousand inhabitants index, with the number of teachers remaining fairly 
stable. Since the late 1980s just the opposite tendency is under way.  The latter tendency 
confirms an earlier in this paper expressed opinion on the changing role of higher educa-
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ticular. 
Generally speaking, the system of higher education in Hungary is  characterised, among 
other things,  by  a relatively low  number of students,  a very  low  student-teacher ratio, 
pragmatic  attitudes  of students  to  higher  education  (as  a  means  for  obtaining  skills 
necessary for professional career rather than for obtaining a set of knowledge)  and the 
consequent high interest of students in faculties related to business and management. A 
two-level organisational system implemented in line with Western (Anglo-Saxon) model, 
responds to these needs. 
The student population of Hungarian higher education was very instable during the post-
war period. It began to soar in the 1950s, when the enrolment rates were much higher 
- to double their level - than in the West European market economies of similar level 
of economic development. Admission rates were then reduced sharply already in 1954, 
which moved the country down in  the European ranking of student numbers. The early 
1960s saw another drastic leap in many faculties and institutions. The growth rate of the 
student population for Hungary was  the highest in Eastern Europe, which  brought the 
country to the tenth place in the European ranking. From the mid-1970s the number of 
students was stagnant in day-time courses and came falling in evening and correspondent 
courses. By the 1980s Hungary had become a laggard of Europe, keeping ahead only of 
Rumania and Albania,  in  terms of per capita day  time students. By  the 1990s  the gap 
had become so  marked that to reduce it,  namely to increase student numbers came to 
be one of the major goals of the system of higher education: in  1985-89 the number of 
students per 10 000 amounted to 99, on average. It should be stressed that this low num-
ber is largely due to demographic characteristic of the Hungarian population (small num-
bers of population in younger age-groups). 
Hungarian higher education occupied a more favourable position as regards the ratio of 
diploma  holders  to  the  population,  which  placed  the  country  within  the  average 
European standards. Precisely for this reason, the conceptions about the role and direc-
tion of increasing the student population need to be studied more thoroughly, albeit, as 
Hungarian experts maintain, their trends certainly deserve support. 
In accordance with the sectoral pattern in  the state socialist model of higher education, 
it was only up to the 1970s that the system was characterised by technical and agricultural 
education with preponderant student populations. From the 1980s teacher's training was 
the  largest  sector  of higher  education  in  Hungary.  Real  research-university  doctoral 
programmes integrated into training were  launched in  the  1990s.  On an  experimental 
basis, a kind of two-level training was also introduced already in the 1960s, and it became 
a prevalent element of higher education in many fields from the tum of the 1980s and 
1990s. 
In the two-level training, the first (BA) level allows  to achieve the professional training 
(imparting packages of skill simplified in comparison with previous full  training) and is 
then  widened  by  the  second  level  by  adding  theoretical  subject,  broader  personality 
development  and  some  professional  elements,  to lead to  the MA degree.  In the next 
decade this model is intended by the state education policy to become a general feature 
of the entire domain of higher education. 
As regards the student-teacher ratio, it is  currently very favourable  (low)  at Hungarian 
universities:  it is  about half of that in  the higher education in  European industrialised 
countries.  And this  particularity was  not  inherited from  the rigidly  planned system  of 
higher education of the 1950s, but is  rather a result of the faster growth in the number 
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number of teachers - 10,312, while in 1981 respectively: 101,166 and 13,890 and in 1991: 
107,079 and 17,477.  The student-teacher ratio was  11.4 in  1961, 8.4  in  1971,  7.4 in  1981 
and 4.8  in  1991. 
The preferences of current students are primarily oriented towards professional training 
in a narrow sense (similar strain can be also seen in other Central European countries). 
The students enrol to the universities or colleges upon their expectation to obtain/provide 
qualification for  some gainful occupation as  soon  as  possible.  In this  connection,  such 
faculties  as  commerce, business administration management, attract really considerable 
interest among students,  as  they offer highly  favourable  employment opportunities for 
graduates. At the same time many faculties,  especially in technical and natural sciences, 
face  problems of insufficient numbers of students. 
The 'socialist' education system in the Czech Republic (as in Slovakia) was characterised 
by  probably the strongest orientation towards  technical training  (at the secondary and 
university levels)  and was  strongly ideology-influenced.  In the  academic year (1991/92) 
the vocational  apprentice  centres concentrated 52.%  of all  secondary  school  students. 
General  secondary  schools  educated  20%  and  secondary vocational  27%  of the  total 
number of pupils in  the secondary schools.  Since the transformation the domination of 
technical orientation on both secondary and university levels  is  being diminished. 
These  are few  university  students per 10,000  population  - the ratio  amounts  to  108. 
There are 23  higher education institutions:  8 (classical)  universities,  6 technical univer-
sities, 1 veterinary university, 1 economic university and 7 other universities; the number 
of students is  112,000. 
The sector of university education witnessed a quantitative upsurge during the 1950s. Its 
growth rate slowed down in the subsequent decades and the universities kept producing 
university-trained graduates at a level of 100 to 120 per 10,000 inhabitants. Also the share 
of admissions to universities in  the 18  to  19  age group was  kept a level of 15  to  16 per 
cent and is now declining. The branch structure by number of students in the university 
sector reflects  a predominate, however  declining,  share  of technical branches  (35  per-
cent},  a prevailing and growing share of social sciences including economics (  41.4% },  a 
decreasing share of agricultural, forestry  and veterinary disciplines  (8.0%)  and medical 
and pharmaceutical branches (9.6% ). 
No  connection  between  research  and  education  at  the  universities  and  separation  of 
university research from activities of the Academy of Sciences are considered as the most 
important shortcoming of the higher education system in  the Czech Republic. 
The education system in Slovakia does not differ much from that in the Czech Republic, 
and has a lot in common with that in Hungary and Poland. It is also organised in a three 
level structure. Until recently it was characterised by  a strong orientation towards voca-
tional  and  technical  training.  The  number  of  university  students  is  rather  low  and 
amounts to 121 per 10 thousand inhabitants (64.3 thousand in absolute terms). The ratio 
of university students to  the population in  the age  of 18-19 years is  also  low  - it was 
14.8 in 1988. There are altogether 17 universities in Slovakia, of which 6 classical univer-
sities,  4  technical  universities,  3  medical  faculties,  1 economic  university  and  3 other 
universities. The number or university teachers in  1992 was  9,351, which makes the stu-
dent/teacher ratio of 6.88. 
The  Slovak  higher  education  system  is  characterised by  clear  orientation  towards  the 
primary and secondary sectors of the  national economy.  In 1992  the share of students 
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munication  7.3%,  agriculture,  forestry  &  fishery  - 7.1 %, while  social  &  behaviourial 
sciences  - only 2.8%. 
The structure of university education by the type of the school also changes. In the years 
1989/1990  - 1992/1993  the  absolute  number  of  students  of  classical  universities 
increased from  16,679 to 23,393  and their share from 33.9% to 42.1 %; in the economic 
university from 5,168 to 6,632 (respectively:  10,5% and 11.9%  ); the number of students 
of technical universities decreased from 22,471  to 20,778 and their share from 45.8% to 
37.4%;  of agriculture  and  forestry  universities  from  4,342  to  4,083  (8.8%  and  7.3%  ). 
These data confirm a clear tendency towards reducing the technical orientation of the 
Slovak higher education, which responses to requirements of the new economic system. 
Apart from 'regular' full-time studies there are also other forms like bachelor and post-
graduate forms.  In the 1992 they represented 5.6% of the total number of students. 
4.6.  Science, technology and education in Central Europe: prospects 
and  policy recommendations 
4.6.1.  Introduction 
The period of 1989-1993 was a unique historical opportunity to organise a highly efficient 
transformation  of the  STE  system  in  Central  Europe.  The  performance  of all  actors 
involved in  these processes was very far from  highest quality standards and was  almost 
totality dominated by  short-term thinking  and  approaches.  Nobody was  able  to design 
and implement the long-term strategic thinking and comprehensive policies in the field 
of science, technology and higher education19. 
The  new  governmental  structures  were  not  able  to  develop  long-term  sciences  and 
industrial policies. The biggest achievements of those governments is the development of 
new legislation being an  important vehicle of the institutional change  - mainly at the 
national level. But even in this legislation we can find many traces of solutions designed 
not in the service  of excellence  - but under the populistic pressures to accommodate 
the interest of the average student and the average professor. 
The international organisations produced a huge volume of partial small- and medium-
scale activities. Those activities have generated many positive effects. However, absence 
of a general strategy implementing the comprehensive grand design is  clearly visible. 
Naturally, all activities in the field of sciences, technology and education were performed 
in  the general global climate of the strong overestimation of the automatic blessing of 
the  market  forces  and  the  strong  underestimation  of the well  known  mechanisms  of 
guided change and long-term strategic approaches including strategic planning. In results 
of that climate  and those only partially efficient transformation activities the system of 
STE has,  in  1993, the following  features: 
19  We  share the value judgement expressed in  TERC: 'As far as the problem of school's self-government is  concerned, 
the  majority  of responders  in  all  four  countries  believe  that  too  much  power was  transferred  to  collective  bodies 
(senates, departmental faculty councils and institutes' scientific councils). Directors', rectors' and deans' executive power 
are too limited.' S. Amsterdamski - TERC - 5 Perceptions of Dilemmas. Summary of a Qualitative study - Transfor-
mation  of the  National  Higher Education and Research Systems  of Central Europe. Institute for  Human Sciences, 
Vienna 1993,  p.  22. 
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The new systemic solutions encounter large fields  and islands of old institutional pat-
terns  and  the  general  level  of coherency  of the  system  is  relatively  low.  The  new 
finality  of the system  is  rather accepted  - at least in verbal terms.  In the field  of 
motivations the role of old mentality is still very important. The dilemma - excellence 
versus mediocrity - has not been solved in  a general way  as yet. 
2.  The system is  functioning in the conditions of financial restrictions and difficulties -
generating the shrinkage effect in many fields.  However, some successes in the crea-
tion of new financial foundations should be noticed. 
3.  The system  is  a bleeding patient of the  external and internal brain drain which  can 
eliminate some strategic links the most advanced fields  of research and teaching. 
4.  The system has an already pathologic biological structure being dominated by old and 
older  generations.  The  deficiency  of  young  dynamic  scientists  is  a  growing 
phenomenon. 
This diagnosis means not that the system has lost its power of survival and transforma-
tion. It only means that the balance of transformation for the years 1989-1993 is not espe-
cially successful due to both subjective and objective factors. 
In 2005  the Central European countries will  have  a new  system of science, technology 
and education which would be adapted to the realities of united and integrated Europe. 
This  system will  fully  accept  the  motivations  and finalities  prevailing in  the European 
Union. This  is  the genus proximum of the new system. 
At the same time,  the differentia  specifica,  associated with the national identity, will  be 
kept alive  - as  a  contribution to  the positive  diversity  of the science,  education and 
culture of United Europe. 
All  actors  involved  in  this  process  of real  and  full  transformation will  develop  com-
prehensive long-term strategies with a proper definition of goals means and instruments 
to  accomplish the historical task of the creation of a coherent new system. 
4.6.2.  Education systems 
The  societies  of the  Central  European  countries  represent  a  relatively  high  level  of 
general and professional education. It is  well that, in  most cases,  the persons endowed 
with  higher  level  of education and professional skills  represent a  much  more  positive 
attitude towards the new reality in the Central European countries than those represent-
ing lower levels of education and professional competence. Therefore, in the scenario a 
process of long-term adaptation of these countries to the realities of the European Union 
will be supported by strong pro-educational policies which would create favourable condi-
tjons  for  the full  transformation and rapid development of the system of education in 
these countries. 
The  passive  attitude  to  tolerate  the  processes  of shrinkage  and  deterioration  of the 
systems of education will be recognised as highly negative from the point of view of the 
development potential of the Central European countries. These countries will meet the 
challenge to create a new system of education in which the principle of excellence is the 
fundamental  criterion  of performance.  The  system  of education will  prepare the con-
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and global societies.  In this effort the self reliance option will  be the main choice. 
There are two  elements in this framework.  The conventional system of education, start-
ing  from  the  kindergarten and  concluding  as  the university,  and the  multidimensional 
system of permanent education defined as a pattern of continuous renewal of knowledge 
and  ability of all  interested members of the labour force  and the society at large. It is 
assumed that both systems of conventional and permanent education will have very high 
development priorities. 
The justification of this  approach is  related not only to  the classical  argument for  the 
development  of national  culture  and  identity  but also  to  the  necessity  of continuous 
improvement of the general conditions for the growth of technological knowledge  and 
know-how  of the  society  - as  the  environment  for  pro-innovative  motivations  and 
activities. 
They system  of education in  the Central European countries will  be developed mainly 
via the application of endogenous mechanisms and resources. In particular, continuation 
of  reduction  of the  inherited  preponderance  of  specialistic  professional  teaching  in 
technical  subjects  in  favour  of  general  education  (at  secondary  school  level)  and 
economic, legal and humanities (at university level). In such a way, the education system 
in the Central European countries will evolve towards Western patterns of the education 
system. 
One may expect a radical increase in the number of university students, to the level of 
some 200  students per 10,000  inhabitants. It will  be a result of lifting of the  previous 
limits on the number of students determined by  the needs of the production sector for 
labour force  as well as  a result of attempts of the authorities to use universities as  'con-
tainers' of youth unemployment, at leats during the few  next years. 
One should also  expect further evolution of the organisational structure of the  educa-
tional system towards more flexibility  and diversity (more short-lasting forms of perma-
nent professional education, more organisational forms of schools and universities, etc). 
In  this  respect,  commercialisation  of the  educational  system  will  be  one  of crucial 
problems.  The role of the private sector (private schools) will  be a subject of political 
debate and will  probably be different in  different countries and will  change over time 
following  changes in the strength of leftist and rightist political forces. 
Especially in the field of the promotion of special schemes for the education of globally-
minded  elites  - with  highest  levels  of  knowledge,  skills  and  competence  - it  is 
envisaged to find solutions related to some extent, to exogenous sources and patterns of 
cooperation. 
Two  solutions will be applied in  this context: 
1.  To  create different institutions for  the  elite education inside  the  Central European 
countries. These institutions, following the already existing modest beginnings, will rely 
- to some extent - on external financial and human resources. 
2.  The 'Go Away solution' (to Western Europe and America)  - following  the example 
of the  dynamic  east  Asian  countries  which  sent  more  than  150  000  students  to 
America alone in the academic year 1991/92  20• 
20  James M.  Montgomery, East Europeans, Too,  Should Go Away  to School,  I.H.T., December 8,  1993. 
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countries - like that of the 'Asian tigers', naturally on a much smaller scale - in order 
to create some additional injections of growth~oriented and  globally~minded young elite 
into the society and economy. 
These process will  allow for much broader participation of the societies in political and 
cultural life of all four Central European countries, for advancement of the technological 
level  of their  economies,  as  well  as  for  much  broader  internationalisation  of  these 
societies. 
4.6.3.  Science, R&D and economic transformation 
The sector of R&D until the year 2005 in the Central European countries will be shaped 
by  the following  developments and factors: 
completion of the critical phase of transformation towards a market economy: 
resumption of the economic growth, 
- continuation of the privatisation process, 
- continuation of the internationalisation of national economies; 
economic and R&D policy of the governments. 
The critical phase of the economic transformation in  Central Europe, which started in 
1989,  is  now coming to its point of completion. This phase has been characterised by a 
dramatic process  of adaptation  of the economy to  new  rules  of the  game,  which,  not 
accidentally coincided with a radical switch of exports from the former USSR and other 
Eastern markets  to  the West.  Generally  speaking,  this  process  of transformation  con~ 
sisted in reducing those capacities which  turned out to be useless in  the new economic 
and political system (regardless whether the process was spontaneous or controlled) and 
in creating institutional foundations for functioning of the new,  market mechanism. The 
reduction of redundant capacities affected,  among other things,  the R&D sector.  Now 
it  seems that all  Central European countries have  reached the final  stage of the most 
critical phase of their transformation towards market economy, though deep and painful 
reforms  are  still  to be introduced. Although considerable parts of national economies, 
especially heavy industries and mining,  are still protected from the blows of the market 
and- with the exception of Poland- more than 50% of GDP is generated by the state 
sector,  a  radical  change  in  the  functioning  of the  economy  and  in  the  behaviour  of 
economic  agents  (producers  and  consumers)  has  occurred.  The  most  spectacular 
evidence and source of this change are developments at the macroeconomic level - the 
transition from  an 'economy of shortages' to an economy of market equilibrium. 
The completion of the critical phase of the economic transformation means, first of all, 
an  end of the reducing of abundant capacities, including those in  R&D, caused by the 
transformation. Of course, it does not mean that other possible mechanisms of shrinkage 
(e.g. international competition, economic recession independent from the transformation, 
etc) will not have worked. However, given the importance of the impact of the transfor-
mation  on  economic  performances  in  the  last  years,  elimination  of  this  particular 
mechanism of reduction of capacities will be a significant relief for the economies of the 
Central European countries. 
The critical phase of the economic transformation should be completed in the period of 
1-2 years. It means that in the following  1-2 years the process of reducing the scientific 
and R&D capacities will  decelerate or stop. 
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ted to science and  R&D will  be restored in all  Central European countries. 
In  the  conditions  of limited  R&D  potential,  the  Central European countries  have  to 
search for their special market opportunities in only few  industries. The most promising 
chances are open to the highly specialised products in  short series at high  unit prices, 
where the competition of big corporations is not very sensible. This applies to some kinds 
of computer  equipment  of ASIC  type,  the  'semi'  or 'full-custom'  integrated  systems, 
robots for specific branches of industry, specialised chemistry products, mainly electronic 
chemicals.  The  above  products  are  counted  among  those  of the  highest  profitability 
('high value added products'), which would improve the economic structure of the whole 
Central European industry. 
4.6.4.  Science of the Central European countries on the global scene 
The  natural,  technical,  social  and  human  sciences  of the  Central  European countries 
have  a long  and,  in  some fields,  successful tradition to  be seen and recognised  on the 
global scene. 
The performance of the communistic past has  a mixed  record of negative and positive 
experiences.  In the field  of natural and technical sciences,  the support of the state for 
the international scientific activities was  relatively strong.  In the field  of social sciences 
and  humanities,  a  valid  difference  between  the  positive  experience  of Poland  and 
Hungary and the negative experience of Czechoslovakia should be noticed. 
The change  of the system  in  1989-1993  has  not created a quantitative  and  qualitative 
improvement in  the  ranking  of the  Central European countries science  on  the global 
scene. On the contrary, the internal financial difficulties and brain drain have somehow 
diminished the competitive edge of these countries. This change, however, is  not deeply 
dramatic and they still have a relatively good ranking even in comparison with the coun-
tries of the European Union, and especially of the four countries of its periphery (Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland and Greece)  21• 
In the perspective of 2005, the science policy in each of the Central European countries 
will  make  a strategic choice between organic and polarised approaches.  In the organic 
approach, science is  seen as  an internally balanced organism where all  parts should be 
developed harmoniously. In the polarised approach, strong preferences for selected dis-
ciplines  or fields  are  chosen,  inter alia  from  the point of view  of the  location  on the 
global scene. A rational and semi-darwinistic philosophy in  Central Europe will  support 
the polarised approaches. The strong feeling of national identity and culture shifts the 
attention to more organic approaches. 
For example, in Hungary the following set of disciplines is regarded as the most promis-
ing:  mathematics, physics  (semiconductors, certain areas of nuclear physics and cosmol-
ogy);  marketable  research in  pharmaceuticals,  agribusiness  and  medical industry (from 
molecular biology to biotechnology). This is  a clear example of polarised model. 
This  is  difficult  strategic  choice  for  the  Central  European  countries  not  mentioned 
explicitly in the background materials and studies. However in implicit terms, the Central 
21  This  is  demonstrated empirically by  an already presented in  this  chapter scientometric study prepared by  J.  Vlachy 
within the programme 'East-Central Europe 2000'. 
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fields  by  a compromise in favour of 'organic' consideration. 
The Central European countries will promote comprehensive evaluations in this field  -
with some reliance on the advice of the international organisations and especially of the 
European Union and OECD. It is  still an open question if it is  possible to develop for 
this  purpose a sui generis  cost-benefit analysis  of the presence of a field  from  a small 
country on the global scene. 
4.6.5.  The special role of transfer sciences 
The Central European countries, as rather small countries which will not be able to com-
pete with  the  technological  and  scientific  superpowers.  Absorbtion  and  adaptation  of 
innovations  coming from  abroad will  definitely be  the more  rationalistic solution  then 
return to autarchic attitudes of the past. 
'Transfer sciences' play an essential role in providing an interface between the world of 
'pure science' and industry22• This interface was historically a weak link in the system of 
science  in  Central  Europe  - and  especially  in  Poland.  The  situation  in  this  field  in 
Bohemia and Hungary is  much better at least in some dimensions. 
The transfer sciences will have strong priorities for growth in the Central European coun-
tries. 
This is  a specially difficult domain integrating the deep knowledge of pure sciences and 
a comprehensive understanding of the problems generated by  the technological,  social 
and economic development. It is  therefore assumed  that a new  generation of globally 
minded  'transfer scientists'  will  be  educated for  and  in  Central Europe.  The  transfer 
sciences  will  be  much  more  efficient  in  the  implementation  of  their  academic  and 
pragmatic functions than the conventional applied sciences. 
In the Central European countries this interface between the world of pure science and 
industry will  rationally be promoted by integrated science and industrial policies. 
4.6.6.  Innovation as the key  of the technological future 
The Central European countries will  - in the next decade  - supply positive  answers 
to  two  questions: 
1.  Is it possible for the Central European countries to create in some fields globally valid 
technological innovations? 
2.  Is it possible for the Central European countries to absorb innovations created by the 
leading powers? 
The answers to these two  questions cannot be left only to the 'lottery of the market' -
even if the market mechanisms are very important also in  this field. 
The  answers  to  these  two  questions  will  be  supplied  via  the  development  of  pro-
innovative strategies and policies deeply rooted in the broad framework of spontaneous 
22  OECD: TEP - Technology and the Economy - Key  Relationship. Paris 1992, p.  37. 
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Central European countries. In the next paragraphs we will look at a the activities of the 
main actors of this great process. 
A comprehensive network of pro-innovative strategies and policies for the next decade 
will  be development in  and for  the Central European countries.  These strategies  and 
policies can emerge in a process of consecutive approximations - as the results of inter-
action and cooperation of five  actors: 
the academic and R&D Communities, 
the national business communities, 
the governmental institutions at the national and regional level, 
the transnational corporations, 
the international organisations with a special role of DG XII. 
The academic and research communities will get a strong financial and institutional sup-
port from all the remaining actors involved in this process. These communities will accept 
the principle  that the  cherished  idea of the  autonomy  of the  corporation  should  not 
diminish the eternal search for excellence and the pragmatic search for effective manage-
ment of human and capital resources. The autonomy of the academic communities will 
be seen rather as  an instrumental than final value. 
The gerontocratic strata of the academic communities will  finally see the mortal danger 
incorporated in the negative change of the biological structure of the community. 
These communities will promote: 
the  internalisation  of pro-innovative  approaches  and  motivations  by  the  academic 
community itself, 
the pro-innovative activities of the governmental and business communities, 
the development of pro-innovative attitudes of the society of large. 
In the development of pro-innovative  strategies and policies  in  the Central European 
countries the role of the national business communities is very important. The growing 
maturity and wealth of the business community in the Central European countries will 
create the pull-effect in the field of innovation. 
At the present stage of development this pull-effect is  rather weak. The general condi-
tions of economic activity  and especially the inefficient systems of credit and taxes  are 
creating a negative climate for the process of innovation absorption by the business com-
munity. Therefore not only the change of the attitude of the business community but also 
the deep change in  the institutional environment has to take place. 
In the  Central European countries,  the governmental institutions at the national  and 
regional levels will assume the leading role in the design of pro-innovative strategies and 
policies. 
It is  wrong  to  assume  that these  strategies  and policies will  create one more field  of 
classical  sectoral  approaches.  The difficulty  and  challenge  of pro-innovative  strategies 
and policies is  to answer the question: how to introduce the spirit of innovation into all 
governmental strategies and policies (science and education policies, industrial policies, 
tax and income policies,  credit policies etc.)? 
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liberal (non-interventionist), 
indirectly (semi) interventionist, 
interventionist. 
If the first  type  policy  is  adopted in  the  Central European countries,  one can  hardly 
expect a quick overcoming the present downward tendency and a considerable increase 
in the R&D activity. This scenario would mean a reduction of the size of the R&D sector 
in relation to the production sector and stronger dependence of R&D on the production 
sector. 
The indirect interventionist policy (i.e. direct interventionism towards selected production 
sectors liberal approach to the R&D sector) would result in creation net gainers which 
would be able to spend more on R&D. The final result would be, however, very difficult 
to predict and it would depend on detailed modalities of such a policy subjected to politi-
cal considerations and conflicts. So, it is not obvious this policy would be more favourable 
for the domestic R&D. 
The interventionist policy relies on direct care of the state taken of some R&D institu-
tions.  Merits  and shortcomings of such  a policy  are obvious:  on the one hand assured 
survival  and development of the selected institutes or fields  of research,  on the other 
hand possibility  of isolation of research in  the protected fields  from  real needs of the 
economy and thus presenting a net burden for the state budget. Given budget difficulties 
of the post-socialist countries, there is little room for pursuing this policy.  Nevertheless, 
a  certain  room  does  exist.  If this  possibility  is  exploited  carefully,  one  may  expect  a 
recovery of the domestic R&D keeping pace with the general economic recovery. 
But the  most  important challenge  is  offered by  the  policy  towards  the foreign  direct 
investments.  One  can  expect  an  increase  in  foreign  investments,  which  will  probably 
bring about divergent effects with respect to R&D and technology. On the one hand they 
will  create favourable conditions for transfer of modern (though not the most modern) 
technologies and equipment.  On the other hand, it is  very probable that foreign  com-
panies will  not be interested in developing or maintaining R&D units in  their Central 
European branches,  except  those carrying out a very limited scope of activities  strictly 
related  to  marketing  of their  goods  in  local  markets.  The most  probable  division  of 
labour within multinationals operating in  Central Europe will  consist in maintaining of 
general management and R&D in countries of origin while leaving to Central European 
branches  or  subsidiaries  functions  of  labour- or  raw-material  intensive  productions 
designed for  exports or assembly and/or marketing of goods for  local markets.  In such 
a  situation  foreign  capital  hardly  can  be  a  promoter of R&D  in  Central  Europe.  It 
doesn't exclude,  of course,  exceptions from  this  rule.  It should also  be added that the 
attitudes of foreign firms towards their Central European activities can be influenced by 
government policies of the countries of the region. 
The  pro-innovative  strategies  and  policies  will  also  have  a  strong  regional  dimension 
following  the experiences of such countries as  France and Germany. 
It is well known that the transnational corporations (TNCs) are a dominating actor on 
the global scene of the creation and diffusion of innovation. For the Central European 
countries there are three questions in this field: 
to what extent the TNCs will keep alive the existing R and D capacities in the enter-
prises bought or controlled in the Central European countries? 
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countries? 
to what extend the general policies of TNCs will  help to build up a pro-innovative 
climate in the Central European countries? 
It is  very difficult to supply an answer to these questions. The Central European coun-
tries will learn - in a painful process - to adapt to the conditions created by the TNCs. 
The international organisations and especially the DG XII of the Commission, have an 
immense  experience  in  the  design  and  promotion  of  pro-innovative  strategies  and 
policies. This experience will  - on a large scale  - be applied in the Central European 
countries. The activity of DG XII will  have a catalytic role to accelerate and rationalise 
the performance of all  actors  involved  in  the creation of pro-innovative strategies and 
policies in and for the Central European countries. 
It  is  assumed  that  the ·  Central  European  countries  will  try  to  overcome  the  present 
vacuum in the field of pro-innovative policies. One of the important goals in this domain 
is  the creation of the efficient national systems of innovation. 
The starting point to create the national system  of innovation  is  much stronger in the 
Czech  Republic  and Hungary than in  Poland and Slovakia.  However,  all  four  Central 
European countries have a long way to go to create a comprehensive set of institutions 
and approaches which will  function as  an efficient national innovation system. 
4.6.  7.  The Central European countries and the new belt of innovation in Europe 
It is worth while to look at pro-innovative policies in the Central European countries in 
a broader geographic perspective of a new innovation belt incorporated by a geometrical 
figure closed by the linking Florence - Szeged - Warsaw - Kaliningrad - Stockholm 
- Oslo - Hamburg  - Norenberg  - Florence (see fig.  18). 
This belt has a very great innovation potential which will,  in the future produce a Third 
Space of special concentration of innovative activities similar to the Blue Banana and the 
Croissant. The Central European countries are vitally interested in the creation of this 
Third Space. This can be a self-fulfilling positive prophecy - if all industries and coun-
tries located in this belt demonstrate sufficient wisdom, effort and good will to promote 
the development of multi-dimensional innovation-related networks which will create 'vir-
tuous circles' of knowledge accumulated at the local, regional, national and international 
levels. 
This belt is: 
linking Baltic and Mediterranean Europe, Western and Central Europe, 
an  area of intensive integration of regions located on both sides of the former Iron 
Curtain, 
an  area  of  strong  interaction  of  German,  Scandinavian,  Slavik  and  Romanistic 
cultures - spirits and behaviour patterns. 
One cannot rule out that the regional patterns of Central European Transformation, as 
discussed in chapter 5, will]  be reinforced by the more general favourite regions setting 
in  Europe, presented in figure  18. 
- 104-In this way we  enter into this part of the report which is  devoted to the spatial patterns 
of transformation in  Central Europe. 
NEW BELT OF INNOVATION IN EUROPE 
Figure 18.  New  innovation belt in  Europe. 
- 105-Chapter 5 
REGIONAL PATTERNS  OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN 
TRANSFORMATION, 1990-2005 
Introduction 
The processes and phenomena presented in this report so far do exist in concrete, physi-
cal  space. They are located in  this space. 
The space is  itself differentiated physically, but also socially and economically. This dif-
ferentiation is the product of history - but also of the last few years. The most important 
analytical question which should be posed in relation to the spatial outcomes of present 
transformation process and future spatial patterns of Central European development is 
the following:  do the new factors of development follow  the traditional spatial patterns 
of particular countries or do they - and will  they - change these patterns? In other 
words - is  the economic geography of the Central European countries going to change 
dramatically in result of the systemic transformation, or is it going to remain, in principle, 
only slightly modified? 
This question is  derived from a reflection on the interplay between long, secular trends 
and current, short-term processes. In other words, this question can be formulated in the 
following way:  does the shift from 'real socialism' to capitalism change dramatically the 
spatial heritage of the Central European countries? Before we examine this question, we 
should pay some attention to this heritage, which is  done in the next section. 
The second basic question refers to the policy principles and measures. What type  of 
actions should be undertaken and on what decision-making level in order to incorporate 
the regions/spatial dimension into the general processes of transformation and develop-
ment? In particular, what type of regional structure: polarised and efficiency-oriented or 
more equalised is the structure advisable for the Central European countries, also taking 
into account their possible integration with the European Union? 
This part of the report discusses these two  main questions. 
5.1.  The heritage 
5.1.1.  The long tradition 
The boundaries of Czechoslovakia and Hungary which exist  to-day (or, in the Czecho-
Slovak case have existed till recently) were shaped after the World War One. These two 
countries emerged out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hungary lost two-thirds of its 
pre-war territory. The full and formal split of Czechoslovakia into two independent coun-
tries  came into being on January 1,  1993,  as  the result of political game and to much 
lesser extent as  a  result of the will  of population. It has  had and will  have  important 
influence on these two  newly emerged countries. 
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World War One, after 123 years of absence on this map. World War Two  resulted in a 
major shift of Polish boundaries westwards. 
All four countries of Central Europe throughout their entire history have been located 
on the European economic periphery. The Czech Republic is  most closed to one of the 
two  main European economic axes:  the 'old' northern one, extending from  London to 
Rome (the 'European banana'). All of them are far away from the new Mediterranean 
axis,  extending from  Milan to Barcelona. 
Only the Czech lands have experienced an advanced level of capitalist industrialisation. 
In Poland, Hungary and Slovakia the main wave of industrialisation came along with the 
socialist system after World War Two, which perhaps was mostly pronounced in Slovakia. 
The present spatial structure of Central Europe is a joint product of two processes: long 
historical  trends in building the pattern of the settlement system  and the 19th century 
industrialisation introduced by the (delayed in the periphery) industrial revolution. These 
two  factors  have  constituted  the  general  spatial  organisation  of the  economies  and 
societies of Central Europe. 
5.1.2.  The socialist heritage 
The socialist industrialisation reshaped the social and economic space of Central Europe 
to a much lesser extent than the socialist system changed social stratification and social 
attitudes  in  this  part of Europe.  In fact,  the  general  spatial  patterns  have  not been 
changed  in  qualitative  terms.  Paradoxically,  one  may  even  say  that  the  socialist 
industrialisation reinforced traditional spatial patterns. 
However,  several  new  phenomena  emerged  in  the  socio-economic  space  of Central 
Europe after World War Two.  Six main dimensions of these spatial change could be dis-
tinguished: 
introduction of 'big' (also of heavy) industry into great cities, which resulted in deep 
changes of their economic and social structures and limiting the development of their 
service functions; 
creation of several new industrial centres, which based on extraction of raw materials 
(coal,  lignite,  copper,  sulphur,  iron,  uranium)  and/or  on  metallurgy  and  energy 
production; 
accelerated industrialisation of traditionally rural areas, in many cases coupled with 
growth  of mining  and  heavy  industries,  which  resulted  in  growth  of middle-sized 
towns and created new socio-occupational structure in these areas (great share of so-
called 'hi-professionals' and widely spread commuting to work, since the urban system 
could not fulfil  all  requirements of the industrial complex); 
collectivisation of agriculture, which changed the settlement system in rural areas and 
created big  state-owned  or collective  farms,  in  this  way  liquidating  the  traditional, 
family-run farming (Poland was the only exception in this process, though agriculture 
in western and northern parts of Poland was  collectivised in 50  per cent); 
the 'fetish of industrialisation' left limited resources for other economic sectors. This 
resulted  in  relative  underdevelopment  of  infrastructure.  Especially,  roads  and 
telecommunication were hit most severely.  Only railroads, essential for transporting 
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better; 
dramatic deterioration of the quality of natural environment due to extremely sim-
plistic attitudes to development and total neglect of other targets of development but 
quantitative growth. 
In result, the Central European countries were not able to overcome the traditional pat-
tern  of spatial-functional  relationships  between  urbanisation,  industrialisation  and  the 
level  of living,  which was  possible  in more mature economies. Towns were the centres 
of industry  and  offered  much  higher  level  of living.  Industry still  remained  the main 
source  of  incomes,  of  social  advancement  and  economic  development.  The  entire 
economies of the socialist countries - and especially their regional economies  - were 
clearly industry-driven, and this  industry was  entirely subordinated to the paradigm of 
the second technological revolution. Only the Czech lands, owing to their older traditions 
of industrial civilisation,  demonstrated some more mature spatial patterns. 
In spite  of accelerated industrialisation the traditional division  of all  four  countries to 
their more developed western and less developed eastern parts has still persisted and is 
still clearly visible.  To  some extent, only Hungary was  the only exception to this pattern 
since  this  country used  to be divided  into  more  developed  North and less  developed 
South. However, the most recent changes introduced the general East-West pattern also 
in Hungary, since the Danube divides more progressive western part from lagging behind 
eastern. In all four countries several areas are still on a low level of development, being 
poorly equipped with infrastructure, predominantly rural, with labour force having lower 
level of education. 
It was  hoped at the beginning of the socialist  industrialisation that these  regional  dif-
ferences will  cease to exist.  This did not happen, which was  due to two  main reasons: 
industrialisation  carried  out on  the  less  developed  areas  was  too  limited  both  in 
magnitude and in the level of diversification of industrial structure to produce a basis 
for self-sustained regional development of these areas; 
in fact,  a great part (in Poland: the main part) of industrialisation effort was concen-
trated in  traditional industrial centres, which  led to overconcentration of industrial 
production in many of them and did not allow for alleviating the regional inequalities. 
In result, several territories of the four countries can be labelled as truly 'old industrial 
areas'. They present all features of 'industrial backwardness': monofunctional production 
structure;  biased  structure of skills  and educational profiles  of the labour force;  high 
levels of pollution; deteriorating urban substance. 
The socialist politics  and the socialist economies were the closed systems.  The relative 
underdevelopment of the border areas was  the direct spatial outcome of this feature of 
the socialist reality. The number of border crossings has been small. International trans-
portation routes were underdeveloped. Trans-border cooperation was almost non-existing 
or - during the last years of the socialist rule - assumed a one-direction pattern (from 
the West to the East: from  Germany to Poland and the Czech Republic, from Austria 
to  Hungary).  Traditional  ties  between  regions  and  cities  were  almost  entirely broken 
(Vienna-Bratislava,  the  two  cities  connected  in  the  past by  tramway  and  then  almost 
totally  separated  by  the  state  border,  are  the  most  pronounced  example  of  this 
phenomenon). 
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strongly  polarised  regional  structure  and  deep  spatial  inequalities,  overindustrialised 
cities,  underdeveloped  infrastructure,  polluted  environment.  Several  new  processes 
emerged during the first three-four years of this transformation, thus giving first indica-
tions  of the  direction  in  which  the  development  of different  types  of regions  might 
proceed in  the future. The following sections will  examine the results of the first phase 
of restructuring and will  attempt to provide a picture of regional structures of Central 
Europe in the year 2005.  Regional policies will  also be discussed. 
5.2.  Territory and territorial organisation 
Three out of four countries of Central Europe are of similar size, Poland itself is by 50% 
bigger than all three taken together. Table 48 presents basic data on their territories and 
their administrative organisation. 
Table 48.  Territories and administrative structures in Central Europe 
Countries  Total area,  Number and status of administrative units 
1,000 km2  regional  county/district  local 
Czech Republic  78.9  - 75  (3  urban)  6,237 
8 (1  urban)  governmental  self-governmental 
governmental 
abolished in  1991 
Hungary  93.0  6  19  2,915  rural, 
Representatives  governmentaV  156 towns, 
of the Republic  indirectly  self  -governmental 
self-governmental 
20  towns of 
county status 
Poland  312.7  49  267  2,459 
governmentaV  purely 
indirectly  governmental 
self-governmental 
Slovakia  49.0  5 (2  urban)  38  ? 
abolished in  1991  governmental  self-governmental 
As it can be seen from the above table, the territorial organisation of the four states dif-
fers  considerably. Polish regions (voivodships)  are similar in  size  to Hungarian counties 
(megye)  and both these units are bigger than Czech and Slovak districts. In all countries 
the government controls the tier(  s)  of territorial division above the local level23• 
The self  -governmental municipality seems to be the strongest in Poland both in terms of 
area and population  - only 27  Polish  communes have  less  than 2,500  inhabitants.  In 
Hungary one third of municipalities have population smaller than 500 inhabitants. In the 
Czech Republic some 80% of municipalities have less than 1,000 population. 
There  are  also  differences  in  powers  and  competencies  of local  governments.  Polish 
municipalities seem to be the strongest economic and legal entities. 
23  These differences create some analytical problems. Only Hungarian and Polish administrative regions are comparable 
in size.  Both Czech and Slovak districts are much smaller (and much more numerous) and the former regions (kraje) 
bigger than the Hungarian counties and Polish voivodships. For clarity and synthetic presentation the bigger Czech and 
Slovak units were used in  all graphic presentations in this report. 
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into 7 districts, each of them having a status of a 'normal' commune (though the biggest 
of them, Mokot6w, inhabited by over 350,000 people, has more population than several 
voivodships  ).  The central Warsaw authority is  relatively weak and managing the whole 
city is  difficult and partly inefficient. Similar situation exists in Budapest, which is  com-
posed of 22 districts and the central city authority has exactly the same status as  any of 
the city districts. 
The  prospected  reforms  of the  territorial  divisions  of all  four  countries  seem  to  be 
following in the same direction. The discussions conducted in every country lead to the 
conclusion  that regions  of the first  order should be  strengthened. Polish  reform will 
probably result in creation of 12-14  such regions,  though a  figure  of 25  is  also men-
tioned. It cannot be excluded that the 6 Hungarian regions hosting the Representatives 
of the Republic will be assigned some powers (though it is much more probable that the 
new regional system will be based on the centuries' long tradition of 19 counties). Also 
in the Czech Republic it is  claimed that a regional level,  abolished in 1991, should be 
re-introduced. 
5.3.  Factors of the regional potential for transformation 
Together with the beginning of transformation from the socialist to capitalist system the 
Central European countries became exposed to Western, capitalist factors  and patterns 
of  development.  The  socialist  patterns  of  regional  development,  such  as  massive 
industrial investment, heavily subsidised housing, voluntary arrangement of space and a 
stigma of 'non-productivity' attached to infrastructure, have  gone.  Instead, the regions, 
in  order  to  meet  the  challenges  of  international  and  domestic  markets,  have  to 
demonstrate good natural and social  environment, highly skilled labour force,  efficient 
production structures, ability to innovate and rich equipment with modern infrastructure. 
The heritage of history,  coupled with  natural endowment of particular areas,  have put 
particular regions of Central Europe in very different positions at the start for transfor-
mation.  Only  some  of them  appeared  to  be  able  to  participate  in  creation  of new 
economic and social structures. These are the leaders of transformation. On the other 
pole there is  a group of regions which would not be able to successfully compete in the 
new  international and  national  setting.  In this way  the  polarisation effect  has  already 
manifested  itself  also  in  the  regional  dimension  of Central  Europe,  as  in  other  -
economic and social  - dimensions. 
The balance-sheet of regional potential for new conditions should therefore include the 
following  items: 
a)  settlement system; 
b)  quality of environment; 
c)  the quantitative and qualitative features of the labour market; 
d)  equipment with R&D centres; 
e)  equipment with infrastructure; 
f)  accessibility from international centres of innovation and capital. 
- 111-~  "1!5- 11l:J 
~  1D:I.- 1!:1l 
~  1!5:1.  :- .zm  . 
~  2¥-i- s:;g 
•  ~- 7"h!!; 
·1~- 9B'tD 
Figure 19. Regional differentiation of the density of population in  Central Europe. 
5.3.1.  Demography and the settlement system 
Demographic processes are the least dynamic ones. Only in times of massive migrations 
the spatial structures of population change rapidly. All Central European countries have 
already gone through this period in the 1950s  and the 1960s  along with the process of 
accelerated industrialisation and the stabilisation of the regional distribution of popula-
tion has been achieved. 
Central Europe has a medium density of population, equal to 120 persons per 1 square 
kilometre.  The Czech  Republic is  the mostly  densely populated country (130  persons/ 
km2), then comes Poland (122),  Hungary (111)  and Slovakia (108).  Figure 19  presents 
the regional differentiation of density of population. 
All  four  countries  present very  similar  level  of urbanisation.  56.1  of Slovak,  62%  of 
Hungarian and Polish population live  in towns.  In Poland the share of population living 
in towns of over 10,000 inhabitants equals 56.7%  and for the Czech Republic 55.7%. 
- 112-The  four  Central  European  countries  have  reached  the  stage  of stability  of their 
demographic and settlement systems, though a constant, slow increase of urban popula-
tion can be observed. 
The pace of changes of the spatial structure of settlement has declined considerably in 
all four countries after the first stage of the socialist industrialisation. The massive shift 
from the rural areas to towns ended somewhere in the sixties, though in Slovakia it was 
prolonged to the seventies. This slow down of internal migrations was coupled with drop-
ping natural increase. In result, during the 1980s the regional dynamics of demographic 
processes was  much lower then before. 
During the 1980s the western territories of the Czech Republic have been losing popula-
tion at the rate of -4 to -2 per cent in a decade. The highest increase of the number of 
inhabitants,  up to  10%  during the decade  of the  1980s,  was  noted in the eastern and 
south-western parts of the country {though the highest increase, of more than 10%, took 
place in  the northern district of Ceska Lfpa, the site of the uranium mine). 
In Hungary, since the beginning of the 1980s the total number of population was drop-
ping fast, at the rate of -1.7 to -1.9 per cent yearly. The north-eastern parts of the country 
noted the biggest growth  of the number of population (Reves,  Hajdu-Bihar, Szaboles-
Szamtar-Bereg)  - these  are  the  regions  with  the youngest  population.  Demographic 
growth is  also noted in some central (Fejer) and south-western (Somogy) counties. The 
general tendency of migrations from the East to the West is therefore natural and visible. 
In Poland the highest demographic growth occurs in two  groups of regions:  south-east-
ern, with high share of rural population and northern and western part of the country, 
with  younger  population.  Both these  two  factors  are responsible  for  traditionally high 
natural increase due to high  rate of births. There have been two  regions which begun 
to lose population: L6dz and Walbrzych - the two regions of especially heavy restructur-
ing  problems. The decade of the 1980s  brought a deep decline (by 50%) of the tradi-
tionally high internal migrations,  to  some 500,000 yearly.  Even in Upper Silesia, which 
traditionally  accommodated  the highest  numbers of newcomers,  the positive  migration 
balance became very small (it dropped from  27,000 in 1980 to mere 2,000 in 1992). 
In  Slovakia  the  fastest  demographic  growth  takes  place  in  the  northern  and  eastern 
regions. Towns still gain in population, which does not seem to be the case in other three 
countries (for example, during the 1980s Poprad increased its number of inhabitants by 
39%, Banska Bystrica by 32%, Presov by 28% ).  Only few districts in the South lose pop-
ulation. 
The pattern of persisting decrease of domestic migrations in  all  four countries reflects 
the decrease of real incomes and shortage of new housing. It leads to petrification of the 
regional structure of job opportunities. It is a kind of a vicious circle: no 'working' labour 
market  may  be  created  without  sufficient  supply  of new  housing  and  propensity  to 
migrate, which leads to slower economic growth even in the regions which could develop 
faster and which could accommodate new labour force from areas experiencing structural 
massive  unemployment.  Housing  thus  appears  to  be  the  crucial  factor  of  possible 
increase  of internal migrations  and  in  this  way  of achieving  adaptation  of the  spatial 
structure  of  the  labour  force  to  the  spatially  differentiated  dynamics  of  economic 
development. 
The international migrations have not changed the basic settlement patterns of the four 
countries. It should also be expected that immigration from the East and outmigration 
- 113-to  the West will  not pose dramatic problems for  Central Europe. At the moment only 
few Polish regions lose population for Germany, but the scale of registered outmigration 
does not exceed some 30  thousand people yearly. 
The four  countries present strongly differentiated patterns of their settlement systems 
(see  fig.  20).  Poland has  the most balanced settlement pattern and  Hungary could be 
placed on the opposite pole. 
In Poland the population is  spread more or less  evenly across its territory with one but 
important exception for the Upper Silesia. The Katowice voivodship (2.0% of the coun-
try's  area)  is  inhabited by  10%  of the total population of Poland. The biggest town  in 
Poland, Warszawa,  has  1. 7 min  inhabitants and its  entire metropolitan region some  2.6 
million. Polish urban system strictly follows  the rank-size rule, with 5 other big cities hav-
ing  population  above  half  a  million  (L6dz:  845,000;  Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot:  764,000; 
Krakow:  751,000;  Poznan:  590,000;  Wroclaw:  644,000).  The  greatest  agglomeration  of 
Poland, the Upper Silesia, concentrates some 4 million people. 
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Figure 20. The biggest urban centres in Central Europe. 
- 114-Hungary  is  a clear example of a country dominated by  one big  urban agglomeration. 
Its capital, Budapest, inhabited by  2 min people, concentrates 20 per cent of the entire 
population of the country. No other town can compete with the role of the Hungarian 
capital  - the next biggest towns with population over 150 thousand are the following: 
Debrecen (216.1  th.), Miskolc (196.4 th.), Szeged (177.7 th.), Pees (170.5 th.). 
The settlement patterns of the Czech  and Slovak Republics  is  somewhat between the 
Polish and Hungarian structures. The two  capitals - Prague and Bratislava - concen-
trate 11.8% and 8.3% of the overall population of these two new republics (their number 
of inhabitants is  1,215  and 441.5  thousand,  respectively).  In the Czech  Republic,  as  in 
Hungary, the capital is  by far the biggest city - the population of the next town in the 
rank, Brno, is equal to 350,000. In the Slovak Republic only Kosice have reached the size 
of a bigger town, with the population of 234.8 thousand. The towns occupying next posi-
tions (Nitra, Presov, Banska Bystrica, Zilina) all have population within the range of 80-
90 thousand. In Slovakia there are only 10 towns with population over 50,000 (in Poland 
there are 90 such towns,  in Hungary 17  and in the Czech Republic 32). 
The regional structures of population and the settlement systems will  not change con-
siderably in the coming years. The demographic processes described above will  persist 
also in the future. 
However,  the  problem  of depopulating  regions  which  emerged  recently will  be  even 
more acute for some areas.  This will  be the case in  the Czech Republic (especially in 
Northwest Bohemia, but also in Northeast Bohemia) and in Hungary (West of the coun-
try, though in-migration may ease this problem there). In Poland some rural, north-east-
ern areas my face demographic problems due to distorted sex balance (shortage of young 
women, who emigrated to towns). 
The  capitals  of the  four  Central  European  countries will  assume  the  role  of open, 
European cities.  There are  good  chances  that at  least  two  of them  - Budapest and 
Prague - will be able to joint the second-order European metropoles and play the role 
of the gateway to Central Europe. 
Prague, with its 1.3 min inhabitants in the year 2005, will regain its position as an interna-
tional cultural and educational centre. This process has already started - in 1993 Prague 
hosted  some  35,000  of foreigners,  mostly  young  people  who  enjoy  its  rich  cultural 
heritage, experimental spirit and intellectual atmosphere. 
Budapest is very likely to become the commercial and financial centre of Central Europe. 
The development of business and financial  services has been especially fast  in this city 
after 1989.  Budapest concentrates some  50-80%  of the national scientific  and cultural 
potential,  which  places  this  city  among  the  best  equipped  with  R&D  base  in  the 
European metropoles of the second order. 
These two cities: Prague and Budapest will have to solve their problems with worn down 
housing stock in  their central areas and obsolete urban infrastructure. The central dis-
tricts of these towns will change their structure dramatically - from occupational func-
tions to general business and cultural services. In the case of Prague the potential conflict 
between  historic  heritage  and  new  service  functions  must  be  solved  in  favour  of the 
historic urban structure, which is  of unique, world-wide character. 
Warsaw, located on the straight route from Paris and Berlin to Moscow and Kiev, seems 
to  have  the best position  for  becoming  the gateway  to  the  East and  a  meeting-point 
between the East and the West. Being a relatively modern city (rebuilt almost completely 
- 115-after the World War Two)  Warsaw lacks the atmosphere of tradition and the flavour of 
history. On the other hand, however, it offers several excellent opportunities for locating 
new  top quality services  (hotels, banks, offices)  in  the very centre of the city.  Creation 
of the CBD is still possible without major costs of demolishing old structures. Relatively 
modern  manufacturing  and  presence  of  several  high-quality  R&D  establishments  is 
another important asset of Warsaw. 
Bratislava seems to  remain in  the shadow of Vienna.  This,  however,  may become one 
of the strongest assets of this city. Transfer of capital, contacts and know-how may be the 
most natural outcome of the proximity between the two  towns. 
5.3.2.  Natural environment 
Central Europe is no doubt 'the basin of dirt' of the entire continent. Only souther part 
of former GDR and some coal mining and heavy industry centres in the former Soviet 
Union may  enter into this negative competition with  the four Central European coun-
tries. 
Emissions  of many  pollutants  - like  particulate  matter,  sulphur  dioxide,  untreated 
sewage, etc. - reached their peak levels in the 1980s, and have been declining now. Still, 
if compared with GDP, these emissions are remarkably higher than in Western Europe 
(see  table  49).  Furthermore,  the  'environmental  performance'  gap  between  East  and 
West  has increased during the last couple of years. This was  a combined effect of two 
trends:  slower  decline  of pollution  levels  and  negative  GDP growth  rates  in  Central 
Europe. 
Much of the East-West difference in this respect can be explained in terms of excessive 
energy use characteristic for the world of centrally planned economies of Central Europe 
belonged to. This is,  however, only a part of the story, and the environmental failure of 
communist regimes in Europe has to be seen in  a much broader perspective. 
The impact of the relatively high aggregate pollution levels is further amplified by their 
highly  uneven  spatial distribution.  As  a result,  a number of areas  throughout  Central 
Europe have been suffering from particularly high pollution doses (see fig.  21). 
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In Poland, 27 'hot spots' were officially recognized in  1983 and - as 'areas of ecological 
hazard' - given special status in some policy decisions.  Of the 27,  two  areas are on the 
very top:  the Legnica-Glog6w Copper Basin, and the Katowice-Rybnik Coal Basin. It is 
geographically linked to  the Czech Ostrava region. 
Two  other areas  in  the  Czech  Republic  are  also  identified  as  heavily  disrupted ones. 
These are: North Bohemia - where many power plants are concentrated - and Prague. 
The high level of industrial development combined with the reliance on coal deposits of 
poor quality are responsible for extremely high energy consumption and C02 emissions 
(  4 tonnes per inhabitant per year  - the highest in  Europe).  A  number of pollutants 
emitted in the process of burning fossil fuels pose a direct threat to the environment and 
- 117-public health. Additionally, the country is affected by its nuclear industry. Chemicals used 
in processing the locally extracted uranium ore represent a serious risk for ground water 
contamination. The Temelin nuclear power plant has been the object of concern for its 
unsolved safety system. 
The extent of environmental disruption in  Slovakia is  rather low  if measured by  Polish 
or Czech standards. 16 areas - scattered around the country - are listed as those suf-
fering  from  adverse  environmental  impacts.  One  has  to  observe,  however,  that  this 
category includes also relatively unpolluted areas, like the Poprad Valley adjacent to the 
southern slope of the Tatra Mountains, which  is  simply  affected by  tourism. There are 
two areas which have been identified as heavily disrupted. One is the Upper Nitra River 
Valley where the disruption is caused by coal mining activities coupled with the develop-
ment of heavy industries (chemicals, building materials and power generation). The other 
one is  the East Slovak Range affected by the emissions from the local power plants, as 
well  as  chemical, timber and paper and pulp industries. In addition, both biggest towns 
- Bratislava and Kosice  - are considered serious problem areas too. 
In Hungary most of the hot spots are located along the 'industrial axis'  of the country 
that goes from south-west to north-east and includes Pees with its vicinity in the south. 
It also  includes several 'new socialist' towns,  as  Ajka, !nota, Varpalota, Dorog, Dunau-
jvaros,  Labatlan,  Ozd,  and Szazhalombatta and big cities  as  Budapest and Miskolc.  In 
1990 twelve cities from this region declared themselves as the dirtiest ones in the country. 
They aim at developing a programme to improve their disastrous environmental quality. 
Unfortunately, such initiatives have proved to be rather ineffective due to the economic 
recession which is very deep in these regions. The other hot spot areas are linked to the 
high  level  of  hydrocarbon  and  lead  concentrations  along  busy  roads,  particularly  in 
Budapest. 
Table 49. Pollution levels in Central Europe in 1991 
Dust 
kg/1000$ 
The Czech Republica  30 
Hungary  4 
Poland  11 
Slovakia  a  21 
The European Community  0.8 
a  Gross Material Product (which is  typically lower than GDP). 
b Only the Federal Republic of Germany, 1987. 
SOz 
per unit of G D P 
kg/1000$ 
50 
29 
24 
41 
3 
Untreated sewag 
m 3!1000$ 
13 
14 
55 
0.8b 
There is  no question about the generally declining pollution levels since the late 1980s. 
In  Poland,  they  decreased  by  more  than  30%  between  1988  and  1992.  Likewise,  in 
Slovakia particulate matter emissions decreased by 43%, S02 emissions -by  38%. Some 
other pollutants  (e.g.  carbon  monoxide)  started  to  decline  after  1989,  yet  other (e.g. 
nitrogen  oxides  and hydrocarbons)  - after  1990.  In the  Czech  Republic,  a moderate 
decline  in  particulate  matter emissions  has  continued  since  1980  but the process was 
intensified  after  1989.  Between  1989  and  1991  emissions  of particulates  decreased  by 
12%,  S02  - by  11%,  and  nitrogen oxides  by  20%.  In Hungary,  the emission of par-
ticulate matter declined by 42%, S02 by 34% and NOx by 17% between 1988 and 1991. 
It should be observed that as a rule, these rates are higher than the decline in GDP, and 
thus  cannot  be  seen  merely  as  a  result  of  lower  production.  Consequently,  this 
- 118-downward-sloping trend is  likely to be sustained also at the time of economic recovery 
now under way.  Of course, the question remains about the pace of this process. 
The most striking feature of the last period is  the increase in the share of expenditures 
aimed at air protection.  This  share  almost  quadrupled in  Slovakia  between  1988  and 
1991,  doubled in  Poland,  and more than doubled in Hungary between 1988  and 1992. 
Three factors may influence this pattern. First, water protection programmes - as those 
which typically do not require a very high level of technological sophistication  - have 
been implemented since long ago  and as  a result, towards the end of the 1980s, water 
quality could be considered not as bad as the air quality. Second, transboundary air-borne 
pollutants attracted much more international attention than the water-borne ones. Third, 
CE governments might have recognized that public health is  at greater risk because of 
the air pollution exposure than because of the water pollution one. 
A declining trend in the Hungarian environmental investment until 1991  was  the com-
bined effect of inflation and of an approximately constant nominal level of expenditures. 
The  latter  can  be  interpreted  as  resulting  from  the  lack  of any  new  regulation  to 
stimulate more abatement effort. 
Although  the  environmental problems  in  Central Europe are enormous,  they  are  not 
irreparable and hopeless. Further, certain regions of Central Europe still enjoy a  high 
degree of ecological soundness and biodiversity. 
In Poland about 8.5% of the area of the country remains relatively unscathed by develop-
ment.  Forests and farms  operating within  sustainable and ecologically acceptable prin-
ciples  include  about  19%  of the  Polish  territory.  Hence,  over  a  fourth  of Poland 
represents an asset that many areas of Europe no longer have. Poland's biological diver-
sity is high, particularly with respect to forest and bog communities. In the last 400 years, 
the Polish vertebrate fauna has lost 15 species (2.5% ), including 3 mammals, 11 birds and 
1 fish  species. At the same time, the Polish flora has lost 31  species of vascular plants. 
Sad as  they are, these figures, however, turn out to be much less alarming than in other. 
more developed, European countries in the same biogeographical zone. 
The ecological value of Poland's natural capital has been internationally recognized. All 
of its 17 national parks are on the IUCN list, as they meet all the criteria for this highest 
degree of protection. Three of them have been included by  UNESCO in a network of 
biosphere  reserves  representing  typical,  well  preserved  examples  of  the  world's 
ecosystems.  One of them - the Bialowiez"a  National Park (whose natural extension in 
Byelorussia has also enjoyed the status of a national park) has been declared an object 
of exceptional importance to the World Heritage, as the last remaining area of charac-
teristic  Central European lowland  primeval  forest.  Also  a  number of smaller  objects, 
'nature reserves',  were  found  to  be of international importance,  some  of them being 
protected under the Ramsar Convention on wetland ecosystems. 
All three of the Czech national parks are, in fact, international ones as their management 
is  coordinated with  the corresponding units  across  the country's boundary:  Krkonosze 
with Poland, Sumava with Germany, and Podyji with Austria. Two  of the 27  landscape 
parks  - Trebonsko and Krivoklatsko  - have been included in  the UNESCO network 
of biosphere  reserves.  At least ten others can be considered as  areas of international 
importance because of their flora and geology. 
Slovakia is particularly abundant with areas of unique ecological value enjoying· the status 
of protected sites. Its 5 national parks cover almost 5% of the country's area. In addition, 
16  protected  landscape  zones  were  established  on  the  13%  of the  area.  These  two 
- 119-categories together with  their buffering zones comprise as  much as  27%  of the Slovak 
territory. There is also a large number of smaller sites under protection. More than 90% 
protected areas represent mountain ecosystems. 5 sites are registered under the Ramsar 
Convention. Several others are planned to be included in  the World Heritage list. 
Hungary also  has  a number of ecologically valuable  areas of international importance. 
As  many  as  13  sites  are  protected  under the  Ramsar  Convention.  There  are  also  5 
objects listed as biosphere reserves. One of these, Ferto Lake, is planned to become an 
international park (with Austria). 
Quite paradoxically, the natural capital which survived several decades of the communist 
mismanagement  is  now  under the serious  threat of a  new  sort of development.  Even 
though the logic of market economies is  likely to lead to a more efficient resource use, 
at the same time, it exposes these resources to new pressures resulting from their open-
ing  up  to  large  scale  international tourism  and international real  estate markets.  The 
Sumava National Park is  reported to experience the tourism pressure which  increased 
rapidly after the collapse of the previous political system. Similar problems are observed 
in many areas of western and northern Poland, which attract the German tourists most. 
Immense as they are, environmental problems in Central Europe are neither unique nor 
irreparable. The awareness of this fact is by far not universal, but the Central European 
countries have  indeed good prospects to recover from  the current predicament which 
very much resembles that of Western Europe and the United States in the 1960s.  It is 
not unrealistic to expect that they will be able to eliminate most of severe environmental 
risks for human health by  the end of the decade. At the same time, it is unlikely that 
they will  succeed in decontaminating all of the 'hot spots', as some of them - sealed 
off from  the public  - will  have to wait for immediate risks to be addressed first and 
for recultivation technologies to become realistically available. 
To  a  large  extent,  Central  Europe  can  replicate  the  OECD  experience,  where  the 
recovery was accomplished after two decades of steady investing in abatement equipment 
and structural adjustments following environmental regulation and growing energy prices. 
This process, however, can be either accelerated by well-conceived integrated economic 
and  environmental  policies  or delayed  if  economic  reforms  drag  and  environmental 
requirements  are  perceived  as  constraints  on  the  continued growth  of old  industries. 
Thus the success of the environmental recovery process crucially depends on the success 
of economic reforms. 
5.3.3.  Economic restructuring and the labour market 
Changes on the labour markets have become one of the most strongly pronounced effect 
of economic transformation in Central Europe. They can be treated, to some extent, as 
an  indicator of the transformation processes, since  the numbers and types of lost and 
newly created jobs precisely reflects more general economic processes. 
This  is  true  for  both  sides  of  the  transformation  processes.  The  overall  recession 
manifested itself with different strength in particular economic sectors - those hit most 
severely lost  the greatest number of jobs. In result,  the regions in which  these sectors 
used to play dominant role, noted greatest redundancies and were struck by unemploy-
ment problems. Some sectors which experienced recovery or have gone through a milder 
recession were able to defend their jobs. 
- 120-In three countries:  Hungary,  Poland  and Slovakia  unemployment became one of the 
most pronounced outcome of transformation. In the Czech Republic this phenomenon 
virtually does not exist yet, since the restructuring process has been delayed in this coun-
try due to adopted strategy of economic transformation. To some extent the 'Czech pat-
tern'  may  be  applied  to  Polish  Upper Silesia,  where,  due  to  socio-political  reasons, 
restructuring has been delayed and unemployment did not manifest itself in  the same 
strength as  if it  had happened in  case  of restructuring similar to other industries and 
regions. 
Figure 22 presents the regional distribution of unemployment in  the four countries. 
There have been different reasons for  emergence of massive unemployment in Central 
Europe. Losing the 'rouble markets' of the former COMECON countries was one of the 
most important, especially in case of one-company towns.  This was  the case  of South-
Eastern Poland, North-Western Hungary, eastern part of the Eastern Bohemia region in 
the Czech Republic). Restructuring of industry which lost competition with more effec-
tive  Western  supplies  was  another  reason  for  the  collapse  of several  manufacturing 
industries,  sometimes advanced technologically.  Restructuring of agriculture  is  another 
cause of unemployment. Since it occurs in predominantly rural areas which do not offer 
other job opportunities, this factor causes the most grave structural unemployment. 
It is  commonly accepted that unemployment in the Czech Republic is  an almost certain 
future phenomenon. At the moment only in  the North Moravia region unemployment 
(in the entire region approaching 5%) is considered as a serious problem (caused by dif-
ficulties  of  textile  and  electric  industries).  The  situation  in  this  region  may  worsen 
dramatically, due to expected restructuring of heavy industries concentrated there (met-
allurgy,  coal mining, heavy engineering, located in Ostrava, Karvina and Fcydek-Mistek 
districts,  though  the  spin-offs  of  the  envisaged  restructuring  may  also  strike  the 
neighbouring districts of Novj Icin and Opava). East to this region the rural, low popula-
tion density districts of Sumperk and Bruntal districts may also  develop massive unem-
ployment along the marketing and sales problems of textile industry. Unemployment may 
also rise in the nearby V  setin district due to choked electrical industry. 
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Figure 22. Unemployment rates in  regions of Central Europe, 1992. 
Also  in  the  Northern Bohemia unemployment  problem  is  around  the  corner,  due  to 
approaching restructuring of its main industries: coal mining (though more efficient than 
in Ostrava), chemical, engineering. There are also several other districts with unemploy-
ment problems, scattered around the country, like the Pribram district south of Prague, 
the site of uranium mining and processing and the town of Kladno, where the steel plant 
is  at the edge of collapsing. Restructuring of agriculture may hit in the future the South 
Bohemia region. 
In Hungary a clear division into three parts of the country can be seen: Budapest, with 
the  lowest  rates  of unemployment  (  ca  5%  );  the western  part, with  unemployment  of 
around 10% and the east, where the rate may exceed 20%. Such a distribution of unem-
ployment follows the reactions of particular regional economies to the restructuring pro-
cesses.  Problems  of the mining  and metallurgy  sectors  are concentrated in  the  North 
(Borsod-Abuj-Zemplen county),  centre  (near Szekesfehervan,  south-west of Budapest) 
and it is  expected in the South near Pees. The collapse of socialised agriculture was the 
main factor of job losses in the backward East. 
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this loss  amounted to some 15%  of the number of working in  1989 due to the collapse 
of state farms.  Unemployment rates exceed 20%  there. The South-East of the country, 
the concentration of the company-towns with industries oriented previously to the Soviet 
markets created severe unemployment in this part of the country. Big urban centres, like 
Warsaw, Poznan, Krakow and Gdansk, due to their diversified economic structures, could 
defend their labour markets from  massive  unemployment.  This was  not the  case with 
L6dz,  where  collapse  of textile  industry  cause  unemployment reaching  18%.  Also  the 
south-western region of Walbrzych  is  the typical  example of old industrial region  (coal 
mining and textiles) where unemployment is  one of the highest in the country. 
In Slovakia the industrial restructuring seems to be deepest and the most painful among 
the  four  countries,  thus  leading  to  the  mostly  pronounced  difficulties  on  the  labour 
market.  A  pattern  of  'internal  colonisation'  which  was  adopted  within  the  former 
Czechoslovakia left now the Slovak part with heavy and military industries (especially in 
Central Slovakia) which do not find demand for their products. In several districts unem-
ployment rates exceed 20%.  This  is  the case of the belt of the most peripheral, border 
regions of the southern and eastern part of country,  though high  unemployment exists 
also in some northern districts (in this last case losing the jobs in Northern Moravia~ now 
the part of the Czech Republic,  added to the difficulties on the local  labour markets). 
Only Bratislava and Kosice can defend their labour markets, though expected problems 
with  Iron Works in Kosice  may worsen this situation soon. 
In all four countries some part of jobs lost in the state-owned sectors was  regained due 
to the development of the private sector. The development of privately-owned firms was 
not evenly distributed regionally.  In all four countries the biggest urban centres concen-
trated the fastest development of the private sector, mostly in trade, business services and 
manufacturing. In the eastern parts privatisation was much slower. Agriculture seems to 
be the economic sector mostly resistant to privatisation, which adds to the problems of 
local and regional labour markets of peripheral, agricultural regions in  all  countries. 
There are  three major  dimensions  of the  regional  profiles  of the educational  level  of 
labour force  (see fig.  23). 
the 'big city'  dimension, 
-the rural dimension, 
the industrial dimension. 
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Figure 23.  Per cent with university-level education in economically active,  1882. 
All big  towns  of the four countries fall  into the first  group. These regions are charac-
terised by high shares of labour force with university and secondary levels of education 
and relatively low levels the workers with semi-secondary vocational training. The shares 
of university  graduates  in  population  aged  over  25  years  in  Warsaw  and  in  Prague 
approaches  20%  and in  Budapest it  exceeds  20%  (47%  of all  Hungarian college  and 
university graduates work in the capital). 
In rural, peripheral regions this share may be as small as 4% (in Polish and Slovak east-
ern regions).  In Hungary the lowest rates of university education do not fall  below 9% 
and in the Czech Republic below 6%. 
The educational level of the labour force  in industrial centres is,  on average,  not low. 
However, the educational structure has been subordinated to the requirements of (mostly 
heavy and mining) industry. In result, in such regions the university education is  biased 
toward engineering and the semi-skilled workers constitute the main group of the labour 
force. General secondary schooling and humanities are strongly underrepresented, which 
hampers the possibilities for economic and social restructuring of such regions. 
Statistical data prove for Poland that there is a negative relationship between chances of 
being unemployed and the educational level.  Only 2.4% of unemployed have university 
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situation does also exist in other Central European countries. 
The future situation of the regional labour markets in Central European countries will 
be  both  the  factor  and  result  of restructuring and transformation.  The  polarisation 
effect will be clearly pronounced during the next decade. The big urban centres, already 
presenting  the  highest  educational  level  of the labour force,  will  tend  to  offer  more 
educational opportunities. The backward rural areas will be left behind and thus their 
development opportunities will  be further hampered. 
5.3.4.  Science and higher education centres 
Central  European  cities  have  rich  and  long  cultural  and  educational  traditions.  The 
Prague, Krakow and Pees universities, all dating from the second half of the 15th century, 
are among the oldest in Europe. All four nations contributed their representatives to the 
world heritage of science and arts. 
The regional differentiation of the scientific and academic potential is mostly pronounced 
in Hungary. Budapest hosts 70% of all employed in Hungarian R&D, 44% of university 
and college students, 70% of all PCs working in the country. 41  academic establishments 
operate  in  Budapest.  It provides  more  than half of Hungarian patents  (two-thirds  of 
those  registered abroad).  Other academic centres in  Hungary  are of relatively  smaller 
importance  (for  example  only  one spatially spread institute  - the Centre for  Regional 
Studies - has its  headquarters outside Budapest, in Pees). 
Warsaw  has  26  schools  of the  university  level  (out of 127  existing  in  Poland)  where 
almost 70,000  take their classes.  Out of 7,500  professors working in  Polish universities 
and equivalent schools, 20% of them work in Warsaw 18% of all Polish students conduct 
their studies in Warsaw. All university-level schools operating in Warsaw are placed high 
in  all  rankings  of Polish  establishments of university education.  One-third of all  newly 
nominated professors, habilitated doctors and doctors work in Warsaw. Warsaw hosts all 
decision-making bodies responsible for Polish science and academic life. It is the location 
of the headquarters of the Polish Academy of Sciences and vast majority of its commit-
tees.  In Warsaw  there are also located many institutes subordinated to particular mini-
stries.  Other main  Polish  academic  are  the  following:  Krakow  (50,000  students,  9,300 
employed  in  science),  Wroclaw  (36,000  and  5,200,  respectively),  Poznan  (35,000  and 
6,200),  Katowice  (32, 700  and 12, 700)  and L6dz,  Lublin,  Gdansk, Szczecin. 
Prague hosts 5 out of 13  Czech  academic institutions and most institutes of the Czech 
Academy  of  Sciences.  Universities  are  also  located  Brno  (3  universities,  several 
institutes),  Plzen  (one  university,  few  institutes),  Ceske  Budejovice  (one  college,  few 
institutes),  Usti nad Labem  (one college,  few  institutes of applied research),  Olomunc 
(one  university  with  tradition),  Ostrava  (2  universities,  several  institutes  of  applied 
research). 
In Slovakia over 55,000  students take their classes  in  14  universities  and high  schools 
operate in  10  locations.  Obviously,  Bratislava with  its  5 universities  and 24  faculties,  is 
national leader, hosting half of all  Slovak students. Kosice  come second with 3 univer-
sities  and  almost  10,000  students.  Nitra is  the lat centres to accommodate  two  univer-
sities, with over 5,000 students. 
- 125-For the overall spatial pattern of academic centres in Central Europe see figure 24. The 
position of the traditional academic and scientific centres will not deteriorate also in the 
future.  This  strong  position  is  also  manifested  in  international  contacts  of the  most 
renowned academic establishments of Central Europe. It can be expected that the growth 
of outlays  directed to higher education and science will  be located in  the already best 
and biggest centres,  since  they do  offer best promises of using  these resources in  the 
most  efficient way.  However,  the increase  of outlays  spent on primary and secondary 
education should  lead  to  more  even  regional  distribution  of basic  educational oppor-
tunities and evening of the quality of teaching. 
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Figure 24.  University centres in Central Europe. 
Emergence of professional training and retraining services will be the most pronounced 
phenomenon in  the educational systems  of the four countries. It can be expected that 
the old,  industrial regions will  be the targets of these activities,  since they need diver-
sification of skills more than improvement of basic qualifications. 
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The Cental European economies used to have  two  important features:  these were the 
economies mainly oriented to the Eastern and Central European markets and these were 
the closed economies. Both these factors changed dramatically in 1989-1990. The impact 
of shifting the commercial contacts from the East to the West has been already covered 
in this report. The role of opening the Central European countries to the world and the 
changes in their neighbours will play and important role for regional development, too. 
The western and eastern borders of the four countries separate territorial systems  on 
dramatically  different  levels  of development  and  civilisational  advancement.  Eastern 
parts of Germany already to-day are much more developed than neighbouring Polish and 
Czech regions and this difference will grow in time along with proceeding levelling out 
the  intra-German  discrepancies.  The same  applies  to Austria  and  western  regions  of 
Hungary and southern regions of the Czech Republic and south-western of Slovakia. By 
the  same  manner,  Polish,  Slovak  and  Hungarian  eastern  regions  - even  taking  into 
account  their  relative  underdevelopment  - are  much  more  advanced  and  better 
equipped with infrastructure than their neighbours in the East. To  some extent a more 
balanced situation exists between Hungary and Rumania and Slovenia. 
The consequences of these two  imbalances will  create unequal chance for  the eastern 
and western border regions of the four countries. 
It can be prospected that the negative impact of isolation of the western border regions 
will be overcome in effect of collaboration with the more developed western neighbours. 
The sole geographical location of the 'western belt' may create its greatest potential. This 
is region located centrally in Europe and the closest to the Western centres of economic 
activity.  It is  also  the  natural  'border market'  for  Austrians  and  Germans, who  take 
advantage of price difference and increase the demand for basic commodities and serv-
ices. It is  estimated, for example, that the German buyers leave some 4 bln DM yearly 
in western Polish regions, similarly, since several years the Austrians have taken advan-
tage of cheaper goods and especially services in Hungary. This might also the chance for 
the  citizens  of  Central  Europe,  who  seek  products  more  advanced  technically,  still 
cheaper in  Germany. 
Moreover, this is the region which has transport advantages for investors from Germany 
who  seek  cheaper  labour  and  financial  incentives  for  their  production.  The  greatest 
agglomeration in Central Europe - Berlin - is just 70 kms from the Polish border and 
its positive (in economic terms) influence can be already noticed in  the form of invest-
ment and other commercial contacts. The same applies to Bratislava and to the western 
regions of Hungary and the Czech Republic. The Western border belts of Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Poland have already attracted attention of foreign (mostly German) 
investors and in  several respects manifests its capabilities in  the new economic system. 
Such  a  development  of manufacturing  and service  sectors  may  give  jobs  to  currently 
unemployed. The proximity of the German market will,  no doubt, be a positive factor. 
Finally,  mutual  proximity  encourages  common  programmes  and  projects,  institution-
building  (like  the  international  university  in  Frankfurt/am  Oder-Slubice,  the  Central 
European University in Prague and Budapest etc.). All parties may thus gain from multi-
cultural contacts through a relatively open frontier. 
However, further transfrontier cooperation in a situation of deep asymmetry of economic 
potentials may create both chances and dangers for the relatively less developed (in com-
parison with their neighbours) western border regions of Central Europe. The scenario 
- 127-of exploitation  cannot  be  ruled  out.  This  exploitation  may  assume  the form  of using 
cheaper labour force for processing and manufacturing products sold under the German 
or Austrian name; in  massive inflow of German capital, which could lead to moving the 
decision-making centres outside the country and even lead to political repercussions; in 
the process of deepening already existing  asymmetry on the two  sides  of the  common 
border; finally, the danger of incorporating Polish and Czech western border regions into 
the economic system of German - as the most distant periphery of this system - cannot 
be totally neglected. 
The  border  regions  on  the  East  are  in  a  totally  different  position.  The  asymmetry 
between the  areas located on the two  sides  of the frontier has  the opposite direction: 
Polish,  Hungarian  and  Slovak  territories,  as  backward  as  they  are,  are  still  better 
developed  than  the  regions  of Ukraine,  Byelorussia  and  Lithuania.  However,  the  low 
level of development does not allow for too great optimism in projecting their future. 
In general, the Eastern Wall always used to be the most backward part of the three coun-
tries. One may say, however, that the location factor - at least as it appears now - puts 
the Eastern territories in worse conditions than other parts of these three countries. 
Until  now,  the  transformation  process  had  more  negative  than  positive  sides  for  the 
entire Eastern Wall.  Privatisation processes were  slow  and  - in  general  - limited to 
trade. Involvement of foreign capital was  minimal (see next section). The rate of unem-
ployment outside agriculture  and in  some  parts of the region  also  the average  rate of 
unemployment are higher than the national averages and job opportunities are low. The 
broken ties with the former Soviet market and shrinking demand of the military complex 
by far are the most important causes of this especially deep recession. According to any 
analyses, there are no greater chances that the commercial cooperation with the East will 
ever come back to its previous shape. The Easter Wall  must therefore seek other ways 
of revitalising its economy. 
The  proximity  of the border could  be  considered  as  one of the  development  factors. 
However, until now this influence is relatively weak and consists, mostly, on the develop-
ment of the 'grey' economy. Poland and Hungary are the attractive markets for the small 
businessmen from the former Soviet republics. These countries also offer better employ-
ment chances and living standard than the homeland. To some extent this inflow of cheap 
goods may jeopardise local manufacturing and local labour markets. 
However,  this proceeder may have  some  positive  multiplier effects on the economy of 
the eastern border regions  of the three countries. Local consumers save  on their basic 
spendings. Several small businesses make their living on this illegal or semi-legal trade. 
Some services emerge oriented towards the visitors from the East. Primary accumulation 
of capital  may  be  the  result  of theses  operations,  which  may  be  important for  these 
relatively poor regions. 
The cultural dimension of exchange of people, ideas and information is of even greater 
importance than on the western borders of Central Europe. Hostilities, which have their 
roots  in  history,  have  had  smaller  chances  to  be  eliminated,  since  the  'frontiers  of 
friendships'  between  the  former  socialist  countries  (especially  these  with  the  former 
Soviet Union) were  the most sealed ones.  New  contacts may  thus  allow  better mutual 
learning of national and regional cultures, in this way introducing the spirit of coopera-
tion and true friendship. 
In any case, it has to be openly stated that Hungarian, Polish and Slovak eastern border 
regions do have  much smaller chances of economic and cultural advancement than the 
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the  East  on  much  more  difficult  grounds.  In  the  horizon  of next  10-15  years  (and 
presumably  even  longer)  the  Central  European  Eastern  Wall  will  still  be  the  least 
developed part of the three countries, no matter what kind of regional or other policies 
will be formulated and implemented. 
The  same  applies  also  to  the  eastern regions  of the  Czech  Republic,  for  which  their 
Slovak  neighbours  do  not create  many  opportunities  and  chances  for  gains  stemming 
from  trans-border cooperation. Similar pattern may  also  be found  in  the south-eastern 
regions of Hungary, neighbouring Rumania. 
Mutual cooperation of the Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian regions is an open ques-
tion.  Until now,  after 1989 more problems have emerged than were solved. The chance 
of the  most  promising  cases  for  cooperation,  like  the  Polish-Czech  town  of Cieszyn 
divided by the national border, have been utilised on a much lower level than it happen 
in another similar town:  Slubice/Frankfurt am Oder, divided by the Polish-German bor-
der. The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case (the dam on the Danube, which is strongly favoured 
by  the Slovaks and strongly opposed by the Hungarians) should not become the model 
of trans-border relation for  the Central European border regions. 
5.3.6.  Foreign investment 
It is  obvious that there is  deep regional differentiation of foreign investment in  Central 
Europe. Two  types of regions are highly preferred by  investors: big  urban centres with 
good international (air) transport and telecommunication facilities, which - at the same 
time  - may  offer  good  living  conditions  and  the  regions  bordering  Germany  and 
Austria. International capital locates itself in the urban centres, the German capital con-
centrates  in  the  Western  part of Poland  and  the  Czech  Republic.  Relations between 
Austria and western part of Hungary have  had already long tradition. 
The eastern parts of the four countries, to a large extent, have been omitted by foreign 
capital. Hungary may be the sole exception of this rule, though much more was invested 
in Budapest and in  the west than in  the eastern part of this country. 
The regional differentiation of the involvement of foreign  capital in  Central Europe is 
presented on fig.  25. 
Spatial distribution of enterprises with foreign capital share over the territory of the for-
mer  Czecho-Slovakia  (the  data  available  come  from  1991-1992)  features  certain 
regularity.  In  Czecho-Slovakia  one  could  notice  a  very  distinct  division  between  two 
federal republics. At the end of 1991  80% of enterprises with a share of foreign capital 
were  located  within  the  Czech  republic.  Similarly,  the  volume  of  capital  was  very 
unevenly distributed, namely 74.3% of total capital was  located in the Czech Republic, 
while only 25.7% - in Slovakia. The data for 1992 indicated that these differences grew: 
92.3% of the total foreign  capital invested in  Czecho-Slovakia in  this year was  located 
in Bohemia, and only 7.7%  - in Slovakia.  In Slovakia a greater number of enterprises 
with foreign capital was  concentrated only in Bratislava, this fact being caused by more 
difficult conditions encountered by foreign investors in this republic. Majority of German 
capital is  concentrated in three regions:  in Central Bohemia (most of it), in Prague and 
in Bratislava. It also seems interesting to note that at the beginning of 1992 German capi-
tal constituted 92.1% of foreign  capital invested in Central Bohemia, 44.1% in Prague 
and 66.1% in  Bratislava. 
- 129-In Hungary the enterprises with foreign capital are present in all regions and the spatial 
distribution of these enterprises in Hungary is  the most homogeneous of all four coun-
tries.  The greatest number of enterprises with  foreign  capital and the greatest foreign 
capital value  could  be  observed  in  Budapest  and  in  Pees.  Budapest concentrates  the 
highest volume of foreign capital among all administrative units in Central Europe. Fejer 
and  Borsod-Abuj-Zemplen  also  attract foreign  investment.  The  least value  of foreign 
capital was  invested in  Tolna, Reves, Nognid and Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok districts. 
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Figure 25.  Foreign capital invested in  regions of Central Europe. 
In Poland foreign firms were established as  early as in 1977 in six provinces of Poland, 
i.e.  in Warsaw, Siedlce, Bielsko-Biala, Krakow, Czestochowa and Walbrzych voivodships. 
With time, more and more firms with foreign capital were installing themselves in large 
voivodship  centres. This process continues until today.  The greatest numbers of enter-
prises  with  foreign  capital  are  located  in  Warsaw  and,  generally  speaking,  in  the 
voivodships of Western and North-western Poland. Among these voivodships we  should 
especially  mention  L6dz,  Gdansk,  Szczecin,  Poznan,  Wroclaw,  Katowice  and  Krakow 
voivodships.  The Western Belt attracts attention of German capital. 
Recently there has been a visible growth of the numbers of joint venture companies in 
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however, still a group of voivodships in which the number of economic undertakings with 
a  share  of foreign  investments  is  minimal.  These  are  the  eastern  regions:  Ostrolt;ka, 
Lomza,  Tarnobrzeg,  Zamosc, Przemysl and Krosno. 
A comparison among Budapest, Prague and Warsaw with respect to the number of enter-
prises and the volume of foreign capital involved is  presented in  table 50. 
Table 50.  Capitals as  centres of location of foreign capital 
Capitals  Number of  firms with foreign capital in  Total foreign  capital in a given country 
a given  country  =  100%  =100% 
Budapest  31.12.1991  31.12.1991 
56.0%  57.5% 
31.12.1991 
Prague  5.10.1991  45.4% 
49.0%  (without firms  with  100% foreign 
share) 
31.12.1991  5.10.1991 
Warsaw  39.4%  32.6%  (declared capital) 
As it can be seen, among the capitals of the three states considered it is  Budapest that 
concentrates to the highest degree the firms with foreign capital and the volume of capi-
tal itself.  The relatively lower concentration of foreign investments in Warsaw is  due to 
existence  in  Poland  of other large  agglomerations, where  investors locate  their under-
takings equally willingly. 
For all  countries the inflow of foreign capital is  regarded as  one of the most important 
factor of transformation and development.  Even in  a greater extent this is  true for  the 
regional economies.  It should not be  expected  that the already established locational 
patterns of foreign investment in Central Europe should change dramatically in the near 
future. The eastern, backward regions will offer much less location advantages than bet-
ter developed core and capital cities. In this way  the foreign  capital will  become addi-
tional factor of regional polarisation in Central Europe. 
5.3. 7.  Transport ties with Europe 
Transport connections establish the 'spatial skeleton' of a given economic system. Trans-
port infrastructure lines create a king  of a web,  constructed on the main nodes  - the 
urban centres which concentrate economic, political and cultural activities. These nodes 
and the areas adjacent to  the main connecting lines have  the greatest chances for con-
stant and fast development. 
New international setting creates also new challenges for particular regions of the Central 
European countries and  - especially  - for their major communication and transport 
lines. 
Mutual  economic  relations  between  these  countries  decreased  considerably.  In  1992 
Czecho-Slovakia  participated  in  4-5%  and  Hungary  in  less  that  1%  of Polish  foreign 
trade.  Poland's  exports  to  Czecho-Slovakia  declined  by  less  then  20  per cent,  and  to 
Hungary by about one-third. Moreover, the structure of Polish exports to the other three 
Central  European  countries  deteriorated  towards  growth  of  share  of  unprocessed 
products (raw materials), at the expense of machinery and manufactured good. All four 
- 131-countries  turned  to  the  West  and  the  importance  of the  Eastern  markets  declined 
sharply. It may be expected that this is  a temporary decline and that mutual cooperation 
will redevelop on new principles and with different structure. On the other hand, possible 
future development of trade between the West and the reformed former Soviet republics 
makes the Vise  grad group an important transitory territory on the East-West connection. 
In this light, the East-West transportation connections seem to gain in importance, which 
will  call  for  accelerated  development  of modern transport infrastructure,  especially of 
roads and fast train. 
Central European countries have relatively well  developed rail connections and poorer 
roads. However, even the rails need modernisation and improvement of speed and safety 
standards. The same applies to loading/unloading facilities  of the main rail harbours. 
The prospected changes in the transportation networks will be subordinated to two main 
principles: incorporation of Central Europe into wider European network and improve-
ment of quality. Highways and fast trains are the most important developments, already 
planned in all four countries (see fig.  26).  Construction of highways from Nurenberg to 
Prague and  extending the German motorway from  Berlin to Warsaw is  of the highest 
priority.  Moreover,  in  Hungary  the  pattern  of  subordination  of  the  transportation 
network  to Budapest is  considered  as  the  main  task of developing  national  transport 
infrastructure. 
The border crossing are one of the most severe barriers in further development of inter-
national contacts, both in commodity and passenger transport. 
The international airports in Prague, Budapest and Warsaw should be considered as most 
important  gateways  to  Central  Europe  and  transit  points  further  to  the  East.  Their 
current standard seems to suffice the demand during next ten years, though a construc-
tion of a new passenger and cargo airport north of Warsaw should be undertaken. No 
other airports may compete with these three (Bratislava will retain its national character). 
The border crossings  are  one part only  of the entire system  of international flows  of 
people  and  goods  entering,  leaving  or crossing  the  country.  These  flows  concentrate 
within the corridors, in which roads, railways  and waterways are located. 
The main corridors are, in fact, concentrated in the already mentioned 'core of Central 
Europe'. This phenomenon will reinforce the polarisation effect in regional development 
of the four countries. The general spatial pattern of Central Europe will be strengthened 
by  the planned network of transport corridors, since the multiplier effects  induced by 
flows  of goods and people along these corridors will be concentrated in these particular 
areas. 
5.3.8.  The regional patterns of transformation: Summary 
The general regional picture of the outcomes of the first stage of transformation in Cen-
tral Europe is  pretty clear. The regions which  have  traditionally been mostly urbanised 
and  mostly  industrialised  and  which  have  been  well  equipped  with  infrastructure 
appeared to be the less vulnerable to the costs and negative sides of transformation. They 
were able to proceed with privatisation in the fastest pace, to attract new (also foreign) 
investment, to defend their position on the (changing) economic map of the country. In 
result,  the  traditional  industrial-urban-infrastructural  complex,  which  has  shaped  the 
regional structure of Central Europe has not vanished and even has been reinforced, also 
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services and also  by  the 'grey economy'. 
The strong became stronger, the weak are weaker. The polarisation effects, so visible in 
recent changes  of economic and social  structures,  also  manifest themselves  in  Central 
European space.  It is  almost  sure  that the growth  of spatial differences will  also  take 
place  in  the  future,  since  particular regions  have  developed  - in  the  course  of their 
history  - differentiated potential for  transformation and  adaptation to  new  economic 
conditions.  Only some regions of Central Europe will  take advantage of new economic 
mechanism and internationalisation of their societies and economies. For several others 
these new conditions lead to decline of their regional economies and create difficulties 
they will  not be able to overcome during the coming decade. 
5.4.  The regional potential for transformation, 1990-2005 
Summing up earlier remarks on economic,  social  and technological aspects of regional 
development of Central European countries, we may present the regional diversification 
of their transformation along the following  major dimensions of spatial differentiation, 
shaping the regions' ability to adapt to  new economic conditions: 
1.  Diversification of economic structure. This dimension includes also the level and dif-
ferentiation of skills of the workforce, the modernity of the fixed  assets. In brief, the 
more  diversified  the  economic  structure,  the  more  qualified  population  and  higher 
level of technological advancement. 
2.  Overall level of socio-economic development. This dimension 'operates' on two levels: 
it discriminates rural areas (less developed) from towns and eastern part of the coun-
tries  (less  developed) from the western parts. It also captures the 'regional spirit' of 
entrepreneurship and the scale of job opportunities. 
3.  Distance to sources of capital and innovation. Several factors are of importance here: 
proximity to an international airport, proximity to the western border (i.e. to the Ger-
man and Austrian capital), proximity to a big urban centre. 'The capital' is not restric-
ted to 'foreign capital' only,  but also to domestic sources of finance,  though the role 
of inflow  of capital from  abroad (and of new technologies)  is  of crucial importance 
for overall development of Central European economies. 
There are, of course, several other, already mentioned dimensions shaping the regional 
ability to transformation, like  the agricultural structure, the density of 'company towns' 
with  collapsing  industries, vulnerability  to  decline  of eastern markets,  ethnic tensions, 
quality of environment etc. However, when looking into the chances of particular regions 
for their emergence form (often accidental) economic difficulties and their potential role 
in transforming the Central European economies,  the above  three dimensions seem to 
be of primary importance. 
All  four  countries  have  their  unquestionable  leaders  of transformation,  which  have 
already  demonstrated  the  highest  potential  for  restructuring  and  great  capability  for 
adaptation to new conditions. These are their greatest agglomerations: Prague and Bmo 
in the Czech  Republic;  Bratislava and to  a lesser extent Kosice  in Slovakia;· Budapest 
and the Balaton region in Hungary; Warsaw, Poznan, Wroclaw, Gdansk and Krakow in 
Poland. 
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terland. Warsaw is  a kind of an island within relatively poorly developed central part of 
Poland. Krakow borders on the wet with  one of the most difficult (if not the most dif-
ficult)  regional  case  in  Europe  and  on  the  east with  Polish  south-eastern  periphery. 
Kosice  is  a relatively small urban centre in a backward Eastern Slovakia. 
On the other hand,  the space between the remaining nodes  is  filled  in  by  the regions 
which  are in fact  the core areas of all  four Central European countries. These regions 
since  centuries have  concentrated the main bulk of development and innovation.  They 
have also proved to be natural candidates to become the final winners of transformation. 
We  have  sketched  in  this  way  the  core  of Central  Europe:  'the  Central  European 
boomerang'  delimited by  the  following  centres:  Gdansk-Poznan-Wroclaw-Prague-Brno-
BratislavaNienna-Budapest. Two  southern parts of this  'boomerang' have  real chances 
to become the truly European centres: the region of Prague and the triangle composed 
of  Vienna-Bratislava-Budapest.  The  Slovak-Hungarian  part  of  this  triangle  already 
attracts important foreign capital flowing into to Central Europe and the location advan-
tages of this region have been evaluated as extremely favourable even on the whole-con-
tinental scale  (see figure  26). 
Further extension of the Prague region westwards is very probable, since the construction 
of motorways connecting Prague with Southern germany and Berlin will bring multiplier 
effects and will create favourable conditions for economic expansion. It will allow for full 
integration of Prague into the system  of European metropoles. 
Warsaw  is  located peripherally to  this core of Central Europe. However,  as  an over 2 
million agglomeration and a capital of an almost 40 million nation, it will retain its role 
a an European city of the second order. It is  quite probable that if the restructuring of 
L6dz agglomeration is successful (and there are good chances for it, since L6dZ, besides 
its industry, presents also rich potential as  an academic and medical centre) a core area 
will  be created by  these two  agglomerations. The same applies to the extension of the 
Poznan agglomeration westwards, along the international route Paris-Moscow (the exist-
ing  expressway already attracts many services and other economic activities). 
- 134-(~ 
Linz 
\.  1 
8>  2 
~ 
3  -- .....  ~  '  4  "'---' 
0  5 
6  8  -
.  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  7  9 
Figure 26.  The Central European 'BOOMERANG' - a concentration of transformation processes. 
1: present and potential Central European axes;  2: major centres of transformation; 3: cores of transformation; 4: potential 
cores of transformation; 5: centres of transformation; 6: main existing or projected highways; 7: Central European 'Eastern 
Wall';  old industrial regions;  9:  regions with tourist potential. 
The southern part of the 'Central European Boomerang' seems to be more integrated 
internally and externally with wider Europe. The northern part, from Poznan to Gdansk, 
lacks  sufficient  infrastructure  and transportation connections  (there  are no  motorways 
planned to  connect  Gdansk with  Poznan). It is  therefore very  likely  that the  present 
shape of 'the boomerang', which expresses current core of the higher level of develop-
ment  and  prospected  dynamics  of  economic  activity,  will  be  changed  and  pulled 
westwards by  the growing role of Berlin which  is very likely to son assume  the role of 
the  European  metropolis  of the  first  order  (together  with  London  and  Paris).  The 
'boomerang' will then become 'a foot', embracing Berlin and Szczecin instead of extend-
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Republic to the Baltic Sea through the Szczecin-Swinoujscie  harbour and the planned 
highway from Szczecin to Budapest might add new factors to this shape of the are with 
accelerated development. Successful integration of the former Easter Germany into the 
wide German economic-spatial system will no doubt create more favourable grounds for 
this process. 
There are two  'black holes' in the socio-economic space of Central Europe: the Silesia 
and the L6dz region. Both of them are the typical old industrial regions. 
L6di is  a  typical  'great city'  region,  which  demonstrates  all  advantages  of an  urban 
agglomeration. It concentrates well  educated labour force  and scientific  and  academic 
institutions and demonstrates mixed  performance during the transformation processes: 
total collapse of traditional textile industries, but at the same time the privatisation pro-
cesses are relatively fast,  involvement of foreign capital visible  and services developing 
rapidly. If the restructuring of industry proceeds well, L6dz has good chances for becom-
ing, however under the shadow of Warsaw, an important growth pole of Central Europe. 
Upper Silesia, composed of the Polish Katowice voivodship and the Czech Ostrava-Kar-
vina basin, constitutes the biggest regional problem in Europe. In Poland the Katowice 
region used to provide more than 20% of the national industrial production. 
Both parts of Upper Silesia (Czech and Polish) are on the edge of massive restructuring 
and dramatic increase of unemployment. Coal-mining, the most important branch in the 
regional economy, will  undergo deep structural changes. Heavy and chemical industries, 
being at the moment in decline, are the other dominating sectors of Upper Silesia and 
will  produce  massive  unemployment  in  the  nearest  future.  For  example,  the  Polish 
programme of coal mining restructuring envisaged closing down of 14-17 coal mines and 
reduction of employment in this economic sector by 170,000 people. 5 steel mills in the 
region are to be closed in the same time-horizon, which will lead to dismissal of further 
30,000 workers. Further reductions of employment will take place in factories cooperat-
ing with those which are to be liquidated. 
However, until now the true restructuring process seems to have not started yet in the 
region. Production of coal in the Polish part dropped by more than 30%, while employ-
ment in  this  branch has  declined by  less  than 15%  (together with energy production). 
Polish coal becomes more expensive than the on the world markets, but its production 
is  still relatively high. 
Upper Silesia will  be the reg'ion in sharp recession for the coming years. Once the real 
restructuring starts, several leading industries will have to note deep decline of their out-
put which would not be able to be compensated by the growth of progressive branches. 
The negative rate of growth seems to be the fate of this region for the next decade. 
The  more  postponed  the  adjustment of employment  in  the  region  will  be,  the  more 
massive reductions will  have to be made and higher social costs will be paid. 
Moreover, it is not likely that the two economies striving with recession and transforma-
tion costs will be able to solve the Silesian problem solely by themselves. The Silesia is 
the region of European importance and will have to be considered as such by the inter-
national economic community. Otherwise Europe will not get rid of the 'black' economic, 
social and ecological spot on its map. 
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corner of Poland to the south-eastern part of Hungary, with extension westwards to the 
eastern part of the Slovak-Hungarian border. These are the least developed,  relatively 
sparsely populated rural areas with  poorly  developed urban system  and infrastructure. 
These areas are crossed by main transportation routes going in the East-West direction 
and no major artery exists nor is envisaged which would connect them in the North-South 
direction. All of these regions are poorly integrated with the centres of their respective 
national systems. Transformation processes are slow there, the level of education low and 
they do not attract the attention of foreign investors (the Hungarian regions could be the 
only example). 
What is  even more important from  the prospective point of view,  these areas can not 
expect to receive inducement for transformation and recovery from  their neighbours on 
the other side of the border (Lithuania, Byelorussia, Ukraine). Even if the scenario of 
chaos and permanent recession in these post-Soviet republics is  ruled out, there are no 
serious chances that the trans-border cooperation could create any  important impulses 
for  growth  and  modernisation.  Moreover,  since  the  economic  power  of the  Central 
European Eastern Wall is  very limited,  there is  no indigenous capital which could take 
advantage of the existence of the market behind the eastern border. These opportunities, 
if taken at all, will be the benefit of the more prosperous core regions of Central Europe 
and of the West. It is therefore very likely that the Eastern Wall will become the 'dead 
end' of Central Europe. 
There are few  more regions which demonstrate promising chances for development and 
which could be more visible even in the European scale. These are the regions which are 
the European reservoirs of unspoiled environment. North-East of Poland and the entire 
border region of Poland and Slovakia do create very promising chances for becoming the 
basins for tourist services and recreation on the continental scale, providing however that 
these  functions  will  not  damage  the  purest nature  in  Europe  since  conflicts  between 
tourist services  and  environmental functions  are possible.  The shore of the Baltic Sea 
might also  have  chances for  attracting tourists. The same applies to the tourist-recrea-
tional and spa centres with long traditions, like the West Bohemia spa triangle of Karlovy 
Vary-Marianske  Lazne-Frantiskovy Lazne,  the  North-Western spa region  of Poland in 
the Walbrzych voivodship  (Polanica-Kudowa-Duszniki)  and the Balaton Lake region in 
Hungary. 
The majority  of these  areas lack sufficient tourist infrastructure,  if not in  quantitative 
terms then for sure in qualitative. Development and upgrading of this infrastructure so 
that it could meet the requirements of the more demanding customers is the crucial con-
dition for these regions if their chances are not to be missed. More intensified coopera-
tion between Poland and Slovakia seems also to become the condition for development 
of their tourist border regions. 
Besides these more general regional patterns of Central Europe, there are several cases 
of micro-regions which will pose specific developmental problems. The mostly pronoun-
ced will  be the restructuring processes of some raw-material extraction and processing 
centres.  These  are  the  regions  deeply  endangered  by  low  profitability  of production 
(uranium,  lignite,  copper,  sulphur,  heavy  metallurgy)  and  by  environmental  hazards. 
Their production will  have to decrease and this will lead to the emergence of very con-
centrated in  space social and economic depressions. 
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During the beginning of the transformation period a comprehensive regional policy has 
not been formulated in any of the Central European countries and the regional aspects 
of any social or economic policies (as weak as they are) are still almost non-existing. In 
fact,  the governments of all  four countries have  left the 'regional problems' to the so-
called 'market forces', letting the new economic maps of their countries to be reshaped 
by the sectoral processes. 
It seems  that  - at  least  in  Hungary  and  Poland  - the  employment/unemployment 
policies became the only tools of the governments which have had some spatial/regional 
dimension. However, the natural doctrine adopted by the governmental agencies respon-
sible for this policy is one-sided. It is  oriented towards 'assisting the poor and the weak' 
and  any  assistance  for  'the  good  and  the  strong'  (which  becomes  a  more  and  more 
pronounced doctrine  of modern  regional  policies)  is  not present in  activities  of these 
agencies. It therefore appears that employment policy is  the only one which uses special 
areas on which some economic instruments are used. 
There are some policies of regions. However, in all four countries the regions are weak 
and  small.  Moreover,  their competencies are limited.  Therefore the regional  develop-
ment cannot be left to the regions themselves and  the need for coordinated and com-
prehensive  regional  policy  becomes  the  necessity  of the  day  in  all  Central European 
countries. 
The most important question for those formulating the principles of regional policies in 
Central Europe is the following:  to what extent the regional policies should struggle with 
the polarisation effect, so clearly visible during the first stage of transformation? Can the 
countries needing rapid modernisation and growth (which is  a basic precondition of any 
restructuring)  spend resources on alleviating  (growing)  regional  differences,  or should 
they  concentrate  on promoting  development,  investment,  inflow  of capital,  which 
necessarily - would be concentrated only in  some regions and places? 
In this way we  come back to  the  old dilemma: equity versus  efficiency.  This choice has 
to be reexamined in the situation of dramatic challenges of the economic future of the 
four countries. The dilemma: which regions should be assisted by the state - the strong 
or the weak? is not an artificial question. It does also not seem to be an obsolete question 
in Central Europe at least, though the answers in favour of the weak had been provided 
in the West long ago. But the Central European countries - are in a markedly different 
situation.  Regional  policies  must  be congruent with  the general course  of reforms,  in 
which  the efficiency principle should play the crucial role. 
There are not too many examples of purely 'efficiency-oriented' regional policies in the 
Western countries.  In fact,  in  none of them the strong regions  are directly supported. 
Instead, the Western states focus  their attention on the regions needing assistance and 
help.  The  same  applies  to  the  regional  policies  of the  Commission  of the  European 
Union. 
The state may support the strong regions indirectly by crating favourable conditions for 
the industries which 'naturally' locate in such places. These are the strong regions which 
take care of themselves,  conducting their own  development policies  and competing on 
the world investment markets. But if this is  to be fulfilled,  the regions must be capable 
of. conducting own development policies, they must constitute an economic entity being 
able to shape their own ways  and methods of development. That is  why  the reform of 
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in creating fewer strong regional units. The question of their constitutional empowerment 
is  not  the  most  important  one.  One  may  imagine  'governmental'  regions  having  own 
budgets and conducting own development policies with a high degree of freedom, or self-
governmental regions with greater autonomy. The Central European countries have dif-
ferent traditions in  this respect and the choices should not be uniform. 
5.5.1.  For prospective regional policy 
During the entire period of transformation all proposals for regional state policies have 
been  based  on  defensive  assumptions,  oriented  towards  reacting  to  processes  and 
phenomena that already emerged (like unemployment or industrial decline). In practice 
it meant that only the so-called 'problem  regions'  or 'crisis  regions'  drew the attention of 
those formulating state regional policies. 
However, due to the acute shortage of resources these attempts have been totally unsuc-
cessful.  Moreover,  there are justified opinions that concentrating on the regions which 
have just entered the painful process of restructuring - therefore in which negative pro-
cesses  prevail  - leads  to  petrification  of old  regional  structures  and  countervails  the 
restructuring process as  such. 
Any  prospective approach to the processes that will  take  place  has  not been frequent 
enough.  Thus  the  existing  assumptions  of  regional  policies  have  not  been  directed 
towards facilitating reforming the national economy, but have been rooted in  past doc-
trines of supporting the places facing  current difficulties and problems. 
5.5.2.  For integrated regional policy 
There  is  an  urgent need  of creating  an  integrated approach  to  sectoral and regional 
aspects  of the  national  economy.  Traditionally,  both systems  (sectoral  and territorial) 
used  to  be  considered  and  'planned' separately, which  left regional  policies weak and 
ineffective,  constantly  losing  to  preferences  of  most  powerful  economic  sectors  and 
branches.  If the  Central European transformation  is  to  be  successful,  this  integration 
should become one of the main principles for  any  policies  and actions undertaken on 
economic and social scenes. 
There may be several suggestions for the regional aspects of the sectoral policies suitable 
for Central Europe. They should be oriented towards different goals in particular areas. 
The main focus  should be  laid on  the crucial problems of particular regions,  such  as 
promotion of new technologies in the greatest scientific centres, creation of new employ-
ment in regions lagging behind, reconversion of obsolete industries in the old industrial 
regions, etc. It has to become obvious to all decision-makers in these countries that no 
sectoral policy can be conducted without its regional aspects - and vice versa - any 
regional policy should be filled with concrete economic and social content. 
5.5.3.  For internationally oriented regional policies 
The geography of Europe is  changing fast.  The position of particular countries in  this 
continental division  of labour has  ceased to be stable,  as  it used to be since the World 
War Two.  The position of Central Europe has been changed dramatically, too, what was 
discussed in  this report. 
- 139-It is perhaps the only part of the strategic thinking in spatial terms which is strongly pre-
sent in  all  four countries. All  programmes for  construction of new transportation lines 
and several prospects for future development of particular regions do take into account 
the new and dynamic international environment. This line of thinking should be further 
developed. 
5.5.4.  For regionally targeted regional policies 
As already stated in  this report, there are several regions in  Central Europe which  are 
on the  edge of social,  economic and  environmental catastrophe (and in  some  respects 
this catastrophe has already taken place). These regions cannot be left to themselves. The 
states must take its  responsibility for introducing, encouraging institutionally, politically 
and financially  the programmes of regional reconstruction. 
Upper Silesia  is  the  first  on  such  a  list.  The  complexity  of its  social,  economic  and 
environmental problems (to which ethnic and cultural should also be added) far exceeds 
the potential of this region itself to solve them. This problem calls, first of all, for strong 
cooperation  between  Czech  and  Polish  governments,  but also  needs  to  be  noticed  in 
Europe. 
Regional intervention should assume the form  of long-ranging infrastructural program-
mes with focus on changing the qualifications structures of the labour force and improv-
ing  the environment. 
There should be no opposition between the efficiency orientation of regional policy and 
direct  involvement  in  some  regions.  The  regions  mentioned  above  demonstrate  high 
developmental potential which  is  deeply shadowed by the negative consequences of the 
general systemic change. It may be easily argued,  on the basis of evidence collected in 
this report, that assisting these regions in their industrial and environmental reconversion 
efforts  may  effectively  stimulate  their  potential  which  now  has  been  covered  by  the 
avalanche of collapsing industries, unemployment, social deprivation, pollution. 
The new regions will be able to create their own institutions which would supplement the 
state  policies  targeted  to  the  problem  regions.  These  institutions  will  be  particularly 
active in training and retraining activities and in creating favourable economic environ-
ment for new investments and developments. International cooperation of regions will be 
further decentralised. 
5.5.5.  For environment-sensitive policies 
Recovery programmes prepared by the Central European governments vary with respect 
to their comprehensiveness and alertness to the risk of lacking realism. Yet, it is reassur-
ing that in most cases the awareness of the value of the inherited natural capital at stake 
has  been growing.  Thus  one  can  expect  that  environmental  policy  will  become  more 
proactive  and  less  oriented  towards  technical  (ex  post)  solutions  to  specific  technical 
problems. This process cannot be taken for granted though. It depends on how profes-
sionally environmental protection will be integrated into economic policies. It cannot be 
ruled out that the decline in  pollution will  be reversed once economies firmly  take off 
while  environmental  authorities  are  still  unable  to  implement  an  effective  policy  to 
protect the environment which  does not entail excessive costs. 
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areas of government activities are those aspects which require substantial improvement. 
Marketable permit pilot projects pave the way for  a broader understanding of the need 
to minimize abatement costs. At the same time there are a number of areas where policy 
integration is  sought without any major successes  as  yet mainly because of the division 
of responsibility between various governmental bodies. 
With  stationary  (mostly  industrial  and  municipal)  sources  of  pollution  step-by-step 
brought  under  increasingly  effective  control,  the  environmental  problems  in  Central 
Europe will start to resemble those of developed market economies. The policy will have 
to  focus  on non-point sources  of air  and water pollution,  including car exhaust  gases. 
Also with living standards increased, pressure to develop undeveloped areas will increase, 
thus  intensifying  conflicts  over  land  use  and  nature  protection.  This  calls  for  a  more 
proactive approach on the part of the government to incorporate environmental concerns 
into every aspect of its policies, including agriculture, transportation, and household con-
sumption patterns. As more and more activities are affected by environmental protection 
measures, cost-effectiveness considerations need to attract more attention. 
The  importance  of a  clear  division  of environmental  responsibilities  between  various 
levels  of government,  private  sector,  and households  should be  emphasized.  Based  on 
that financial  responsibilities can be assigned  and a system  for  financing  environmental 
protection activities can be improved. 
The final  choices of the type of regional policy and the new  territorial organisation of 
the four  countries will  be  of purely political  nature  - but the obvious  fact  that the 
regional policy is a  part of politics has to  be finally acknowledged. 
This choice will also have its direct impact on the regional structure of Central Europe 
in the coming years. Not all regions will  be the winners, but these which will  be  able 
to  take full  advantage  of new  conditions  will  support the all four  countries  in  their 
efforts to transform themselves into modern states, integrated with Europe. 
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The work has been completed. Three questions may now  be asked: 
1.  How  useful  this  work  has  been,  for  whom,  and  when  its  usefulness  will  be  the 
greatest? 
2.  How good the results are? 
3.  What next? 
These questions are, obviously, mutually interdependent. Bad work can be useful only for 
our enemy, since wrong result provide incorrect information. We  are not a position of 
evaluating our job, though several deficiencies of the results have nor escaped from our 
attention. It was  too late of impossible at all to correct them all. 
Moreover, only the future may verify of falsify the validity of the programme results. Any 
prospective type of endeavour brings risks from the side of a fast changing reality. These 
risks  are especially great in such an part of the world,  as  Central and Eastern Europe, 
which still undergoes and will undergo deep changes. 
The results of the project may,  however, be regarded as  a set of statements, based on 
sound knowledge collected by  a wide  array of respective specialists from  several coun-
tries, who all  have followed  the three methodological lines: 
1.  Our studies looked into the future  and their authors tried to free  their minds from 
crying and pushing present-day reality.  The strategic perspective adopted was  there-
fore  oriented towards goals and means, it took into account the starting point, but it 
was imaginative. In this way, the entire programme 'Central and Eastern Europe 2000' 
is,  in the intension of all authors involved,  a contribution to the development of the 
art of long-term strategic thinking on and in  the Central European countries. It is 
assumed that have a strong demonstration effect creating inducements and initiatives 
in  the field of diagnostic and prognostic thinking. 
2.  The studies  embraced four  spheres of development:. economics,  socio-political  pro-
cesses, developments in science, technology and education and the regional aspects of 
all  three  sphere  mentioned  before.  We  have  attempted  to  pursue  the  holistic 
approach  in  social  sciences,  knowing  how  difficult  this  may  be.  In  this  way  these 
studies are conducted in an interdisciplinary manner, which breaks with the traditional 
'branch' oriented research and analyses. 
3.  The  studies  were  conducted  in  a  comparative  way  for  the  four  countries  treated 
equally,  researched by  their national specialists and often refereed to as  'a Region'. 
The wider  international  setting was  also  taken into  account,  where  necessary.  This 
means,  that a new  spatial entity emerged in  the field  of the European studies:  the 
Visegrad group. Our programme proves that both the very existence of this group and 
devotion  of attention for  studying  it are positive  new  element of the  post-socialist 
period. The studies are of therefore of a fully  international character, which creates 
grounds for more integrated cooperation between the economies, societies and politi-
cal elites of the four countries. 
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been made available to the international scientific community and to the public, will  be 
met with critical, but still positive reaction. It may be also hoped that the results of the 
project will add new dimensions to the methodology of studies on the post-socialist trans-
formation and will  bring new,  concrete knowledge about Central Europe. 
It may be also assumed that the conclusion of the Project is new beginning of an intellec-
tual and pragmatic process which will keep the momentum created by the decision of the 
European Union and Institute of Human Sciences to establish and to sponsor the Project 
- Central and Eastern Europe 2000. 
There are two possible ways of continuing the prospective reflection on the future of this 
part  of the  continent:  broadening  the  studies  to  embrace  other  Central  and  astern 
European countries (the post-Soviet republics, the Balkan states) or to go into depth of 
some  of the topics  touched upon in  the present project.  If the first  approach is  to  be 
applied,  the 'research pattern' is  almost ready and needs only small refinements. Such 
a project would provide a more general outlook into mutual interrelations between the 
West  - the  Centre and the East of Europe, thus covering the entire socio-economic 
European space. It would also allow foe  better integration of the research communities 
of the  Eastern and Souther European countries  to  become  more  integrated with  the 
international scientific community. 
The 'in depth' approach would be based on the experiences of the international group 
of researchers who  have  already been active  in  the current project. It would  allow  for 
providing a more detailed and precise picture of several phenomena and processes which 
could have been studied here only in  a general way.  To  limit ourselves  to  the regional 
problems only,  at least two  topics seem to be worth undertaking: 
the regions of Central Europe 2005; 
the regional and local environment for innovation in Central Europe. 
The first  proposal would  aim  at  explanation  of main  factors  of regional  dynamics  of 
transformation in  Central Europe. In particular, the regional leaders of transformation 
will  be identified,  as  well  as  regions  to which  transformation process will  pose major 
challenges. The role of international, national, regional and local factors in economic and 
socio-political restructuring will be examined. The project would result in formulation of 
the foundations for regional policies which would be performed in the Central European 
countries during their adaptation process, before they become the EC members. It  would 
also  examine possible influence of the EU enlargement on the regional policies of the 
Union. 
The identification of local and regional factors responsible for innovation and technologi-
cal progress in  Central Europe (i.e.  in four countries: the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Hungary, Poland) would be the main goal of the second project. 
In particular, the research should relate to the following issues: diagnosis of the regional 
differences in dynamics technological progress and innovation in Central Europe; iden-
tification  and  systematisation  of factors  responsible  for  creation  of the  regional/local 
environment  for  innovation  in  Central  Europe;  policy  recommendations  for  policy-
makers of the central, regional and local levels. 
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